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ABSTRACT

Although some of the most recent work in the field of
multicultural education has acknowledged and begun to
theorize about what has been called the new cultural
politics of difference, problems concerning the very,
notions of marginality, boundaries, and their accompanying
"essentialist" thought remain undertheorized. It is my
intention to bring discussions about marginality and
essentialism from literary theory, feminist psychoanalytic
theory and poststructuralist philosophy more explicitly
into the conversation about multicultural curriculum
theorizing. In this study I have attempted to further
develop this conversation around notions of "translation"
as generated by philosophers Michel Serres (1982) and John
Rajchmann (1991) as well as literary critics Alan Nadel
(1988) and Henry Louis Gates (1987), and novelist and
critic Wilson Harris (1983, 1989). These translations
expose another kind of communication across difference—
that is, across difference within (Johnson, B., 1980,
1987). I approached possibilities for this sort of
communication through the interweaving of translation,
autobiographical, and psychoanalytic theories.
Such communication theorizing, I believe, remains
insufficient without consideration of the powerful
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significance of place (Pinar, 1991). Through the literary,
sometimes explicitly autobiographical, examples of both
Black and White southern American authors as well as
African-Caribbean authors (and, sometimes, myself), I have
attempted to expose the ways in which encounters between
are constitutive of and are constituted by place.

CHAPTER ONE
Cultural Studies and the Multicultural Curriculum
For this study my interests are theoretical and
directed primarily at curriculum for teacher education. My
project is to, in part, bring what has been called
cultural studies to bear upon curriculum, and to do that
through the debates around multicultural education, the
humanities, and what constitutes "western culture". There
is a practical reason for my choice in that it is only
through the, sometimes forced, inculcation of what is
called multicultural education that is taking place in
this country that many practitioners and theorists of
curriculum are coming into some contact, however weak,
with the problematics of culture and marginality. For this
reason, although I am very critical of much of what has
been called multicultural education, I do not wish to
destroy in my arguments that place of entry. I do,
however, wish to provide a rationale for going beyond the
models and approaches to multicultural education that
currently predominate. The canon debates are debates about
culture— its definition generally and particularly
(particularly in the U.S., it's specific definition for
U.S. education). These debates impact upon decisions
around curriculum at all levels of the educational
enterprise. Teachers, administrators, and school policy

makers need to acquire the historical, philosophical, and
social theoretical insights to participate in these
debates among themselves and interested others.
The necessary insights for dealing with these
problems, I believe, are made possible for students of
teacher education through readings of literary works
authored by members of marginalized groups (both in the US
and in "third world" nations such as Caribbean nations
which have explicit historical ties to the US and to the
"West" generally), and by drawing these readings into
"conversation" with philosophy, history, social theory,
and the students themselves via reflective writings about
their own school, life, and reading experiences. Such a
conversation also fruitfully involves "canonized" literary
works viewed from the perspective of encounters between
such works and marginalized ones. Literary works of
marginalized groups can provide a passage to a shifting of
the discourse away from conceptions of multiculturalism as
something we "add on" to the curriculum, or do for
marginalized groups to a more fluid and thoughtful
"discourse of encounters" in its abrogation of the problem
of representation, and in its problematization of notions
of cultural translation. Literary works can serve as a
kind of counter-screen in a field of other varieties of
texts that often tend to screen (simplify) societies,
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cultures, and Individual experience. Social theory alone
does not do it, because the writings of social theory that
we have access to are themselves trapped within discursive
forms that privilege the language/expressions of white
middle class academics. These texts talk about the
marginalized, whereas literary texts written by the
marginalized speak the marginalized.
I intend to support these claims, in part, through
demonstrations of such ''conversations” involving literary
works by Toni Morrison, Ralph Ellison, Jamaica Kincaid,
William Faulkner, and others. Particular authors were
selected for various reasons, including powerful
attachments to place, writings that engage "canonical”
works (or, for example, in the case of Faulkner, are
canonical works which speak of cross-cultural encounters),
writings that demonstrate the power of cross-cultural
encounters and imagination (Harris, 1989). Some student
and personal autobiographical work will also be included
in these demonstrations.
I defend my choice to limit my discussions of
multicultural education and cultural studies primarily to
issues of race and gender with emphasis on relations
between black and white by virtue of such issues being
especially pressing in the particular time and place in
which I have conducted my studies— in the deep South,
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Louisiana. Also, I contend that much of the theorizing
that comes from this study is translatable

to issues

around difference and otherness more generally, however,
particular applications must be attentive to particular,
local contexts. The particular encounters, both historical
and contemporary, that occur in specific places are also
significant to these approaches to literature and theory
(Pinar, 1991). Autobiography provides a critical
conjuncture in exploring local context.
I will begin this task by describing the general
shapes of the fields of multicultural education and
cultural studies from the recent past to the present.
Current debates around such issues as Eurocentrism,
Afrocentrism, and the humanities will be discussed as they
hold direct implications for multicultural education and
cultural studies. Following that, I will outline the plan
that guides remaining chapters and suggest ways in which
those chapters attempt to address the problems posed in
this introductory chapter. Current approaches to, and
models for, multicultural education are discussed first.

Multicultural Education
Conceptualization of what is now called multicultural
education first began in the 1960's in response to
minority demands for more equitable school practices
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(Banks & Banks, 1989; Gay, 1990; Sleeter & Grant, 1987;
Sleeter, 1991b). Prior to this, schools followed a basic
assimilationist model (McCarthy, 1990, p. 39). The
language used and form taken by much of what was called
multicultural education "disarticulated elements of black
radical demands for the restructuring of school knowledge
and rearticulated these elements into more reformist
professional discourses around issues of minority failure,
cultural characteristics and language proficiency" (p.
41)

*

In his critique of current multicultural educational
theories, McCarthy outlines three general models
characterizing the field to date. The first, "models of
cultural understanding," emphasizes ethnic studies for
"improving communication" and approach ethnic differences
through a stance of "cultural relativism." The primary
assumptions underlying such models involve placing
greatest significance on individual attitudes toward
ethnic difference. Their efforts, therefore, are toward
cultivating respect for ethnic cultural differences within
individual students (and teachers). Stronger versions of
this model, McCarthy suggests, "directly target white
students and teachers . . .

as the flawed protagonists in

their racial relations with blacks and Native Americans"
(p. 44). Weaker versions attempt to dispense with negative
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images of any sort, and promote instead "racial harmony
and tolerance of social and ethnic differences" (p.44).
All versions of this model tend to neglect the larger
social context of racial production and tend to collapse
racial and ethnic differences into a monolithic idea.
Indeed, some studies have pointed to harmful effects of
programs based on attitudinal change (Fish, 1981; Baker,
1973; Buckingham, 1984). Quoting Fish, "One semester after
completion of a fieldwork experience, students' attitudes
toward the mentally retarded and the physically disabled
persisted at the pretest level, whereas students'
attitudes toward blacks significantly worsened from the
pretest level" (p. xii, cited in McCarthy, 1990, p.46). In
addition, such models tend to focus on differences between
ethnic groups while neglecting differences within groups,
thereby promoting unintended stereotyping which can lead
to results such as those noted by Fish (Garcia, 1974;
Gibson, 1984; Pettigrew, 1974).
The second category McCarthy outlines consists of
"models of cultural competence." Major concerns for
educators operating out of these models include
inculcation of values of cultural pluralism in the
schools, and the preservation of cultural identities for
minority groups. Liberal social scientists such as
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Riesman, Glazer and Denney (1969), and Glazer and Moynihan
(1963) introduced the idea that social institutions
represent "a plurality of ethnic interests” (McCarthy,
1990, p. 47). Educators such as Banks (1981, 1987), Cortes
(1973), Pettigrew (1974) and Gollnick (1980) were
concerned with the lack of intercultural competencies,
"especially in the area of language" (McCarthy, 1990,
p.47).
Bicultural and bilingual programs associated
with this cultural competence approach aim to
prepare minority students for their social and
cultural negotiation with dominant white
mainstream society. At the same time, it is
expected that white students will also acquire
[cultural] knowledge. . . of minority groups (p.
49) .
While challenging the centrality of dominant cultural
values as well as notions of "cultural deprivation"
whereby minorities are viewed as "naturally" deficient,
such programs, in their hopes of "building bridges"
(Sleeter and Grant, 1986, p. 4), still focus on individual
mobility rather than collective identity formation and
action toward structural change (McCarthy, 1990, p. 49).
Minority youth are still expected to respect social
institutions and their rules designed to accommodate
mainstream America.
"Models of cultural emancipation and social
reconstruction" constitute the third of McCarthy's
categories for this field. These models are further
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divided into two "conceptual strands" (p. 51). The first
strand is concerned with the development of positive self
concepts for minority youth for the purpose of boosting
academic achievement (Bullivant, 1981). As McCarthy points
out, "this first set of claims therefore retraces some of
the ground of the cultural deprivation theorists in that
it is suggested that minority students do poorly in school
because of their lack of self esteem, among other things"
(1990, p. 51). While this seems similar to the older,
"cultural deprivation" theories, what makes this stance
different is its linkage of underachievement to teacher
prejudice and the exclusion or suppression of minority
cultures. In this way it does, at least, value minority
cultures as something to be respected, if only in part.
In the second conceptual strand of these emancipatory
models the larger social structural context is brought to
bear by way of a more direct linkage of race relations in
the classroom to the economy. A program which generates
greater academic achievement by minorities is viewed as a
program for breaking "the cycle of poverty and missed
opportunity created by a previous biography of cultural
deprivation" (p. 51). However, this agenda, McCarthy
asserts, ignores research that indicates a relative lack
of correlation between educational qualifications and job
opportunities for minorities, whereby racial and social
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connections take on the greater significance (Troyna,
1984, in McCarthy, 1990, p. 53). Major weaknesses of these
approaches are their tendency to place the overwhelming
majority of reform burdens on individual teachers while
ignoring, at the same time, such issues as "policy
formation, decision-making, trade-offs, and the building
of alliances for specific reformist initiatives" (p. 54).
Sleeter, partially in response to criticism, outlines
five different approaches to multicultural education,
some of which she too is critical, and some of which
overlap with McCarthy's models (Sleeter, 1991b).
The first, which she calls the "human relations
approach," focuses on such things as sensitivity training,
the "power of love, unity and harmony," and the need for
attitudinal and behavioral change which supersedes
concerns with social change. "Unfortunately," Sleeter
writes, "many people equate multicultural education with
[only] the human relations approach" (Sleeter, 1991b,
p.11). (Here she cites McCarthy, 1988.)
The second approach, "teaching the culturally
different," is concerned with raising racial minority
achievement levels through "culturally compatible
education programs" (Sleeter, 1991b, p. 11). Sleeter is
critical of this approach for its advocacy of racial
minority internalization of mainstream cultural values and
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its assumption that this is all that is necessary for
minority youth to succeed in the job market and other
social spheres.
The third, fourth, and fifth approaches are viewed by
Sleeter as having great potential value when
differentially applied according to the needs of specific
schools, communities, and classrooms. Multicultural
education or "cultural democracy" as a third approach is
concerned with the "redesign of classrooms and schools to
model an unoppressive, equal society which is also
culturally diverse" (p. 11) . Through this approach social
criticism is taught only implicitly. Empowerment for
social change is brought about through validation of
minority cultures as well as through student experience of
a pluralistic and democratized classroom.
"Single group studies" constitute the fourth
approach. In this approach such courses as Black, Chicano,
and women's studies are taught in order to deal explicitly
with the "history of [the] target group's oppression. . .
as well as the culture the group has developed within
oppressive circumstances" (pp. 11-12). This approach is
said to produce greater solidarity within specific
oppressed groups to a greater degree than other approaches
can, as well as "clearly defining boundaries between the
in-group and out-groups" (p. 12).
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Finally, "education that is multicultural and social
reconstructionist" is the (fifth) approach which intends
to create spaces for the formation of coalitions among
these "bounded" groups as well as between these groups and
members of dominant groups. This is to be accomplished by
way of "direct teaching" about political and economic
oppression as well as preparation in "social action
skills" (p. 12).
It should be noted that in laying out methods and
approaches to multicultural education both McCarthy and
Sleeter are suggesting a general chronology to the
development of the field since the 1960's, but at the same
time, each of the methods and approaches described remain
current in practices to varying degrees.
Another conceptual approach to viewing the history of
multicultural education has been to outline three
generations of attempts at "curriculum desegregation", the
last of which "is now in its formative stages" (Gay,
1990).

Following is Geneva Gay's account and critique.

In the first generation of curriculum desegregation
efforts were made to eliminate ethnic and racial
stereotypes from texts and to include information on
"ethnic heroes", as well as to provide compensatory
programs to aid minority students in making the transition
to mainstream curricula. While many overtly stereotypical
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images were eliminated from texts, representations
remained distorted
not so much in the actual content of the books
as in their approaches to the subject matter, in
the questions asked, in the tone of the
presentation, in the persistent use of maledominated language to refer to general human
experience, in the philosophical assumptions
that undergirded textbooks, and in curriculum
designs (p. 59).
In addition, issues such as oppression, racism, and
inequality were scarcely dealt with and, when mentioned,
the discussions around these issues were framed in such a
way as to portray minorities as the passive, voiceless,
nameless recipients of various policies and treatments. As
for the inclusion of "ethnic heroes",
Only ethnic individuals who conformed to the
middle-class, mainstream cultural standards of
heroism were added to the lists of exemplars for
children to emulate. Those whose heroism
involved fighting oppression, preserving
cultural integrity, or combating social
injustices in ways that were not sanctioned by
mainstream culture were conspicuously absent
from the curriculum (p. 59).
Furthermore, teachers were not offered the support
necessary for dealing with new materials such that many
were unprepared to approach subject matter from different
perspectives and/or held negative attitudes toward racial
difference. And even when teachers were relatively
prepared, standardized tests, to which students and
teachers were accountable, were not altered to include new
materials. Finally, the new programs designed to
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facilitate entry into the mainstream simply became
permanent tracks for many minority students (p. 59).
In response to the failures of the first generation
reforms to effect significant change in minority school
success a second wave of curricular reforms ensued.
Its primary targets were unequal access to
instructional opportunities, unequal
interactions in the classroom, teachers' biased
attitudes and low expectations, and
discriminatory patterns of program placements
(p. 60).
As such, the emphasis was shifted away, somewhat, from
revising textbooks and other instructional materials
toward methodological issues. The two major thrusts for
this effort were to deal directly

with racial prejudice

through sensitivity training for teachers and school
personnel, and through them, the same was to be done for
students, and, secondly, to assist victims of
discrimination to develop positive self concepts.
Materials that did come from this generation were largely
directed at questions of methodology and attitude. Also,
they were limited to selected subjects— such as
social studies, language arts, reading, and fine
arts— and were often earmarked for those
students who were members of the groups profiled
in the projects (p. 61).
With the institution of a third generation of
curriculum desegregation, Gay proposes three specific
principles for guiding efforts in its shaping.
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First, no one group or culture should have a
monopoly on knowledge, learning, and humanity.
Second, educational equality requires the total
reconceptualization of our views of American
history and culture and of the ways they are
taught and learned. Third, diversity is a
characteristic of the human condition, one that
education for equality and excellence must
embrace unconditionally (p. 61).
She challenges the notions that excellence and equity
operate at the expense of one another, that mere social
contact within diverse groups is sufficient for bringing
about equity (and, therefore, excellence), and that the
present structure and frameworks around which schools are
built are sufficient for producing truly multicultural,
desegregated curricula.
There seems to be little research to date in the area
of multicultural education that would fit the requirements
of Gay's third generation, or of Sleeter's fifth approach
(social reconstructionist). This would imply that such
programs are even less represented in actual practice.
There are, however, some efforts in terms of both research
and school practices that seem to be listening to such
challenges. To provide an example which relates to my own
project in terms of the specific cultural groups involved,
I will discuss some research around, and implementation
of, an Afrocentric approach, as well as debates around
that approach.

One of the more outspoken proponents and articulators
of an Afrocentric approach— that is, to history,
philosophy, literature, psychology, and social theory— is
Molefi Kete Asante (The Afrocentric Idea. 1987, and
Afrocentricitv. 1988). He defines Afrocentricity as
"placing African ideals at the center of any analysis that
involves African culture and behavior" (1987, p. 6). This
perspective, Asante argues, enables African-Americans (and
others of African descent) to be positioned positively in
history. One project is to
re-establish the centrality of ancient Kemetic
(Egyptian) civilization and the Nile Valley
cultural complex as points of reference for an
African perspective in much the same way as
Greece and Rome serve as reference points for
the European world (p. 9).
His argument in support of this move is that by shifting
the center away from Europe the universality of any
historical perspective is challenged. He counters
anticipated charges, of separatism by beating such critics
to the draw. It is the dominance of a Eurocentric line
that promotes separatism, says Asante, and he likens the
"seizure of intellectual space" by Eurocentrists to the
seizure and colonization of physical territories (p. 9).
Asante also notes some interesting congruences between
certain feminist criticisms and Afrocentric criticism in
terms of ways of viewing community, nature, and
relationships. However, he is critical of Marxist
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analysis, including feminist Marxist analysis, as it
"rests on a reaction to the industrial capitalist order
and must use its language to demonstrate the opposition"
(p. 8). To summarize Asante's position:
What I seek to do here is to move closer to the
possibility of a post-Eurocentric idea where
true transcultural analyses become possible;
this can be accomplished alongside a post-male
ideology as we unlock creative human potential
(p. 8).
Afrocentric curricula drawing from the work of Asante
and others have been implemented, albeit with many
difficulties, in Portland, Oregon, and in various stages
in school districts in Atlanta, Indianapolis, Milwaukee,
Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C. (Viadero, 1990), and some
cities in New York and California

(Winkler, 1991). They

also are in place in some black independent schools in
Chicago (Lee, Lomotey & Shujaa, 1990). These curricula
have been endorsed, with some qualifications, by the
Organization of American Historians (O.A.H.) and
unqualifiedly condemned by conservative scholars such as
Diane Ravitch and Arthur Schlesinger (Winkler, 1991).
Criticism can also be read in some words from "cultural
studies" scholars Henry Louis Gates and Gayatri Spivak,
though it takes on a different tenor from conservative
criticism (Winkler, 1990). In the paragraphs that
immediately follow, I will attempt to lay out the debates.
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The curriculum in Portland, after which some other
school districts are modeling themselves, was designed by
commissioning African-American "baseline essays" from
noted African-American scholars throughout the country.
These essays focus on the "contributions" of African and
American blacks in art, language arts, math, science,
social studies, and music. They are to form the basis or
standpoint for all curricular content (Viadero, 1990).
Conservative critics charge that the essays are
distortions of the truth and that they threaten to divide
black and white further as the essays focus on white and
European oppression of all that is black and African.
Diane Ravitch asks, "Does this do anything to bring people
together?" She adds, "The great tragedy of segregation is
that it prevented us from knowing who the other person
was" (cited in Viadero, 1990, p. 13). Schlesinger takes
issue with "the notion that Africa was [the] source of
everything good and Europe was the source of everything
evil . . . [It] is not history at all, but rhetoric"
(cited in Viadero, 1990, p. 13). In a separate interview
he claims "Afrocentrism in the schools is a symptom of a
growing fragmentation that is threatening to divide our
society" (cited in Winkler, 1991, p. A5). Indeed, Ravitch
claims, an ethnocentric perspective is the opposite of a
multicultural one (cited in Viadero, 1990, p. 11).
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Proponents of an Afrocentrlc curriculum claim that it
is an improvement to current school curricula for AfricanAmerican students in that African ideals become central to
schooling rather than just an "add-on" which tends to be
more divisive and marginalizing than helpful— what James
Banks calls a "tepees and chitlins" strategy (cited in
Viadero, 1990, p. 11). The Afrocentric perspective has
been defended variously by virtue of an Afrocentric
capacity to establish a balance to a nation with a
dominant Eurocentric world view, by its capacity to
bolster African-American engagement with school thereby
bolstering self esteem and academic achievement, and by
claiming it to be the truth— this last a gesture that
appropriates some of the language of its critics,
sometimes to dubious ends.
The Organization of American Historians (OAH)
supports such a move insofar as it provides historical
content that is "based upon sound historical scholarship,"
and rejects "a history that asserts or implies the
inherent superiority of one race, gender, class or region
of the world over another" (cited in Winkler, 1991, p.
A6). Still, boardmember Gary Nash is concerned that the
word "Afrocentric has become something of a red herring"
(cited in Winkler, p. A6). Other board members such as
Indiana University's David Thelen, Howard University's
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Arnold H. Taylor, Boston College's Terrie L. Epstein, and
University of Pennsylvania's Frances Berry (also president
of OAH) see conservative critics as largely coming from a
set of either/or orientations. These orientations are as
follows: either you study one distinctive group or you
study larger society; either you teach good (Eurocentric)
history or bad (Afrocentric) history (an either/or
orientation that, it could be argued, also describe some
Afrocentric proponents); either one interpretation of
history is correct or another one is; either you teach for
self esteem or you teach for critical thinking. Alas,
Diane Ravitch claims the OAH support as a victory for "our
side of the debate" in that
Many of us have always said we support teaching
and research in areas such as black studies or
women's studies— just not the distorted version
being introduced into many schools (p. A6).
OAH president Francis Berry replies,
My fear is that people will say they agree with
our statement, and then will still go off
promoting a point of view poisonous to
multiculturalism (p. A7).
Still, research that has been done on Afrocentric
curricula has tended to focus solely on the effects of
such curricula on African-American groups and individuals
(e.g., Lee, Lomotey & Shujaa, 1990; Ladson-Billings &
Henry, 1990) leaving an opening for critics to dismiss it
as limited and antagonistic. It should be understood,
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however, that most such programs are intended for all or
predominantly black schools. Some Afrocentric proponents
intend to support and maintain all black schools, or even
all male black schools. Such schools are deemed safe and
necessary places in an era of resurgent white racism and
racist national policies, and a time when young black
males are seen as particularly at risk of not reaching
adulthood with an education or, even, at all. Others
intend the curriculum for inner city schools that have
been defacto segregated for years. The debates surrounding
an Afrocentric perspective highlight a multi-layered sense
of confusion over such issues as the purposes of
schooling, national cultural identity, and questions of
truth and accuracy.
A look to some criticism of aspects of
"multiculturalism" among proponents of multiculturalism in
the humanities in higher education is useful, I believe,
for extending the conceptual field around multiculturalism
generally. Such a look also provides a bridge to my own
project of articulating a position toward multicultural
education that draws selectively (and in part) from
traditions within British cultural studies and French
poststructural philosophy.
Henry Louis Gates and Gayatri Spivak, among others,
spoke out at the annual meeting of the American Studies
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Association last November (1990). An account of that event
was covered by the Chronicle of Higher Education (Winkler,
1990). Spivak expressed concern that scholarly emphases on
the marginality of women and minorities "has served to
reinforce their place on the margins of culture" (cited in
Winkler, 1990, p. A8). Gates extends this thought:
"Minority critics are accepted by the academy; but in
return, they must accept a role already scripted for them"
(cited in Winkler, 1990, p. A8). He also argues that
through the kinds of "oppositional criticism" that are
prevalent, impenetrable barriers are built between margin
and center. He suggests,
Perhaps we should try to think of American
culture as a conversation among different
voices— even if it's a conversation that some of
us weren't able to join until recently (cited in
Winkler, 1990, A8).
This vignette is one of many at the surface of a
history of crises in the humanities and of "national
identity" both in Britain and the United States. Their
words (Spivak and Gates) in this rather decontextualized
vignette could be read to mirror certain conservative
critics' concerns about multiculturalism and cultural
studies. I hope to demonstrate the difference in later
pages. Prior to that it will be necessary to explore
debates around the humanities in the United States which I
will contextualize by framing the beginnings and growth of
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cultural studies. As a preview to demonstrating my
investment in cultural studies for this project, I should
also mention what about Spivak's and Gates' words grabbed
my attention. As suggested early on, I find compelling the
notion of a cross-cultural "conversation" that neither
reduces one culture to the concerns of another, nor
proliferates into infinity the "multiplicities" or
"pluralities" of human concerns.
Through interdisciplinary, cross-cultural approaches
to studies— including studies labeled "Western"— such a
conversation may be possible. For example, a class reading
Melville might also read Toni Morrison's interpretation of
Mobv Dick in an article which is also about race, culture,
history, and an intricate phrasing of the question "what
and who is 'Western?'" (Morrison, 1989). Indeed, I contend
in this writing that encounters between cultures shape and
transform those cultures, not so they all become the same,
but such that neither exists as pure and unmediated—
outside a conversation. That mediation is often expressed
in literary works. A turn to cultural studies provides a
useful frame for thinking about such a project.
My "turn to cultural studies" should not be
interpreted as wholesale acceptance of a predominating
philosophy or theoretical perspective or methodology
associated at any one time with British cultural studies.

Significantly for both the content and the style of this
work, I have drawn rather eclectically from the work of
several people who sometimes oppose one another. In this
sense, I model a project called cultural studies, to some
extent, stylistically.

Cultural Studies
To the extent that it makes sense to talk about
origins, cultural studies can be said to have been
conceived in its contemporary configuration in the 1950's
in Birmingham, England by Stuart Hall, Richard Hoggart,
Raymond Williams, and EP Thompson. All four were
"extramural teachers," which meant that they were marginal
to the academic centers in England where they taught such
courses as literacy for adult working-class students. They
were marginalized, in part, because none of the
traditional academic disciplines fit cleanly into their
interests. As such they were thought of as lacking rigor,
among other negatives. Cultural studies have since gained
legitimacy in the academy to a greater extent (Stuart Hall
was given a chair in sociology though his academic degrees
are in literature, and the Center for Contemporary
Cultural Studies [CCCS] is fairly well established in
Birmingham), but it's still not considered a full member
in many senses as England is undergoing some similar
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identity crises to those of the United States where we
hear calls for "cultural literacy," for "opening" the
"closed" American mind, and for a return to "the canon".
(More on that later.) Now there are other strands of
cultural studies, American and French to name the dominant
others, which influence and converse with British cultural
studies and with one another to varying degrees. For
example, Stuart Hall draws on the work of contemporary
French philosophers Foucault and Derrrida in his most
recent work, whereas earlier work was primarily influenced
by more structuralist theoretical perspectives derived
from Althusser, Gramsci, and Frankfurt School critical
theory.
In the United States cultural studies as a somewhat
organized and recognized area of scholarship is newer. A
cultural studies perspective has existed to various
extents and in various senses in departments of American
Studies. One recent event marking a trend here was a
conference called "Crossing the Disciplines: Cultural
Studies in the 1990s" sponsored by Robert Con Davis and
the Oklahoma Project for Discourse and Theory last year at
the University of Oklahoma, which featured speakers such
as Gayatri C. Spivak, Robert Scholes, Gerald Vizenor. It
is Davis's contention that "the study of [literary]
criticism can profitably be situated as a part— and a
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leading part— of the study of culture. . . In fact, a
strong argument can be made that the texts we customarily
call literature constitute a privileged site where the
most important social, psychological, and cultural forces
combine and contend." This has been a line of a number of
British cultural studies scholars as well, though by no
means a line of all of them. It is one that I adopt.

British Cultural Studies; A Brief History and Description
Stuart Hall, one of the founders of the Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham,
England, has traced a history of British cultural studies
at the centre in two separate writings. The first one,
written in 1980, was called "Cultural Studies and the
Centre" and supplied the introduction to his edited book
Culture. Language. Media. The other, published in 1990 and
called "The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis
of the Humanities," (1990) provides a briefer historical
tracing which is brought into conversation with current
issues around the humanities, national identity, and
national curriculum in Britain. A third article, Richard
Johnson's 1986 piece entitled "What Is Cultural Studies,
Anyway?" is a look at the disadvantages and advantages of
"academic codification" for something like a discipline
called cultural studies. He also discusses possible
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strategies for defining and describes forms of research in
cultural studies. His concerns in this article are
predominantly with CCCS and Britain (he is a former
director of the center), but are not entirely so limited.
A version of it was presented at the 1988 Modern Language
Association conference in New Orleans with a panel
including an array of American cultural studies scholars
including Spivak (who is a native of India and teaches in
the United States). These three writings serve as the
basis for my historical and descriptive impressions.
Originating texts, or what Hall calls the "original
curriculum," include Richard Hoggart's The Uses of
Literacy (1958), Raymond Williams's Culture and Society
(1966) and The Long Revolution (1975, originally published
in 1961), and E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English
Working Class (1978, originally published in 1964), this
last being a critique of Williams' work.
These early texts built on the work of F.R. Leavis in
terms of his efforts to deploy literary criticism as a
means of reading "social arrangements, the lived cultures
and 'languages' of working class life, as particular kinds
of 'text'" (Hall, 1980, p. 18). While they utilized some
of Leavis' notions of cultural critique, as well as
Matthew Arnold's, they departed from these two in terms of
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partisanship and the fixing of Culture with a capital "C."
Williams' work, in particular,
shifted the whole ground of debate from a
literary-moral to an anthropological definition
of culture. But it defined the latter now as the
"whole process" by means of which meanings and
definitions are socially constructed and
historically transformed, with literature and
art as only one, specially privileged, kind of
social communication (Hall, 1980, p. 19).
In The Making of the English Working Class E.P.
Thompson produced a labor history which challenged older
versions by breaking with a limiting economic determinism
and institutional perspective, and by going beyond a
Leavisite elitist version of culture in favor of a notion
of culture situated between "social being and social
consciousness" (p. 20). It also implicitly challenged
Williams in Long Revolution in terms of his somewhat
evolutionary approach to culture. "Thompson insisted on
the historical specificity of culture, on its plural, not
singular, definition— 'cultures,' not 'Culture'" (p. 20).
Another ground of contestation for British cultural
studies was at the site of British sociology which was, in
the 1950's, "massively dependent" on American sociology
(p. 20), which Hall characterized in the following way.
American sociology was predominantly either Parsonian or
structural-functionalist in methodology, and as such was
incapable of dealing theoretically with issues of culture
as conceived by the new cultural studies. It denied the
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category of contradiction in favor of such notions as
"dysfunctions” or "tension management." It claimed no
ideology and even disclaimed ideology as a sociological
concept except to attribute it to "totalitarian society"
as opposed to the (non-ideological) "pluralist society"
that was America. This polarity was advanced as scientific
fact. "Culture" was dealt with only "within the terms of a
highly pessimistic variant of the 'mass society/mass
culture' hypothesis." Furthermore, the methodology it
preferred was "modelled on a highly outdated version of
the natural sciences, militantly empiricist and
quantitative" (p. 21).
"Schools of English and Contemporary Society" was
Hoggart's lecture introducing cultural studies at the
Birmingham Centre. It proposed two emphases for the
program: (a) primary concern with neglected materials from
popular culture and mass media, and (b) deployment of
literary critical methods as an approach to reading such
materials for their "qualitative cultural evidence" (p.
21 ).

This lecture precipitated vigorous attacks by both
the sociologists and the humanists. Sociologists "while
not concerned with such issues [as popular culture and
mass media] reserved a proprietary claim over the
territory" (p. 21). The humanists
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regarded "culture" as already inscribed in the
texts they studied and in the values of liberal
scholarship. Anything more modern was, by
definition, a sign of cultural decline and
debasement . . . They shared, in fact, with
Leavis, the assumption that culture and
democracy were unalterably opposed (pp. 21-22).
Finally, by incorporating history and historiography
into the sociological work of cultural studies, the
dualism of literary versus sociology was broken down.
Also, by performing historical analyses on the classic
sociology texts themselves, thereby situating them outside
of science and in history, the field of sociology began to
be appropriated from within. Through this process other
neglected sociologies were turned up as well, such as
German sociology (Weberian; hermeneutic approaches of
Dilthey and Simmel) and American "social interactionism"
(in the work of Mead and the Chicago School)

(pp. 22-24).

For several years a central and ongoing debate at the
Centre and in cultural studies generally was over a
perceived incompatibility between structuralism and
culturalism. From its inception— with Hoggart's Uses of
Literacy and beyond— cultural studies was concerned with
the lived experience of real people. Yet, the problem with
this perspective, structuralists claimed, was that the
work attending to such concerns too often seemed to lack
theoretical grounding. Such work ignored the larger
conditions under which cultures were produced. The
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culturalists, on the other hand, were critical of the
excessive determinism of the structuralists. Williams and
Thompson in particular were concerned with the pessimistic
outlook that dismissed any notion of human agency capable
of resisting the power of history and ideology.

(Turner,

1990, pp. 11-13)
Structuralisms entered the conversation at the CCCS
through the years as European works by Lukacs, Benjamin,
Goldmann, Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Althusser, and Gramsci
became available as English translations. Through these
authors theoretical turns were taken and explored with the
growing sense that early conceptions of culture and
ideology were over-simplified and under-theorized. As a
progression of European structuralist‘theorists captured
the interests of various scholars at the Centre, with each
turn, the debates over culturalism versus structuralism
became more intricate. For example, the traditional
Marxist base/superstructure metaphor became more and more
radically revised to include interactions among all
practices— economic, political, ideological, and cultural-Althusser's concepts of overdetermination and relative
autonomy were particularly exciting for this movement.
Nevertheless, the problem of human agency, insisted upon
by culturalism, remained inadequately addressed by
Althusserian theory. In particular, the solutions offered
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by structuralism seemed especially lacking. As Hall puts
it,
Its formalism and rationalism, its privileging
of the highest levels of abstraction as the
exclusive mode of operation of "Theory” with a
capital "T," its obsession with epistemological
issues, themselves constituted formidable
barriers to the solution of problems which
structuralism itself posed (Hall, 1980, p. 29).
The culturalism/structuralism split ceased to hold a
significant place in the Centre with the introduction of
the work of Antonio Gramsci. "Where Althusser's
explanation implies that cultural change is almost
impossible and ideological struggle futile, Gramsci
explains how change is built into the system" (Turner,
1990, p. 32). "For Gramsci, 'hegemony' is never a
permanent state of affairs and never uncontested" (Hall,
1980, p. 36).
While Gramsci "remains within the basic terms of a
materialist theory" (p. 36), Foucault's work represented
for cultural studies tendencies to look beyond materialism
to critiques of earlier semiotic models and appropriations
of psychoanalytic theories. Hall's ambivalence is once
again aroused by this theoretical turn as the problem of
determination is repressed, but, at the same time, the
problem of representation is re-opened, (p. 37)
This has also proved a crucial opening for theorizing
around gender and race. The impact of feminism in
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particular imposed a crisis on the CCCS in that questions
of sexual difference are seen to, in many senses, precede
social class differences. Certainly, social class
(difference) is more complicated by its interactions with
gender issues. Also, since the writing of Hall's essay
(1980), theorizing around race has entered cultural
studies in a similar manner. Still, race is grossly under
theorized and largely peripheral. Nonetheless, all of this
has required a radical rethinking of many theoretical
perspectives and agendas for the Centre, with a
concomitant need for redefining.

Defining Cultural Studies: Evasion. Necessity and
Constraint
In 1983 Richard Johnson produced his essay asking
(and tentatively answering) "what is cultural studies,
anyway?" (later published in the 1986-87 issue of Social
Text). Many of the concerns with defining, and thereby
possibly constraining and undermining, cultural studies
remain, at this writing, the same as they were in the
beginning. Johnson writes,
A codification of methods or knowledges
(instituting them, for example, in formal
curricula or in courses on "methodology") runs
against some of the main features of cultural
studies as a tradition: its openness and
theoretical versatility, its reflexive even
self-conscious mood, and, especially, the
importance of critique (p. 1).
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Critique in the cultural studies tradition has meant
critique of the disciplines which proceeds through "raids"
(Hall, 1990, p. 16) in which elements are lifted from
areas such as sociology, history, anthropology, literary
criticism, and philosophy— elements which are useful to
theorizing culture and the movements and workings of
power— and what remains is rejected. As such,
it involves appropriation not just rejection.
From this point of view cultural studies is a
process, a kind of alchemy for producing useful
knowledge. Codify it and you halt its reactions
(p. 2).
Yet, pressures to define are real. At the level of
daily politics of colleges and schools is the need to
attract resources for jobs and research. In terms of the
larger political field, there is need for resources to
challenge conservative assaults on public educational
institutions, and "to decide priorities for teaching and
research" (p. 7). Johnson also sees a need for viewing
cultural studies not as unity but as whole for the
purposes of "reforming the elements of different
approaches [appropriations from the disciplines, and
theories] in their relations to each other" (p. 7).
Johnson suggested "strategies of definition" which
would presumably maintain the integrity of cultural
studies critique. His strategies are as follows: define
(a) as an intellectual and political tradition,

(b) in its
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relations to the academic disciplines, (c) in terms of
theoretical paradigms, or (d) by its characteristic
objects of study. He favors the fourth one. I will not
elaborate on these for the reason that, in terms of the
CCCS, the question of departmentalization (a kind of
definition) has become a moot one since Johnson's writing
of this. Under University pressure to be reabsorbed into
the Department of English, CCCS managed a compromise
whereby they became the Department of Cultural Studies.
This meant creating and offering an undergraduate
curriculum whereas before the Centre had sponsored only
graduate students and provided only reading and research
groups without formal classes (Turner, 1990, p. 79). With
the diffusion of their (still) small departmental numbers
to preparing and teaching undergraduate courses as well as
directing graduate students, it is feared that what was
the CCCS will lose the powerful influence it has had on
the international scene. As Turner explains, prior to
departments1izat ion,
it adopted a policy of encouraging its students
to publish their work rather than produce
assignments or even finish their degrees! While
this did little for the Centre's "academic
throughput figures," it did make the work
visible, disseminating the fruits of its
research and establishing the reputations of its
students (p. 80).
The issue of definition is less settled elsewhere. In
Ellen Rooney's article "Discipline and Vanish: Feminism,

the Resistance to Theory and the Politics of Cultural
Studies" (1990) she suggests that research and practice in
cultural studies might best survive the ravages of such
groups as the National Association of Scholars (NAS) by
emulating Women's Studies (with regard to their visible
commitments and influences outside the university). She
also asserts that cultural studies (in the United States)
must resist the pressure to being incorporated as a
discipline in order to retain its critical edge. If
incorporated, it would "abandon its position as a critical
reading of the traditional disciplines and of the
disciplinary as such" (p. 17). Rooney draws an analogy to
the situation for cultural studies in the U.S. from the
history of American Studies. Its becoming an established
discipline fragmented it politically such that "American
Studies too frequently participates in the resistance to
progressive work in the humanities" (p. 18).
On the other hand, other scholars of cultural studies
are concerned about such distancing from the traditional
academic disciplines. Rooney interviewed Gayatri Spivak,
where Spivak expresses such a concern:
if one establishes an interdisciplinary space
which does not engage with the most important
arena (a silent, unemphatic arena) of warring
power in the disciplines themselves, where the
people who don't publish much, who don't teach
very well, engage day after day, as with
distribution requirements, let us say, if one
doesn't budge them, but proliferates

36
interdisciplinary, anti-essentialist programs,
in fact one provides an alibi, once again, for
the ruthless operation of neo-colonialist
knowledge (in Spivak, 1989, p. 133).
The question seems to come to this. Should cultural
studies in the U.S. retain its distance from "the
disciplines," evading the "border patrol" that seeks to
constrain by a strategy of define-and-conquer, and better
avoid the risk of losing its critical capacity, OR should
cultural studies operate through "conversations" across
and within, through self-critique, remaining within the
traditional disciplines (where it has mostly been, de
facto), and, perhaps, better avoid the risk of
divisiveness and academic marginalization? This is not a
simple question. Given the complexity of the situation
whereby cultural studies scholars from many academic
departments and with a tremendous diversity of interests
are increasingly being lumped together and charged with
being "politically correct" dogmatists, I am not sure the
question is even a real one. My own hope is that reduction
to such an "either/or" can be avoided, at least in some,
important, respects.
When we look at the public ("non-academic") debates
around multicultural education, the humanities, the canon,
and "Western" culture that are directed at practice and
curricula for primary schools through higher education,
the problem emerges somewhat differently.
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The "Culture Wars11— An Analysis of Debates Around the
Humanities
The public discourse around current controversies
over the humanities in the United States has been framed
in large part by conservative and neo-conservative
academics such as E.D. Hirsch, William Bennett, Alan
Bloom, and to a lesser extent Lynne Cheney.

This is not

to say that they represent a monolithic position. Each of
the above mentioned speaks from a different notion of "the
good," and what is considered "good" is key to their
arguments about what the humanities are and what purpose
they serve. The "humanities" that they criticize do not
teach "the good" as they conceive it. For Cheney the good
is that which is "aesthetically pleasurable"; for Bloom it
is that which is "true and eternal"; for Hirsch the good
is what is shared in "common culture" and what is (thus)
expedient for teaching; Bennett's view of the good seems
to be synonymous with what he considers to be Western
culture, which for him means "civilization's best thoughts
and finest utterances" (1984, p.vii). Similar stances are
taken by educationists Diane Ravitch and Chester Finn with
reference to secondary education (1984, 1985, 1987), and
later by Ravitch with reference to higher education
(Ravitch, 1990).
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Compelling arguments against such perspectives have
come from a number of less publicly known critics, who
also hold diverse viewpoints. Despite all the diversity,
it is possible to see a major split between two rough
categories of views: those who view Western cultural
studies as both having a discernable "essence" and as
primary, and those who question such essentialism and/or
the primacy of "Western" culture to study of the
humanities.
Also at stake is the very definition of the
humanities. Does it include the "social sciences" as well
as the usual— art, music, literature, drama, etcetera?
Many seem to agree that it does, though to widely varying
degrees. A problem with this question, of course, is that
what we call the "social sciences" is not clear either.
According to Clifford Geertz in his article "Blurred
Genres," just about everything can be thought of as text
and can thus be interpreted via literary criticism. If
this is so then it would seem that nothing is completely
outside the domain of the humanities. Geertz writes,
The great virtue of the extension of the notion
of text beyond things written on paper or carved
into stone is that it trains attention on
precisely this phenomenon: on how the
inscription of action is brought about, what its
vehicles are and how they work, and on what the
fixation of meaning from the flow of events—
history from what happened, thought from
thinking, culture from behavior— implies for
sociological interpretation. To see social

39
institutions, social customs, social changes as
in some sense "readable" is to alter our whole
sense of what such interpretation is (Geertz,
1983, p.31).
Critics of this idea complain that such "definitions"
reduce to absurdity the possibility of coming up with a
core curriculum for humanities studies in the United
States. For example, Ravitch and Finn, who advocate
institution of a national core curriculum for secondary
school humanities, also advocate the strict separation of
those disciplines (history and literature, primarily) in
high school teaching (1984, pp. 250-257). The desire for a
core curriculum along with the rather convergent questions
and answers about what constitutes "the good" represents
the most striking difference between the two "rough
categories" of viewpoints— a difference which most often
generates an impasse to discussion about the subject among
critics.
The Hirsch, Bloom, Bennett, Cheney contingent (which
I will from now on refer to as the "essentialists" for
simplicity's sake) share at least the assumptions that
"the good" is to varying degrees knowable and is so in a
fairly "objective" sense. Critics of this group doubt the
possibility of an objectively knowable good that can be
prescribed "across the board" for all curricula in the
humanities. Particular styles and types of interpretation
seem to be especially offensive to the essentialists.

These interpretations involve such ideas as historicizing
literary works and re-interpreting those works on the
basis of, for example, the social and historical contexts
of the author. This sometimes results in readings that are
less than flattering to authors of "canonical" texts.
(Re)interpretation is the "essence" of the critical stance
against the sort of essentialism which has a pre-set
definition for what is called Western culture with its
"best thoughts and finest utterances". These critics (the
"anti-essentialists") see re-interpretation as the only
way change (social or individual) takes place as well as
the only way the world is understood (Rabinow and
Sullivan, 1987, p.27). The possibilities for multiple
interpretations— in terms of deciding what is good work
and what is part of a "common culture" and thus what is
valid material for study as well as what is knowable—
implies an impossibility for certainty that shatters an
essentialist structure.
Psychoanalysis might reveal differences in degrees of
comfort with uncertainty as fundamental to the conflicting
views in question here, but I want to emphasize that such
an analysis may have little to do with material human
beings under discussion. It is based on a reading of their
language use that is in print and that I have read. As
such it is based on a reading of a cultural construction
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of these individuals. An essentialist strong sense of
certainty implies a sense of self that is defined via
rigid boundaries between self and other.

Thus those who

define themselves in this way are dependent on having a
strong sense of "other” — that is, one who is not me,
those who are very different from me— as well as a strong
sense of identity with "those who are like me”. But the
strong sense of "other" to which I refer does not mean a
sense which is based on deeper understandings of the
"other" and the very real differences between self and
other. I mean "other" here in the psychoanalytical sense
of one who is alien and thus threatening to the self— one
who is despised and thus marginalized.
The imaginary order as explained by Jacques Lacan is
the place of formation of positive self and other
identities. It emerges from Lacan's "mirror stage" in
which a unified (specular) image comes to be viewed as
natural and fixed. As Whitson points out, the imaginary
order is important to "the realm of ideology, particularly
with respect to ideological recognition of race, class,
gender and national stereotypes as intrinsic properties of
the self” (1988, p. 298). There exist contradictory
elements within such a psyche in the sense that there is
so much need for rigidity (certainty) because of a lack of
certainty about their own and others' abilities to act in
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their best interests. It comes from a lack of faith
(certainty) in "human nature." This is ironic, for such
people often rigidly define a transcendental,
transhistorical "human nature" (as does Allan Bloom).
By this somewhat crude generalization, I do not mean
to imply that rigid personalities don't exist among those
to the left of "Bennettites" or that there exist no "BushRepublicans" with a sense of play about them. The search
for certainty takes many different forms along the entire
political spectrum. Indeed, it could be argued that a
language of simple opposition regardless of the position
taken is susceptible to this analysis. Still, "social
psychoanalysis" of this sort seems at least to have some
degree of usefulness in understanding fundamental
differences among those framing such issues and thus among
the issues themselves. It is most useful when taken in
conjunction with cultural and historiographical analyses.
The essentialist view assumes that Western culture
exists and can be studied and understood in isolation from
other cultures. This notion is exemplified by Bennett when
he writes, "in studying other cultures it is best to begin
with a thorough knowledge of our own." The degree of
naivete' expressed within such a notion is of the order of
one who misunderstands the irony of Martin Mull's The
History of White People. This sort of thinking plays out
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at the level of practice when, for example, at one state
university in northern Louisiana, an institution that is
only about 7% black in a city that is 50% black, a course
proposed on the history of black education was rejected on
the basis that it "singles out one group and thus promotes
race hatred."
The historiographical assumptions behind this
essentialism are at the same time "monumental" (with
regard to the grand "American System") and "antiquarian"
(nostalgic for a mythical past) in nature. They fear, and
understandably so, the dangers of a "critical"
historiography (one which attempts to connect the past to
the present through constant reinterpretation) advocated
by, for example, the American Council of Learned Societies
(Watkins, 1989), with regard not just to the study of the
humanities, but also to what is perceived as perhaps the
"American way of life." Such a view of history and the
humanities strikes essentialists as "ideological" and
"biased," and as wanting only to tear down. Again, this is
an issue similar to that of who is "other." It is about
notions of difference. Critical re-interpretation looks
for differences as much as similarities/ commonalities.
The critical historian would ask, "How can we even begin
to arrive at opinions about "the good" unless we have
bases for comparison and argument?" This is a

contradiction in the essentialist positions except when
they admit to believing, as does Allan Bloom, that "the
good" has already been determined for all time— it is
transhistorical. Most of them don't go this far— at least
not consciously or publicly. For to admit to this belief
is to rather automatically exclude a multiplicity of
cultural groups which constitute American society.
Ravitch, Finn and Hirsch defend themselves to critics
who claim their project is elitist. Their defense is
basically that they propose the same education for all—
that everyone has a right to become knowledgeable of "our
cultural heritage", with culture defined by Matthew
Arnold. What they apparently fail to recognize is that it
is that very definition of culture that has succeeded
historically in excluding Others from the domain of
legitimated knowledge. The point is not to replace in the
curriculum that which has been generated by an Arnoldian
view of culture with another canon— another list of
"greats." Indeed, it is critical that we know the forces
that have shaped us, and those forces include patriarchal
and racist ideologies. The point is that a liberal
education is one that provides a view to transformation of
ideologies rather than mere transmission. Still the battle
proceeds through simple oppositional language as though it
were a simple opposition of them versus us.

Criticisms of so-called political correctness, of
multiculturalism, and of the humanities seem to be
increasingly strident and erupting from the same section
of the gallery. At a conference held by the National
Association of Scholars in November 1988, those assembled
were exhorted "to redeem American higher education from
intellectual and moral servitude to forces having little
to do with the life of the mind or the transmission of
knowledge." Such forces were characterized as consisting
of academic "radicals" who engaged in "oppression
studies." Other examples of comments made were: "the
barbarians are among us. We need to fight them a good long
time. Show them you are not afraid; they crumble," and
"Say to the feminists, 'what do you mean by separate
courses? You have no methodology.' When you lose, make
them state their agenda to the world. They haven't got the
guts to state

it, and you'll beat them that way" (cited in

Rooney, 1990,

p. 15). This meeting was attended by such

media figures

as John Silber (often cited in the work of

Ravitch and Finn) and

Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Use of the term

"barbarian" as opposed to "civilized" is found repeatedly
in the Ravitch, Finn and Fancher book (1984, p. 82, 240)
where barbarians are apparently those who do not have
anything that can be called "the humanities"— they have no
"culture", in the Arnoldian sense.

Yet, at points, as noted earlier in this chapter,
conservative criticisms such as those of Ravitch,
Schlesinger, Hirsch, and Bloom, converge with more radical
critiques. All are concerned in some senses about the
alienation that is symptomatic of what is called the
failure of modernity— the fragmentation that devalues a
liberal education, one rich with the insights provided by
deep involvement with history and literature. A
significant difference in the perspectives of the above
mentioned critics and my own (as well, perhaps, as those
of Gates, Spivak, and many others) is in an orientation
toward language, toward textuality and interpretation,
that recognizes the power of language to shape subject
positions— the ways in which we view the world.
Specifically, I speak of an orientation toward binary
oppositional language— language of hierarchy, of
patriarchy, of domination. Conservative critics seem to
fail to see themselves as situated within the symbolic
order whereby "identities" are constructed and re
constructed through language.
Finally, in looking at these debates, the problem
(for cultural studies) emerges not so much as one of
definition or "academic codification" as it is a problem
of combating what Wilson Harris calls an "illiteracy of
the imagination" (1989).

That Ronald Reagan is known as
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"the great communicator" elicits the following response
from Harris:
So many things are eclipsed, so many things are
lost sight of, and masses of people respond
because the way he communicates allows him to
operate within a certain sort of frame which
seems to simplify everything and to make it
easy, so that there is no difficulty in
comprehending what is being said (pp. 16-17).
It is an illiteracy of the imagination among Reagan's
supporters, Harris suggests, that explains Reagan's
persuasiveness. It stems from the inability to read in any
way outside a uniform frame, a uniform kind of narrative.
"No wonder," Harris writes,
we live in a world of such fanaticism. If we
have cultures which are locked into certain
functions, which read the world only in one way,
then fanaticism grows out of that, terror grows
out of that— a total refusal, a total difficulty
to read the world in any other way, to make any
other kind of adjustment (p. 18).
A Map of This Study
I have outlined the history of cultural studies and
the debates around multiculturalism and the humanities in
hopes of setting a context from which my work has emerged.
My project is intended to address the problem of an
undertheorized multicultural education in terms of
difference and otherness as well as to explore a
particular approach to practice in multicultural teacher
education. The overall focus of my efforts is to expose
the workings of an alternative to "illiteracy of the

imagination". It is hoped that such an exposure can enter
the debates around multiculturalism as a challenge to the
narrow vision of mainstream, dominant discourse, as well
as to some of those views opposing the mainstream. It
challenges those who continue to use a language of simple
or binary opposition exclusively, thereby allowing that
which is opposed to set the terms of the debate.
In chapter two I lay out problematics that have been
under-theorized in the multicultural education literature:
marginality, essentialism, and a kind of communication
across difference which I refer to as translation.
Marginality is viewed as a complex and dynamic interaction
among social and individual subjectivities. It is
insufficient to view it in simple opposition to centrality
or dominance. Essentialism, in this writing— reduction of
ideas, phenomena, social actors to positive transcendental
essences— is a problem that emerges out of attempts to
discuss oppressions and subjectivities on the basis of
race and gender. This problem is approached from feminist
and poststructural philosophical perspectives. Given the
problematics of marginality and essentialism,
communication across difference becomes particularly
challenging. The term communication is insufficient as a
referent for this problem as it carries connotative
baggage from over-use in such areas as popular psychology.
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To indicate the greater difficulty, complexity, and multi
directionality involved in the construction of an
educational space for cross-cultural conversation, I have
chosen to explore the notion of translation.
Such "communication theorizing," I believe, remains
insufficient without consideration of the powerful
significance of place (Pinar, 1991). Serres's notion of
"local pockets" of knowledge and communication as well as
Deleuze and Guattari's "collective subjectivity" or
"group-subjects" will provide some of the theoretical
support. Encounters within (translation across difference
within) differ from but inform and are informed by
encounters between, and are explored through the literary
examples in the next chapter as well.
Finally, this translation can not be understood
outside notions of love. This word has been appropriated
(made kitsch) repeatedly such that we are afraid to use
the term— especially in theoretic works. I intend to
reclaim it. It is about power. If it were not about power,
it would not be so often stolen. But it is also,
potentially, about power that is dynamic rather than
static and asymmetrical.
Chapter three consists of readings of literary works
that serve as demonstrations of the theoretical
problematics framed in chapter two. The readings are
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generated in such a way as to highlight the translation
and subsequent conversation that takes place between and
among certain texts. Through the literary, sometimes
explicitly autobiographical, examples of both black and
white southern American authors as well as some AfricanCaribbean authors I hope to expose the way in which
encounters between are constitutive of and are constituted
by place. These texts and readings serve as examples for
possible inclusions in a teacher education course.
Chapter four deals with the idea of autobiography
written in parallel with literary and various theoretical
readings in a teacher education course. In this chapter I
discuss autobiography theory and provide an example of my
own re-reading of, and autobiographical writing with, a
work of historical fiction that I initially read as a
fourteen-year-old. The novel is set in Louisiana which is
where I spent my childhood. This provides a passage for a
demonstration of the significance of place to my teacher
education project. Finally, I have included a sample of
student autobiography produced from a class I taught for
pre-service teachers in which my ideas for this project
were explored.
In the concluding chapter I summarize my position and
return to the debates around multiculturalism, cultural
studies, and the humanities in order to situate this work

among them. From this the discussion moves to one of
implications and recommendations for the curriculum field
with respect to teacher education.

CHAPTER TWO
Marginality, Essentialism, Translation: The "Place" of
Love
I have divided this chapter into separate sections
with subheadings for marginality, essentialism,
translation, and love, but it should be understood that
these separations are, to some extent, artificial as the
categories function through and within one another both in
terms of my vision of them and of my writing. The
separations are intended to act as markers calling
attention to key issues as they figure most prominently in
this text. It should also be noted that the four
subheadings are not the only problematics that emerge in
this writing. They simply serve as organizing principles
in my effort to promote a certain clarity. These
theoretical categories are set up but not completed or
enclosed in this chapter. These constructs become more
fully developed as they are viewed in action— that is, as
they are engaged in the literary and autobiographical
readings that come later.
At this point my writing leaves behind, to some
extent, the style that dominates the first chapter. I feel
it necessary to demonstrate my project not merely through
straightforward content, but, and perhaps even more
importantly, through a style marked by certain
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discontinuities and leaps— a style that is itself
interdisciplinary and, as such, analogous to the crosscultural imagination to which Wilson Harris refers (1983)
as well as to the historical tracings of cultural studies.

Identity and the Currere of Marcrinalitv
The ways in which marginalized groups, individuals,
and ideas come to be marginalized in a given culture,
society, and/or place has much to do with what is
considered to be knowledge and who is considered to
possess it— who is perceived as knower and who is
perceived as known. Clearly, education is deeply
implicated in these processes, and these processes are
themselves deeply implicated in the formation of
identities or subject-positions. This notion of identityformation has been systematically neglected in approaches
to multicultural education. As Taubman observes,
Not only have they failed to address how
identity is formed, what it might mean and how
it functions, but they have also left unexplored
the way the approaches themselves consciously or
unconsciously are used to create identities (In
Press, p. 3).
I will expand the discussion of Taubman's thesis below as
it relates in important ways to my own concerns.
Taubman has examined notions of the emergence of
identity through three registers which, he suggests, are
most precisely viewed as in dialectical tension with each
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other. In the first register identity emerges as a
construct of language and, thus, as a kind of fiction
which alienates one from the complex interplay of
differences within oneself and between oneself and others.
It can be viewed from a psychoanalytic perspective, as a
result of Lacan's "mirror stage" (mentioned in chapter
one). This fictional register functions through a selfessentializing movement in which boundaries between self
and not-self, margin and center, are rigidly drawn and
assumed stable. In this register knowledge is discourse.
As such, multicultural education conceptualized from
within an awareness of this register may be approached by
examining the way in which discursive practices (including
those of multicultural education itself) "maintain
oppression . . . block understanding . . .

or produce

paranoid knowledge" (p. 8). The danger for a multicultural
education conceived within an awareness of this register
only, Taubman observes, is that "it leaves unquestioned
who or what puts the period at the end of its speech and
thus reintroduces meaning" (p. 8). That is, it risks
becoming nihilistic in its potential for endless
signification and deferral. It is not rooted in action. It
is "bloodless" (p. 8).
The second register, which Taubman calls the
"communal as an identity-in-motion," (p. 9) involves group
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membership and all that it implies for identity as it
emerges in the relations among and between individual,
group, and society. The term "identity-in-motion” is
derived from Henry Louis Gates's explanation of the "maskin-motion" exemplified by the Yoruba mask which only
produces meaning when worn in front of an audience of
initiates. This meaning-making evokes a sense of interior
cohesion for the group involved in the process of
producing this meaning. Taubman explains,
Within the communal register identity is made
the ground for action. The identity is not taken
as a formation of language but as an identityin-motion . . . In such a world only those who
are members can explore the meaning of the
identity (p. 10-11).
The socially marginalized (which I will discuss in more
detail later) stand to benefit from the solidarity
generated by such identity formation. It is through this
register that multicultural education is approached as,
for example, an Afrocentric curriculum. However, this
register risks essentializing identity (also discussed in
more detail later), freezing it into mere group
membership, if its relationship to other registers is
lost.
The third register Taubman describes is the
autobiographical. Explication of the subtle difference he
intends between this register and the others requires that
I quote him at length.
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Within the autobiographical register, unlike the
fictional register, the narrative which the
subject constructs does not create the real
experience of living but rather posits the
possibility of external validation. One's
recounted autobiography therefore does not
create one's experience but captures it. Thus
autobiography as a means to self-knowledge is
possible since a dialectic exists between
narrative and actual experience. This
autobiography is both the ground for action and
what is to be transformed (p. 14).
Theoretical debates around the meaning(s) and
definition(s) of autobiography will be raised in my fourth
chapter. Suffice it to say for now that within this
register is a vision for the possibility of
responsibility, action, and agency from the perspective of
transforming and transformative individuals in
relationship to others. Nonetheless, as Taubman warns,
there are many dangers when this register loses sight of
the others. Fixation within this register alone ignores
the extent to which race, class, gender, ethnicity, and
the unconscious do determine identity and knowledge. For
example, a multicultural approach that is frozen in this
register may take the position of a "color blind"
curriculum. But it is also through this register in
interaction and tension with the others that the operation
of those multiple and partial determinisms may be
explored. As Paul Valery reminds us, "There is no theory
that is not a fragment, carefully prepared, of some
autobiography" (cited in Lionnet, 1989, p. 91).
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The three registers of identity formation about which
Taubman writes resonate with my theoretical conceptions of
layers of marginality. At this time I will proceed to my
discussion of marginality during which, as appropriate, I
will return to Taubman's registers.
The texts I examine in this dissertation confront the
issue of marginality from different racialized and
gendered standpoints. I use the term confront to emphasize
the problematic nature of marginality as it appears in the
literary works examined in this writing as well as this
writing itself.

In these texts, and as Brazilian educator

Paulo Freire notes, the marginalized are, in many senses,
in a position to know more about the culture that keeps
them far from the center than can members of that culture
know about the margins (1970). Likewise, marginal aspects
of even those who are in the center in the broadest sense
are the aspects of self through which they gain a
metaperspective or distance from self. This is because the
margin must "know" the center in order to survive, but the
reverse is not true to the same extent. Yet neither exists
as such without the other. Hence there is an infusion of
each in the other. I refer to this idea as the "currere of
marginality."
Currere, as William Pinar explains (1975), is the
Latin root of the word curriculum and its study "involves
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investigation of the nature of the individual experience
of the public" (p. 400). It is by the experiences and
ideas through which I am marginalized, or through which I
choose to dwell in the margins, that I experience the
public as an individual (not as an indistinct member of a
group). And it is from that experience that I gain
multiple perspectives around notions of self, other,
society as both separate and connected. The term currere
is apt in the context of this writing in another sense:
curriculum theory as a field of study is itself
marginalized in academia generally. And, synchronous with
Friere's characterization of the oppressed, this
marginalization is at one and the same time oppressive
(low funding, negligence, threats of obliteration, etc.)
and enlightening (there is relative freedom to explore
multiple perspectives due to a sort of "benign neglect"
within power structures). As such, curriculum theory is a
place of encounters between and translations among
different local knowledges— a process which itself
constitutes the generation of new knowledges.
The education professorate has historically been at
the fringes of academia as teacher education has been seen
as an instrumentally vocational, service-oriented field
that cannot claim a discipline of its own. It has been a
field that was seen as derivative of disciplines such as
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philosophy, history, and psychology. The curriculum field
was "born [in the 1920's] . . .

of administrative

convenience rather than intellectual necessity" (Giroux,
Penna, & Pinar, 1981, p. 1). Curriculum, in recent history
due to economic and demographic trends, has been
subordinated to educational psychology and administration
departments to the point that it was declared "moribund"
in 1970 by Joseph Schwab (Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981, p.
6). It has since climbed out of that hole a bit but
largely remains in the same relative position. Part of
this climb has been a result of its diversification,
"reconceptualization," and commitment to scholarship more
resembling that of other disciplines from which it was
seen as derivative. It is not simply derivative of other
fields. This idea places curriculum theory, in many
senses, in a similar situation to cultural studies. We
either became "artists" and scholars or we died—
fulfilling "the role of the artist and the role of
curriculum theorists as seers of the intersections of
humanity and things condemned by vocation to marginality"
(C. McCarthy, personal communication, May, 1990).
Marginality both as theoretical and embodied
existence is a source of big trouble. It "lives" within
the very language/world that makes it necessary and that
it must oppose. Paradoxically, it must oppose the notion

of opposition. Frequently marginality is placed in binary
opposition to centrality or dominance where it is further
reduced to social categories such as race, class, and
gender with little or no regard for the intersection of
these categories with smaller group and individual
contexts. That is, it is viewed only from Taubman's second
register— the communal. Social theories and institutions
as well as philosophical writings based on the logic of
binary opposition are ill-equipped to deal with the
nuances of these (non)categories and their implications
for the production of subjectivity. Literature is often
the only written source of assistance and encouragement
for one who wishes to think about these issues in a multi
dimensional way. Ralph Ellison, in his Shadow and Act,
echoes these concerns in the context of expressing his
reasons for writing fiction:
Unfortunately many Negroes have been trying to
define their own predicament in exclusively
sociological terms, a situation I consider quite
short-sighted. Too many of us have accepted a
statistical interpretation of our lives and thus
much of that which makes us a source of moral
strength to America goes unappreciated and
undefined (1953, p. 16).
Probably no one would deny that literature has value
far beyond that of pleasure and escape (not that those
values are not inextricably linked to the others), but in
many of the social sciences— and even the natural sciences
(e.g., Michel Serres, 1982b and N. Katherine Hayles,
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1990)— including my own field of curriculum theory, the
potential power of literature to inform those fields has
only recently begun to be articulated.
But marginality, in this writing, is not only about
the socially marginalized. Marginality can be viewed from
at least two perspectives or layers: social marginality
and individual marginality. The socially marginalized
refers to lives which lie outside the dominant culture
(the center). While I am aware that race, class, gender
and other categories are social, historical and cultural
constructions and not natural ones, at this particular
historical juncture it seems accurate to refer to the
margins of larger United States society (the socially
marginalized) as, in part, non-white or "racialized",
economically deprived and feminist/"feminine." Still, it
can be argued that everyone is marginal in at least some
aspects. The way we attempt to define ourselves has a
great deal to do with who or what we attempt to define as
"other" to us. And it is at the frontier between this self
and this other (these selves and these others) that our
own individual marginality lies. For example, if I situate
myself as a white, middle-class woman, then anyone who I
situate as non-white, non-middle class, and/or male would
be an other to me. But, I may also exhibit characteristics
that are traditionally thought of as masculine, I may come

from a working-class background, and my physical
appearance, manner of speech and behavior may be "racially
ambiguous." Therein rests part of my marginality in what
might be called the individual layer. This particular
example of individual marginality also illustrates, albeit
simplistically, the interaction between social and
individual layers in that the individual layer differs
from the social layer by virtue of ambiguity around
categories that define the social layer. In other words,
there exists something beyond these two layers, an
interactive space where these layers enfold one another,
which reveals the leakiness of boundaries between
different forms of marginality and between margin and
center.
The problem with defining margins and, by default,
centers as such is that in doing so we are stuck in a
language of oppositions whereby the only option for change
is to move from one pole to the other, a complete
reversal, or to merge the two in dialectical synthesis,
obliterating differences and flattening out the cultural
landscape. Either the insidious structure of hierarchy is
maintained or the integrity of individual difference and
autonomy is endangered. Perhaps a more desirable state of
affairs could result from deconstruction of that
hierarchical system— and I speak here of deconstruction as
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set forth by Derrida. Gayatri Spivak explains this notion
in the context of the feminist concern with the publicprivate split (opposition):
The shifting limit that prevents this feminist
reversal of the public-private hierarchy from
freezing into a dogma [synthesis] or, indeed,
from succeeding fully [reversal] is the
displacement of the opposition itself. . . .
The opposition is thus not merely reversed; it
is displaced. . . . The peculiarity of
deconstructive practice must be reiterated here.
Displacing the opposition that it initially
apparently guestions, it is always different
from itself, always defers itself. It is neither
a constitutive nor, of course, a regulative
norm. . . . It is in terms of this peculiarity
of deconstruction then that the displacement of
male-female, public-private marks a shifting
limit rather than the desire for a complete
reversal (1988, p.103).
As such, what I have called the interactive layer of
marginality is not a synthesis of social/individual or
even larger social/ community/individual— it is a
deconstruction of those layers, which undermines claims to
a "positive" stable identity for either self or other,
margin or center.
At this point I should call attention to a difference
between my vision of the interactive layer as a
deconstruction and Taubman's understanding of a
dialectical tension among the three registers of identity
formation. There are, of course, many different accounts
of "dialectics." I am basing my discussion of the
difference between dialectics and deconstruction on a

64
particularly lucid account of marxist dialectics by Bertel
Oilman (1986). In the paragraphs that follow I go into
perhaps more detail than such an interlude in my arguments
should warrant. I do this for two reasons: first, the
differentiation is complex; and second, I have been unable
to find this explicitly done elsewhere.
A dialectical approach assumes that the processes by
which events take place are knowable and, somehow,
sensible. Thus, it must assume a certain transparency of
language (through to reality). Analysis or investigation
that proceeds through dialectical thinking is indeed
complex and dynamic. In that sense it is not mired in
chains of certainty or pre-determined outcomes. However,
in a total sense, such analysis can proceed only through a
kind of faith in the knowable— an epistemological faith.
Dialectical thinking as it is most often characterized in
contemporary theory is dependent on a notion of structure
which presupposes a center of meaning of some sort (even
those structuralist theories that regard social formations
as a "decentered" structure) . "This centre governs the
structure but is itself not subject to structural analysis
(to find the structure of the centre would be to find
another centre)" (Selden, 1989, p. 87). A dialectical
approach depends on conceptualization as direct connection
to the real— thus giving rise to the possibility for

synthesis or incorporation. It is a movement between
concepts in search of the knowable. The concepts with
which it deals are necessarily assumed to be opposites, at
least in key aspects. This would imply that to some extent
the concepts (in this case the three registers) can be
thought outside one another.

(Derrida's notion of the

supplement in deconstructive thinking denies this
possibility.)
Dialectical thinking is predicated on what Serres
calls the "ordered structure." In one essay he begins his
account of this with a quote from La Fontaine's "The Wolf
and the Lamb" parable: "The reason of the stronger is
always the best" (1982b, p. 15). The ordered structure,
like the positioning of the wolf and lamb (and shepherd
and dog) along the running stream "designates a set of
elements provided with an ordering relation" (p. 16). This
can be diagrammed as three points (a, b, and c) on a line
with a direction (irreversible). Each point is either
preceded or succeeded, or both, by another point. No point
can precede or succeed itself, so the relation is
irreflexive. From this model of the ordered structure one
can define processes of dominance ("strength"), reason,
causality, hierarchies in general. "The order of reason is
only a particular exemplar of order in general. And this
has immense consequences" (p. 17). The operation of the
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ordered structure proceeds through a series of trials in
which the first task is to establish responsibility. In
order to win in this trial it is necessary to "play the
role of the minorant" (p. 20)— to demonstrate injury or
victimization. The game is a never-ending dialectical
process. "Stable structures and dialectical processes are
inseparable" (p. 21).
Given this characterization of dialectical thinking I
do not dismiss it as an important strategy for approaching
certain types of problems, especially at a theoretically
"local" level. As Guattari explains,
Certainly, in the field of social ecology in
particular, there will be times of struggle in
which all men and women feel a need to set
common objectives and act "like little
soldiers"— by which I mean good activists (1990,
p. 7).
However, such a synthesis inevitably gives rise to new
contradictions, and this is where a deconstructive
approach to thinking and reading may provide relief.

(It

should be noted, ironically, that setting up this
comparison as an essential opposition is "antithetical" [a
term that introduces another ironic turn] to the spirit of
deconstruction.)
Deconstruction is based in re-readings— the refusal
of final meaning (or synthesis), even momentarily. It
proceeds in search of a space between concepts— a marking
of the unknowable. Realist representation that can emerge
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from dialectical thinking and synthesis is viewed as an
illusion of presence. Not unlike notions of power for
Foucault, for deconstruction meaning is not inherently a
problem until it becomes (viewed as) static, and
asymmetric in its stasis. As such, a deconstructive
approach may sometimes be inappropriate to particular
problems of an immediate, daily or local nature (problems
that Jacques Daignault refers to as difficulties) because
of its infinite deferral and lack of closure. That is, to
think of it as a "method11 which is applied to difficulties
whereby "solutions" are perpetually deferred can result in
a nihilism and passivity.
On the other hand, a deconstructive approach to the
problem of identity in three registers could indeed have
strategic interventionary value for specific (i.e. local
and particular) problems in that it allows for a play of
reversals among those registers, as long as the reversals
are not made static. Sometimes, even for difficulties,
solutions need to be temporarily deferred. Deconstruction
also acknowledges the extent to which Taubman's registers
cannot even be thought outside or apart from one another,
at the same time they are not collapsed onto one another.
For a dialectical approach, a kind of sublation among
registers is the goal. Such an approach is unable to take
into account breaks and discontinuities in meaning.
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A deconstructive approach to the three registers
would seek spaces between, by virtue of these breaks and
discontinuities in meaning, which defy categorization
(knowledge), but which nonetheless mark a persistence that
is unsayable. Its expression in words (or otherwise) is
not possible by any direct approach. Such expression is
found in literary works, for example, where direct and
positive categorization of "messages" or "morals" cannot
be drawn, but where, perhaps, a sensibility remains— where
a good reading leaves in its wake the trace of crosscultural experience, a partial translation that is never
final but always open to re-reading, re-interpretation,
re-translation. It is not an attempt to subsume through
synthesis, incorporating differences and discovering
oneself in every other.
Deconstruction is a conscious acknowledgment of the
ordered structure and an attempt to subvert it— an attempt
which is ultimately impossible in any total sense. In
terms of issues surrounding multiculturalism, racism,
sexism, the value of deconstruction over dialectics is its
"self-conscious" recognition of the ordered structure and
the way in which the structure itself produces,
necessarily, victims. Possibilities and visions for
processes/movements capable of minimizing violence and
victimization seem most likely through this awareness
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which works to keep power and meaning in motion— similar,
perhaps, in operation to Taubman's "identity-in-motion."
Finally, the idea of identity almost "begs the
question" of whether or not to approach it dialectically
or deconstructively as these approaches ultimately signal
particular orientations toward identity and subjectivity
in their very constructions. For example, the fictional
register was conceived by Taubman as being informed, in
part, by Derridean deconstruction. Another example: both
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas argue "that the subject can
never grasp its own act of grasping" (Taylor, 1987, p.
204). As such, Merleau-Ponty posited a "dialectic without
synthesis" to replace the "bad dialectic [which] is that
which thinks it recomposes being by a thetic thought, by
an assemblage of statements, by thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis" (cited in Taylor, p. 79). I will not attempt to
elaborate on Merleau-Ponty's work in this writing.
Ultimately, decisions about approaches to problems or
difficulties with identity formation and multiculturalism
require a local and situational judgment. Such judgment, I
insist, requires a competence that is a "literacy of the
imagination" (Harris, 1989).
Paulo Freire could be said to operate through
dialectical thinking in his approach to the oppressed (the
marginalized), and thus to identity. According to Freire,

70
the marginalized, or the oppressed, are the only ones who
can understand the full significance of oppression, hence
they are the only ones who will have the vision and the
strength to eliminate it. The greatest obstacle to their
accomplishing this feat, he says, is that the oppressed
"are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor
whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict
lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or
being divided . . . "

(1970, p.32). This idea is an

example of what is known in dialectical thinking, as it is
laid out by Bertel Oilman (1986), as the "interpenetration
of opposites." However, according to Friere, once this
process begins there is a danger of complete reversal due,
in part, to internalization of oppression and the
consequent identification of oppressors as embodying what
it means to be human.

Another danger comes from attempts

(by whom is not clear— perhaps, for example, by
individually marginalized people at the social center?) to
facilitate the activism of the oppressed through the use
of "monologues, slogans, and communique's" rather than
dialogue. This is an "attempt to liberate the oppressed
with the instruments of domestication" (Freire, 1970, p.
52) .
While Freire's sense of marginality as expressed here
most closely corresponds to what I have called social
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marginality, part of his concern is similar to Spivak's
"deconstructivist" warnings about being subsumed within
the very discourse being opposed. The difference is in
Spivak's insistence that one can never oppose a discourse
from a position entirely outside it. In so doing, Spivak
is able to encompass a broader sense of marginality to
include the interactive layer. That idea is illustrated
(and was alluded to earlier in this writing) by the very
use of the word "oppose" for a "project" that wants to
displace binary oppositions (Spivak, 1988, p. 106, 108,
110). This problem, however, is not a contradiction so
much as it is a paradox. (A paradox, as I use the term
here, is a problem that does not require— indeed can't
have— a solution. It requires deconstructive reading.)
Displacement is not the same as elimination.
Another problem with Friere's position is that in
referring to a choice of becoming "wholly themselves" he
seems to discount the degree to which the oppressed are
within and constitutive of the oppressors, as well as the
degrees to which the oppressed (and the oppressors) differ
from one another. Excavation of these relations provides
the possibility for opening spaces to dialogue and
reinterpretation. As Russell Ferguson explains,
The intent is not to create a new center of
authority based on a spurious unity of the
marginalized, but rather to open up spaces for
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new ways of thinking about the dynamics of
cultural power (1990, p. 9).
Indeed, marginality in all its layers is constituted
by encounters. The social margins result from encounters
across differences between (in terms of race, class,
gender, nationality, sexual orientation, etcetera)—
encounters that often have necessitated one-way
translation by the marginalized of those who suppress and
oppress them; that is, "translation with a master"
(Rajchman, 1991, p. 7). Encounters across differences
between transform all of those involved in some ways. When
translation takes place without a master, the
transformations that take place can set cultural power in
motion, blurring the boundaries between margin and center.
Individual margins can be thought of as encounters
across differences within— differences generated by
socially and culturally produced psyches within
"singularized" subject-positions. Clearly, these margins
emerge in the context of the social, but are not, in many
respects, predictably determined by social structures, in
part because the social structures are themselves highly
contradictory. My margins are precisely those areas in
which I am unpredictable, a surprise. When that
unpredictability becomes a surprise even to myself then I
have been set up to learn.
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When those margins are set in the context of their
interactions with the larger (social) margins, the
readings required become more complex, richer. I learn
through good readings of the world (and that includes
readings of myself), just as good reading is reading that
is situated to allow for the "surprise of otherness"
(Johnson, B., 1987, p. 15). Good readings are those that
operate at some conscious level through all three of
Taubman's registers.
That is, a reading that sets up the conditions for a
knowledge-within-difference would proceed through some
degree of awareness of collective and individual histories
of the movement and ambivalence of desire, of exploitation
and privilege, and of the possible relationships among
these.

(Autobiography is one place to explore those

relationships.) For example, William Pinar's essay
"Understanding Curriculum as a Racial Text" is both itself
such a reading at the same time it is a call for and a
description of the conditions for eliciting such readings
from teacher educators, teachers, and students. In this
essay Pinar explains how, psychoanalytically, the
repression of African-American history, literature, and
culture can be understood in terms of attempts at American
identity formation and stabilization. Such an identity can
only be sustained through a kind of willful ignorance that
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distorts and deforms at the level of the individual and
the social both European-Americans and African-Americans
alike. Such a national identity can only be sustained
through deployment of a "border patrol" between center and
margin.
Desire operates through this labor (of sustaining
national identity) from within a history that lives in the
present, not unlike the lie that is told and goes out of
control, snowball-like, requiring constant re-creation to
protect not only the perpetrator, but all who were taken
in. The desire itself (to perpetrate a lie, for example)
is what must be explored. What is needed, Pinar suggests,
is a kind of social psychoanalytic therapy to expose the
lie and save the subject— to de-center then "re-center"
the subject on the basis of cross-cultural encounters that
assist the continuous (re)constitution of it. That subject
is himself. It is also the rest of us, as citizens of the
northern United States and of the southern United States
in particular. Exposure and exploration of the lie and
what drives it presents a surprise of otherness when I
discover that as a European-American I am being
constituted also by that which is African-American, that
this infusion lives and moves through a collective
unconscious and memory of which I am part and from which,
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at the same' time, I differ. Now I can read in a new way.
Ground is provided for a new assemblage.

The Essence of Essentialism
The problem I refer to— margins and centers,
frontiers, boundaries, outsides and insides, the places of
reified (and re-reified) structures— is about the
necessity for coming to terms with difference and
otherness. As Mark Taylor reminds us, "The history of
society and culture is, in large measure, a history of the
struggle with the endlessly complex problems of difference
and otherness" (Altaritv. 1987, p. xxi). Learning is about
difference and perception. And difference that is
perceptible is necessarily concentrated at the boundaries,
fluid and dynamic though they be, the borders between
margin and center. Thus a society that values learning
also values and loves and listens to its so-called
margins. Yet too often, to be marginalized is already to
be situated in a kind of "double bind" with respect to the
so-called centers of society. That is, the socially
marginalized are expected to adopt and function within a
cultural "memory" that is not truly their own at the same
time they must struggle if they wish to be included in
that society.
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At the same time that the margins are posed with a
double bind, their questions and other responses to the
center take the form of another kind of double bind— a
kind of chiasmus to the double bind imposed on the margins
by the center of expectation/exclusion. Margins, being
both advantageous and dangerous territories, ask us to
abandon an ostensibly rationalist discourse by posing
questions and responses to the center in the form of mixed
messages that say "I am this,” "Don't label me as this".
For example, in challenging the common wisdom about
race among white people as well as among her peers in the
literary community Zora Neale Hurston frequently played
with stereotypes and cliches about race. She does this in
an essay called "How It Feels to be Colored Me" published
in World Tomorrow in 1928 (examined by Barbara Johnson in
1987). Hurston divided the essay into small separate parts
and responded to the question differently in each part. By
so doing she, at times, appears to give contradictory
answers to the question as she reverses and re-reverses
cliches about race. Her "answer" comes, therefore, from
the piece as a style. Hurston's reversals play between
herself as essentially black (different from you, white
person) and essentially nothing (the same as you, white
person). Johnson's speculation is:
In the first essay, Hurston describes the jungle
feeling as an art, an ability to feel, not a
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reversion. In the second, the jungle appears as
a result of "strain." In the first, Hurston can
proclaim "I am this"; but when the image is
repeated "you are that," it changes completely.
The content of the image may be the same, but
its interpersonal use is different. . . The
difference between difference and sameness can
barely be said. It is as small and as vast as
the difference between "like" and "as" (1987,
pp.177-8).
This call for abandoning a rationalist discourse is
often heard through literature, poetry, and art— symbolic
arenas that have historically been more often excused from
the "responsibility" of rationalism. Through such
literature, the problematic of an antiessentialism/essentialism binary is exposed and, as I see
it, calls up two notions of essentialism: essentialism as
it is typically used in a pejorative sense— that is, one
that absolutely prevents translation (the signifier
becomes the signified), and another that ambiguously
simultaneously demands and rejects translation— "translate
me" or "I am this, understand me" and at the same time "do
not translate me" or "do not label me as this."
(Translation will be discussed further below.)
The first sort of essentialism is based on the notion
that identities of persons and things are stable and
definable according to transcendental essences and/or
standards of judgment. The second is a destabilized
essentialism that is locally and strategically deployed as
resistance to the first as well as to terrorism generally.

78
The difference, as expressed by Diana Fuss, is that the
first type of essentialism is "inherently reactionary—
inevitably and inescapably a problem or a mistake" (1989,
p. 20). The second type when deployed "may have some
strategic or interventionary value. . . the radicality or
conservatism of essentialism depends, to a significant
degree, on who is utilizing it, how it is deployed, and
where its effects are concentrated" (P.20).
The case of Susie Phipps in Louisiana (in 1982) in
conjunction with much of civil rights legislation provides
an example that demonstrates the political problematics
coming out of the anti-essentialism/essentialism binary
opposition. Susie Phipps contested her legal definition as
black which was arrived at by conformation to a Louisiana
state law (1970) that asserted that anyone who had "1/32
black blood" was indeed black. This was to be determined
by genealogical records which, in Phipps case, indicated
that a great-great-great-great grandmother had been a
"Negress and a number of other ancestors mulattoes,
quadroons, and octoroons" (Dominguez, 1986, p. 2).
The trial involved expert testimony from
anthropologist Munro Edmonson who argued on Phipps behalf
that by virtue of the way genes are "shuffled" before
birth it is at least theoretically possible for one to
inherit all genes from just two grandparents. Furthermore,
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he cited "modern genetic studies [that] show that blacks
in the US average 25% white genes and that whites average
5% black genes, and that by these statistics, using the
1/32 law, the entire native-born population of Louisiana
would be considered black!" (p. 2). (How these statistics
were arrived at is another interesting question that I am
not now prepared to deal with.) Though Susie Phipps lost
her case, nervous Louisianians overturned that law in
1983. But the question of legal racial identity remains,
though now, at least ostensibly, for different purposes.
With the hard-fought battles over civil rights
legislation, legal racial distinctions are deemed
necessary in order to insure equal protection under the
law, etcetera. The contradiction that arises is one where
legal distinctions on the basis of race may both limit
choice at the same time they enhance it in other ways.
This case demonstrates the demand for deconstruction
of that binary which opposes essentialist definitions of
race (as in blood, for example) to "anti-essentialist"
claims of uncertainty, at the same time it points to the
second form of essentialism/translation, that is, the
ambiguous and shifting one, as politically strategic for
the marginalized. Replacing what is dynamic with static
essences (or, for that matter, static "anti-essences" that
claim to know the essence of essentialism) is a

characteristic of modern social and economic structures.
It is what Milan Kundera calls "totalitarian kitsch" which
is, he says, "the absolute denial of shit," the expression
of a desire to reach "an agreement with being as such"
(Unbearable Lightness of Being. 1984, pp. 248, 249). It
"deprives people of memory and thus retools them into a
nation of children" (The Book of Laughter and Forgetting.
1981, p. 235). Robert Boyers writes in a letter to
Kundera, "Collective activity inevitably entails parades,
slogans, and the belief that one is right. So you suggest.
To oppose totalitarianism is to ask questions and to
refuse to become a model of anything, not even of
dissidence" (1985, p. 231).
But, if democracy is possible it should by its very
definition resist totalitarian kitsch. It is difference
that puts the pressure on governments to live up to
democratic ideals. And kitsch, as conceived by Kundera, is
the absolute denial of difference. But how does one
"deconstruct" such a binary when deconstruction itself is
often touted as a paradigm of anti-essentialism? Herein
lies another aspect of the double bind presented to us all
by the margins.
This double bind has been articulated and explored
extensively by such literary figures as Milan Kundera,
Zora Neale Hurston, Toni Morrison, and Ralph Ellison. They
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all deal either explicitly or implicitly (or both) with
notions of double binds and the schizophrenic insight that
they induce. I see an interesting linkage between the
language and literature of schizophrenia and the
characterization of the reader of literature in a state of
engagement with a text. The engaged reader is said to
experience a dissolution of the reading self— a "moment of
dispossession of the reading ego: as separation of itself
from itself" (Ricoeur). Of course, those who are
"clinically schizophrenic" probably suffer a
"dispossession of the ego" which goes far beyond the
momentary.
Gregory Bateson, in his Steps to an Ecology of Mind
(1972) included an essay "Toward a Theory of
Schizophrenia" (pp. 201-227) in which he reflects upon his
work with schizophrenics. He notes that schizophrenics
spent their childhoods caught in a double-bind sort of
logic. That is, they received incessant, inescapable,
contradictory messages with regard to their own behavior
and feelings from one or more significant family members.
The "way out" for these people is to develop different
systems of logic in order to deal with the situation and
to translate from other systems to their own. Such logic
is often circular and rich in metaphor. The difference
between this metaphor use and ordinary metaphor use,
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Bateson suggests, is that schizophrenics use "unlabeled"
metaphors in the form of distorted syllogisms. For
example: "Men die. Grass dies. Men are grass" (p. 205).
In drawing analogies among a debilitating
schizophrenia, the marginalized, and the reader engaged
with a text, by no means do I wish to imply the existence
of a pathology to be exorcised from the latter two. It is
just that it occurs to me that when one is confronted with
a challenge to one's logical system, such as what often
occurs with reading and learning and living in the
margins, one is forced to compensate and does so through a
schizophrenic moment. There is also a decontextualization
about schizophrenia that seems similar to those aspects of
reading in which the reader is submissive to the text.
Again, they are but moments for the reader in which s/he
is confronted with difference, challenged to be creative
of new systems but temporarily relatively unanchored to
history. As Alan Nadel explains, as we read,
we may even rest on one set of connotations, but
we do so very tentatively, for the pleasurable
compact of reading is that we are always open to
moments of acquisition and surrender— in which
we recover and discard implications brought to
the surface by the text (1988, pp. 51-2).
For Wilson Harris, the process of writing is also
schizophrenic:
the unity or density of original expression in a
work of profound imagination, is paradox; it is
both a cloak for, and a dialogue with, eclipses,
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of live "otherness" that seek to break through
in a new light and tone expressive of layers of
reality. Sometimes this combination and
breakthrough . . . is schizophrenic (1983, p.
xvii).
I wonder if it is these rebellions against logic,
this playfulness, the schizophrenia in us all that allows
for the construction of new "schema," configurations,
categories, via something like "unlabeled metaphors." For
Deleuze and Guattari there exist "positive schizophrenic
lines of escape" (1983, p. 363) which I interpret to be
similar to this state of reading/learning/engagement/
dispossession. The problem with the "sick schizo" arises,
they say, when s/he is "effectively neuroticized" (p.
363), paralyzed by the double-bind. Bateson notes that
psychiatric institutions are often themselves productive
of the double-bind (Bateson, 1972, p. 225). Likewise, I
would argue, other institutions and the theories that
produce them can be. I see theory based on the movement of
difference as providing a "line of escape" whereas much
social theory within a privileged rationalist discourse
attempts to enclose us in the double bind by telling us
that our experiences and feelings are insignificant.
Calling once again on Nadel:
the great value of Derrida is that he . . .
makes a strong argument for the idea that . . .
were we not constantly readjusting everything we
know (recognizing difference and deferring
under-standing)— we could not make sense of
anything (1988, p. 57)
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Resisting from the margins, we can avoid that trap, and
often do so through literature, poetry, art, storytelling,
ritual, popular culture.

Translation and Tradition
Translation in this writing emerges as a composite
notion from my readings of the idea through several
authors. For some of them, translation includes but goes
beyond the purely linguistic categories set forth by Roman
Jakobsen. Those are: intralingual translation, or
paraphrase; interlingual translation, or translation in
the most common sense; intersemiotic translation, in which
for example, verbal signs are reencoded in nonverbal sign
systems. In going beyond, for example, Michel Serres
writes of translations among the disciplines of
literature, philosophy, and science which call into
question the whole notion of separate "disciplines"
(similar, in this regard to cultural studies). Philosopher
John Rajchman theorizes a "translation without a master"
that is a kind of cultural translation (1991). Cultural
studies scholar David Murray envisions a cultural
translation as something that is almost always possible,
but always problematic, undecidable, and dynamic (1991).
Derrida writes of the problematics of translation as being
the problematics of the difference between signifier and
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signified— also undecidable. Because this difference is
impure, he prefers a notion of transformation to
translation: "a regulated transformation of one language
by another, of one text by another" (1981, p. 20).
(Indeed, this transformation that takes place is clearly
embodied in literary works of Afro-Caribbean writers.)
Henry Louis Gates shares Derrida's notion of translation
as transformation but "translates" it to accommodate his
African-American literary theory. He differs from Derrida
in that, for Gates, the texts in which he is interested
demand constant re-translation, or at least bitranslation,
just as the hyphen between African and American suggests a
doubling (in Fuss, 1989, pp. 82-83). I will begin more
detailed constructions of these various notions of
translation with Michel Serres.
For Serres, a major (global) problematic involves
finding passages between the sciences and the humanities.
These passages exist, he contends, but they are not as
simple as they have sometimes been made to be. Knowledge
from all domains exists only as local pockets or islands
or spaces. The problem of these spaces has been repressed
in favor of time which, ordered linearly, can be contained
in an ordered structure (i.e., globally applied). The
spaces of knowledge are local, not global, between which
passages exist— but these passages are not generalizable.
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Spaces are disorderly multiplicities that resist a
totalizing and linear history (1982b, p.xiii).
These passages or translations are found and
demonstrated not through similarities, metaphors, or
analogies but through formal operations of translation
(which may appear to be "unlabeled metaphors") whereby
fundamental structures are found to be "isomorphic"— that
is, Serres explores the identical workings of the "ordered
structure" in different domains. Thus, in Zola's texts for
example, "The narrative does not function like a motor, it
is a motor; thermodynamics is part of its very textuality"
(p. xxxvi). Science, literature, philosophy, and myth of a
period are equivalent cultural formations, according to
Serres. Consequently, models of knowledge can be read to
function in the same way across domains. Still, such
connections are not obvious and require what Serres calls
"rigorously disordered" readings.
This sort of translation can occur across identity
registers, and does so in certain literary works. For
example, as Francoise Lionnet suggests, Zora Neale
Hurston's autobiography Dust Tracks in the Road
amounts to autoethnography, that is, the
defining of one's subjective ethnicity as
mediated through language, history, and
ethnographical analysis; in short, that the book
amounts to a kind of "figural anthropology" of
the self (1989, p. 99).

Translation, in Serres's sense of it above, is
similar to the inter-, or more accurately, anti
disciplinarian efforts of cultural studies. His method for
locating isomorphisms between different fields (or spaces
of knowledge) is at the same time historical, literary,
and anthropological; his analysis is philosophical and
social. As the editors of his book of collected essays,
Hermes. explain:
if the separation of knowledge into regions,
formations, or disciplines is no longer
applicable, then knowledge must be reformulated
on new bases, new practical and theoretical
operators must be discovered, and new operations
must be defined. As we have seen, Serres calls
these operations, interference, translation,
distribution, and they all converge toward the
idea of communication (1982b, p. xxxv).
It is his notion of communication (that includes, for
him, translation) that links his specific notion of
translation described above to that of other theorists
here. For Serres, communication is contingent upon
exclusion— not the result or demonstration of a dialectic
movement between opposites. Fluid movement across
boundaries without obliterating boundaries (margins,
differences) is paradoxically hostile to communication and
necessary for it. That is, there must be difference, the
"excluded third man" ("parasite", "noise") in
communication; It is what the communicators
(interlocutors) team up against and try to destroy.
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Communication occurs in the search for sameness but it is
necessarily a reaction to and against difference. As such,
communication always risks violence.
Perhaps translation, given that it is always partial,
can serve as an approach to communication that is not
based in a desire to eliminate the noise of otherness. The
notion that translation can take place presupposes some
common meaning— some "common sense." Rajchman advises, "If
it is sense that translation preserves, where there is
translation, there can be no altogether new sense. There
is always some sense in common" (1991, p. 6). Yet, too
often the translation that takes place between dominant
and subordinant groups in institutions called schools is
such that the "common sense" ("common culture") is
attributed only to a single dominant cultural identity.
This is certainly true of any form of "cultural
deprivation" theory. But it is also, more subtly, true of
those multicultural models or approaches that fail to
recognize the complexity of difference and the production
of subjectivity. "Conversely," Rajchman continues,
"translation without a master would be the art of breaking
with those with whom one nevertheless identifies, while
exposing oneself to the singularities of those one
nevertheless tries to understand" (p. 7).
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Again, translation without a master is a two (or
multi) way process. As Murray points out with regard to
early encounters between aboriginal Americans and whites
in the United States,
In a situation of dominance, the cultural
translation is all one-way, and the penalty to
the subordinant group for not adapting to the
demands of the dominant group is to cease to
exist. Knowledge of the processes of this
translation, though, must be repressed by the
dominant side, in favour of a reassuring image
of mutual intelligibility which does not
register as significant who has had to
"translate" (1991, p. 6).
This assumption of the transparency of language, this
"unspoken belief in the isomorphic relationship between
language and reality" (Greenblatt, 1976, p. 572), is
precisely the trouble with an ideology of positivism which
has such a firm grip on current theory and practice in the
curriculum field and in education generally. Rajchman
asks,
Can there exist a common sense, a public, or
public space— a glasnost— which is not
identified with a single tradition, or with a
single way of classifying the plurality of
traditions, but which is so divided up that each
tradition remains exposed to the singularities
of the others, and of those yet to come? (1991,
p. 6).
Such translations within the multicultural curriculum
need not succumb to the criticisms of those who fear the
"loss" of Western culture and tradition. Tradition in such
a new assemblage, contrary to accusations by conservative
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critics of multiculturalism, is not tossed out; it is
rearticulated, reinterpreted, eventually re
territorialized (a continuous cycle); it is translated.
Encounters among positions in the margins and the center
result in such rearticulations of traditions—
rearticulations that initially deterritorialize elements
of the old. Just as the margins are simultaneously
advantageous and dangerous positions, so is this
deterritorialization. Deterritorialization, as explained
by Guattari, is a breaking up into singularities, it is
ruptures of meaning, and it constitutes existential
territories that have "always sought refuge in art and
religion" (1990, p. 6).
Each of the existential territories . . . exists
. . . as a precarious, finite, finitized entity
for itself; it is singular and singularized; it
may bifurcate into stratefied and death-laden
reiterations; or it may open, as process, into
praxes that enable it to be rendered
"inhabitable" by human projects (p. 8).
Such "human projects" become reterritorialized,
transformed by cross-cultural imagination as, for example,
in literary allusion— which is "to translate out of time"
(Nadel, 1988, p. 49). Allusion is a linguistic expression
of encounters between, for example, in the case of post
colonial Caribbean nations, the traditions of colonizer
and colonized, as well as between those traditions and
"original" expression. The paradox of tradition, Alan
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Nadel indicates, is that "when we deal with the concept of
tradition, we see that only its own manifestation can
alter it" (1988, p. 30). In elaborating on the implication
of allusion (in Ellison's Invisible Man) in "translating
tradition" Nadel argues that the
artist must . . . both invoke and overcome his
or her historical sense. He or she must know the
difference between the past and the present so
well as to be able to afford not to know it. . .
. Tradition, for Eliot, means the manifestation
of the past in the new (p. 29).
It becomes a "revisionary repetition" (Moreland, 1990, p.
4) .
Nadel's theoretical use of literary allusion as a
kind of revisionary repetition resonates with other
theorists of the margins: Wilson Harris's development of
"cross-cultural imagination," Francoise Lionnet's
appropriation and extension of Edouard Glissant's
"metissage," and Henry Louis Gates's "signifyin'." For
Harris, forgotten pre-Columbian traditions return in his
novels to interact with traditions brought by the Western
colonizer, and the encounter produces a revisionary
moment. Within each of his novels, he writes,
there are different texts playing against each
other, as much as to say that if you were to
have a profound, creative democracy, you must
have various texts playing against each other in
such a manner that the tradition comes alive so
marvelously that one begins to break the
apparition of tyranny, the habit of conquest
(1989, p. 27).
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Lionnet retains Glissant's notion of metissage in
French rather than translating it to English (as "halfbreed" or "mixed-blood" or "creole") as, in French, its
meaning does not carry the negative connotation of the
English translations. Metissage involves the braiding of
"cultural forms through the simultaneous revalorization of
oral traditions and reevaluation of Western concepts" (p.
4) for the purpose of recovering unwritten pasts. It
parallels
the Greek art of metis [which] is an art of
transformation and transmutation [alchemy], an
aesthetics of the ruse that allows the weak to
survive by escaping through duplicitous means
the very system of power intent on destroying
them (p. 18).
This evokes notions of the "trickster" and "signifyin'" as
explained by Henry Louis Gates with reference to AfricanAmerican literary theory, and which can be seen in the
works of Maya Angelou and Zora Neale Hurston, for example.
"Signifyin'" involves repetition and reversal of an idea—
a chiasmus— which is carried out so as to "constitute an
implicit parody of a subject's own complicity in illusion"
(Gates, 1987, p. 240).
The concepts developed by Nadel, Harris, Lionnet, and
Gates will be more fully explored through literary
readings in the next chapter. (Lionnet also provides
autobiography theory which is useful to my project in
chapter four.) I mention them now in the interest of
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elaborating a theory of marginality which is wary of the
dangers of thoughtless essentialisms at the same it
insists on the possibility for dynamic self-creation for
the margins through translation and love.
Implicit in all this is the notion that a truly
creative alchemical response to crisis and
conflict and deprivation— a response that
engages with formidable myth— may well come from
the other side of a centralised or dominant
civilisation, from extremities, from apparently
irrelevant imaginations and resources (Harris,
1983, p. 30).
The case of Susie Phipps illustrates one-way
translation imposed on the margins from the center
("centralised or dominant civilisation") "Ironically, the
1970 Louisiana law was enacted to supersede an old Jim
Crow statute which relied on the idea of "common report"
in determining an infant's race" (Omi and Winant, 1986, p.
162). However, this case represents faulty translation on
three levels: (a) it represents an attempt to impose a
language of scientific rationality on situations where
multi-dimensional aspects of human experience are at play
and at stake, (b) given that its authors buy into a
scientific rationalism, they misread or fail to read
scientific understandings, in this case, about recombinant
DNA and a social construction is natural scientifically
defined,

(c) they attempt to make the local the global.

Boundaries between margin and center are rigidly defined
on the basis of a "purity," and that purity operates in
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only one direction— from center to margin. As such, the
center is clearly defined as only that which is in no
amount "other." The margins are left to fend for
themselves out of a neglect that is sometimes benign, but
more often not.
To communicate (to know), to translate, is always to
risk killing, Serres reminds us. Communication/translation
is always an attempt to eliminate the noise of otherness,
to exclude, to marginalize, both symbolically and
literally that which paradoxically forms a necessary
backdrop for that same communication— that is, something
against which exists the need to communicate. But maybe
that violence can be best resisted if communicating
discourses (essentialisms) are localized journeys
traversed in love (listening). The margins, like the
creoles of Louisiana, are local phenomena.

The

particular historical relations of diverse cultural groups
in a particular locale carry immense import for the
processes of translation which continue to shape
subjectivities for a region. It is in this sense that the
multicultural curriculum need attend to the notion of
place. For translation to be a truly two-way process,
local historical circumstances (relations among cultural
groups of a place) have to be excavated and acknowledged.
For even those who are relatively new to a region are
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affected by the region's history as well as by the
specific histories they bring with them. Indeed, this
movement constitutes new encounters which continue to
shape the character of local and national cultures. These
encounters cannot be explored outside a deep listening
among and between marginalized and dominant groups. Such
listening is, inherently, a part of translation that is a
two (or more) way process.
The pedagogy that I seek attends to the identity
politics of individual student experience of literature
and life without collapsing under such politics to new
"atheoretical" essentialisms. The deconstruction and
translation that must take place in the classroom is
situation specific and, as such, must fall back on
questions of judgment. Judgment not based in love can only
give rise to terrorism.

Love in the Margins
I begin this section with two quotes that represent a
spectrum of love inclusive of mind and body, eros and
agape', and something else beyond those dualisms. Perhaps
that space beyond that Michel Serres and Zora Neale
Hurston differentially explore in these quotes could be
referred to as "eco-erosic" love.
Love has just been defined as an intermediary.
It is neither a god nor a mortal, neither rich
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nor poor; it occupies the middle spot between
knowledge and ignorance. Love can be thought of
as being among the fuzzy subsets. He is the
included third. He is between.
(Serres, 1982a,
p. 246).
And,
She was stretched on her back beneath the pear
tree soaking in the alto chant of the visiting
bees, the gold of the sun and the panting breath
of the breeze when the inaudible voice of it all
came to her. She saw a dust-bearing bee sink
into the sanctum of a bloom; the thousand
sister-calyxes arch to meet the love embrace and
the ecstatic shiver of the tree from root to
tiniest branch creaming in every blossom and
frothing with delight. So this was a marriage!
She had been summoned to behold a revelation.
Then Janie felt a pain remorseless sweet that
left her limp and languid. . . .
Oh to be a pear tree— any tree in bloom!
(Hurston, 1978, pp. 24-5).
I write about a problem that has no solution other
than love— and that is no solution because it resists the
framework that anything called a "solution" requires. Not
being "rational," love is well suited for dealing with the
call to abandon the privileging of certain rationalist
discourses. This love that I speak of is also listening—
listening on many perceptual levels. Listening, as a part
of language, is itself marginalized by so much
philosophical writing that privileges the saying aspects
of language (Fiumara, 1990). Zora Neale Hurston loves us
with her novel Their Eves Were Watching God at the same
time she makes demands on our rationalist conditioning
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(with regard to double-binds, for example). She teaches us
to listen. Michel Serres does the same.
With regard to my earlier positioning of feminist/
"feminine" in the margins of larger society and my
emphasis on love as integral to the workings of all the
other oppositions operating within this text, I would like
to preface my discussion of love with some notes about the
connection between love as agape'/eros and notions of
masculine/feminine. Again, stressing my intent to avoid
successful reversals (new essentialisms) I should perhaps
clarify my use of the term "feminine" and thus also
"masculine." I believe that probably every man and every
woman possess characteristics from both of the cultural
categories feminine and masculine so that what are
considered feminine and masculine are not necessarily
coexistent with female and male respectively. Yet
"feminine" perspectives toward love are mostly
marginalized in the philosophical literature, particularly
in Western philosophy and theology. It is the "feminine"
conception(s) of love, therefore, on which I wish to
focus.
In my search for meaning in the idea of love I have
examined some of the historical discussions stemming from
my own "Western Judeo-Christian" cultural heritage, a
heritage in part "inherited" by African-American people in

the United States (Plato, the Disciple Paul, St.
Augustine, and finally Freud were read via Donnelly,
French, Kristeva, 0'Donovan, Soble). As several of the
sources I consulted point out, such discussions are rich
with possibilities, but they are largely lacking with
regard to female/feminine (as well as black racial)
perspectives. For female/feminine perspectives I have
turned to a contemporary feminist theological
interpretation of the Christian concepts of agape' and
eros (Donnelly, 1984). My thesis (and Donnelly's as I read
her) is that a "feminine" conception of love is one that
does not hierarchicalize (and thus artificially split)
agape' and eros— a hierarchy which necessitates dualistic
thinking with regard to mind and body, spirituality and
sexuality. Donnelley and others call it "radical love" (p.
30-34).
Agape' refers, historically, to selfless love—
especially the sort of love that is said to exist between
God and human beings, but also within some forms of human
friendship. It is considered to be the highest form of
love in much of Christian (male) theological literature.
Eros involves, but is not limited to, sensual, sexual
and/or romantic love between human beings. Both terms
have, however, been variously interpreted over time. True
to Derrida's insistence on the indeterminacy of origins,

99
contradictory readings of early usages of these terms
abound. The opposition deconstructs itself when looked at
historically.
Both eros and agape' were concepts developed by men.
Plato spoke of eros, the disciple Paul spoke of agape7.
Erosic love for Plato was desire— to love was to seek and
to love what is lacking. Still, Plato separated mind and
body within eros by differentiating between a raving or
vulgar eros (body) and a sublime eros (mind). Thus, for
the philosopher, love involved lacking and seeking beauty,
truth, the good. Freud's notion of the libido (which, is
only male) is Plato's eros (Kristeva, 1987, pp. 59-82).
St. Paul first announced agape' as a sort of three-tiered
plan for moving the concept of love away from eros and
desire and passively under the thumb of the Father/God who
bestows it. He emphasizes first, God's disinterested love
for man, second, His sacrifice of the Son to prove it, and
third, the importance of loving one's fellow man,
including (especially) enemies and sinners as proof of
allegiance to the Father (pp. 139-150).
Alan Soble interprets erosic love as being "propertybased and reason-dependent," one in which we appraise the
worth of the "object" to be loved, and agapic love as love
which bestows value on the loved one regardless of prior
properties (1990, p. 12). According to Soble, Eric Fromm
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sees mother love as agapic (unconditional) and father love
as erosic, whereas Irving Singer considers all parental
love erosic (p. 13)• Soble's definitions point to male
imagery for eros and female for agape if one takes
"property-based" and "reason-dependent" to be
characteristics of modern patriarchy, and nurturing to be
a "feminized" concept.
St. Augustine, like Plato, divides love on the basis
of mind (spirit) and body while introducing the notions of
sin and shame (O'Donovan, 1980, p. 10). In the scheme of
St. Augustine women had little to say or offer as they
were viewed as virtually all body with no mind or
spirituality and limited souls (French, 1984, p. 107).
With woman as body and man as mind the (one-way)
translation in Christian thought to woman's love as erosic
(erotic) and man's love as agapic was easy. Both Plato and
St. Augustine saw mind and body as separate and
hierarchicalized— a dualism that has since proven vicious,
but which is still very much in place in what has been
called "Western rationalist masculine discourse."
Is another hierarchy emerging with these notions of
feminine and masculine? Only in a limited sense, I think,
because as stated before I do not believe these categories
are natural, let alone restricted to associations of
feminine to female and masculine to male. The limited
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sense of hierarchy I present here is an example of
strategic use of fluid essentialisms. It is an inherently
unstable one in that concepts/categories of
feminine/masculine are historically and culturally defined
moment to moment, and as such are synchronically,
diachronically, and linguistically unstable. With this and
my female status in mind it should come as no surprise if
my arguments and discussion favor a feminist standpoint. I
do not claim innocence, but neither do I apologize. Spivak
speaks of this issue as follows:
By pointing attention to a feminist marginality,
I have been attempting, not to win the center
for ourselves, but to point at the
irreducibility of the margin in all
explanations. That would not merely reverse but
displace the distinction between margin and
center. But in effect such pure innocence
(pushing all guilt to the margins) is not
possible, and, paradoxically, would put the very
law of displacement and the irreducibility of
the margin into question (1988, p. 107) .
Soble argues a case through a logic of binary
oppositions (although he neither explicitly formulates it
on the basis of hierarchy nor on prior marginalization)
for complete reversal of the agape'/eros hierarchy and the
non-necessity, then, of agape', forgetting that the terms
of language derive meaning from difference (if not
differance) and the only difference at work in his system
is that of opposition. Thus he obliterates all meaning in
his "structure of love" by attempting to discredit and
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eliminate the term to which eros is opposed (and thereby
derives its meaning).
A "feminine" complete reversal of the agape'/eros
hierarchy is a fallacy no less than the "masculine"
version. The problem for everyone is the same insofar as
an incomplete reversal or displacement is the goal. The
ways to approach that problem are different— different
broadly for masculine and feminine standpoints and
different particularly for each individual. Still, I would
argue for the existence of a certain advantage for the
feminine standpoint through what I have called a currere
of marginality. The feminine standpoint in which eros (or
feeling) is often allowed to supersede agape'
(rationality) is a marginalized standpoint in Western
market society.
well . . .

(Although true agape' is marginalized as

a kind of pseudo-agape' prevails— what

Donnelley calls "sloppy agape'" [1984, p. 20]) As
expressed earlier, those coming from marginalized
standpoints are typically more driven to deal with other
more dominant standpoints and thus reach broader
understandings encompassing multiple possibilities. This
is why I feel some comfort in referring to the nonhierarchicalized yet non-contradictory conception of erosagape' as feminine.

It is through the multiplicitous experience of an
entity, idea, or concept— both in mind and body— that we
come to know it non-violently. "True love" for anyone or
anything comes from both mind and body, selflessness, and
a kind of selfishness. I conceive of this selfishness as
one where the lover attempts to soak up as much experience
of the other, the loved, into the self as possible, though
not in an intrusive (violent) sense, and not in a selfobliterating sense. It differs from pure agape'
(altruistic, selfless love) in that it involves more of an
emotional investment and risk of rejection. But in order
to truly be established such that it can grow and evolve
it cannot be rejected— it must be reciprocal, the lover
must receive a "return" on that emotional investment.
Otherwise it never goes beyond agape', which by my
interpretation of agape', need only be a one-way affair
(as in "love your enemies"). This is not to say that
agape' is an inferior form of love— just that agape' is
neither superior, isolable, nor is it all there is. I am
also suggesting that displacement of these hierarchies is
more easily associated with the feminine at this
particular cultural moment, since such a standpoint could
be conceived of as displacement of at least three
oppositions: masculine/feminine, agape'/eros,
margin/center. The displacement or deconstruction of
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hierarchicalized love, I believe, is found in the idea of
transference love— transference that is peculiar to the
pedagogical situation. An explanation of this follows.
Love as multi-layered engagement with life is a
prerequisite for translation, and translation is essential
to the multicultural curriculum. The implications that
psychoanalysis holds for pedagogy are manifested by the
significance of love to both. Henceforth in this writing
love functions as an analogy for teaching/learning at the
same time it is often, as in psychoanalysis, more than an
analogy; it is a very real and necessary condition for the
pedagogical situation. Returning to the initial quote in
this section by Serres, this (transference) love "occupies
the middle spot between knowledge and ignorance."

These

assertions are detailed in the immediately following
paragraphs.
Love (in the sense of "in love") effects a stifling
of imagination (as in "love is blind") at the same time it
totally disrupts. It is a dangerous moment at the same
time it renews (like the margins). "One speaks [of it (one
learns; imagination returns)] only after the fact"
(Kristeva, 1987, p. 3). It subverts and problematizes
language providing an opening for translation. "I" becomes
an "other." It makes one unique and special (particular)
at the same time it blurs boundaries between self and
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other. Fear shares its symptoms. Indeed, it is "fear of
crossing and desire to cross the boundaries [margins] of
the self" (p. 6). And, like learning, it is schizophrenic.
The experience (love) ties a knot with strands made
of the symbolic, the imaginary, the real.
Strangled within this tight knot, reality
vanishes: I do not take it into account, and I
refer it, if I think of it, to one of the three
other realms. That means in love I never cease
to be mistaken as to reality (Kristeva, p. 7).
Like learning/teaching, these are dangerous territories,
disruptive, unsettling, risking blowing apart all that is
official or certain. Love and learning are marginal
passages. Love (learning) calls into question the very
notion of identity.
Indeed, in the rapture of love, the limits of
one's own identity vanish. . . . Do we speak of
the same thing? And of which thing? The ordeal
of love puts the univocity of language and its
referential and communicative power to the test
(p. 2).
What do we mean by love? Searching the question reveals a
"linguistic profundity"— love as "solitary because
incommunicable" is nonetheless translatable. Versions of
love (languages of love) "commune [only] through a third
party: ideal, god, hallowed group" (p. 3) (sometimes,the
communal register).
Can a classroom be one such place (Serres's "included
third"; "between"), political problematics and all?
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Love probably always includes a love for power.
Transference love is for that very reason the
royal road to the state of love; no matter what
it is, love brushes us up against sovereignty
(p. 9).
Transference takes place through a granting of authority
by the analysand (student? teacher?). We ask our students
to "suspend disbelief" in our competence. We ask them to
grant us authority.
But it is they who are to listen as we tell our
stories. Here lies the "swerve" in this analogy. The
swerve is the surplus, the place of nonsense, the
uncultivated (Serres, 1989). It is a margin (a "margin of
mystery" [p. 8]). The swerve gives us time, "breathing
space" (p. ll). There is still something left to do; to
fill. This particular swerve means sovereignty is not
complete. If it is they, our students, who listen, are
they not the analysts and we the analysands in this
analogy? Yet, it is we, the teachers, who are "presumed to
know." And "as soon as there is somewhere a subject
presumed to know, there is transference" (Lacan, cited in
Felman, 1987,

p. 35).

Psychoanalysis proceeds, as does teaching, through a
kind of "mutual apprenticeship" (p. 33). The analyst
"attempts to learn from the students his own knowledge"
(p. 33). Love, then, is two-way. Lacan insists:
I deemed it necessary to support the idea of
transference, as indistinguishable from love,
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with the formula of the subject presumed to know
(cited in Felman, p. 35).
and
The question of love is thus linked to the
question of knowledge (cited in Felman, p. 35).
and
Transference is love . . . I insist: it is love
directed toward, addressed to, knowledge (cited
in Felman, p. 35).
Listening is a love; love pays attention to
listening. It occurs in an open system. Kristeva writes,
"As implied in modern logical and biological theories
dealing with so-called 'open systems,' transference is the
Freudian self-organization" (p. 14). With this, as Felman
reminds us,
the position of the teacher is itself the
position of the one who learns, of the one who
teaches nothing other than the way he learns.
The subject of teaching is interminably— a
student; the subject of teaching is
interminably— a learning (p. 37).
It (learning/love) is also indefinitely deferred.
A coincidence between findings of psychoanalysis and
modern physics (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) led
Lacan to the following pedagogical principle:
Until further notice, we can say that the
elements do not answer in the place where they
are interrogated. Or more exactly, as soon as
they are interrogated somewhere, it is
impossible to grasp them in their totality
(cited in Felman, p. 29).
As most dramatically evidenced by those students who
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return later to marvel at what they learned in a class and
how little they realized it at the time, it is always
after the fact— always deferred.
"Hate is the integral of all contraries," says Serres
(1982b, p. 25). Is the "center"

also the integralof

all

contraries? If so, love can not be the opposite ofhate,
nor can the margins be the opposite of the center as both
would then themselves be contraries. There is no
"solution". The best we can do is attempt to read well, to
listen, to set ourselves up for the "surprise of
otherness" (Johnson, B., 1987, p. 15). As such, the
"integral of all contraries" is a poor reader. It reads
itself into all texts, denying,

repressing, and

suppressing difference. Denying

learning, growth,

experience— yet requiring all of those for its very
existence and continued dominance. Thus it cannot remain
dominant for all situations, for all events, for all time.
It moves about and around the margins where it recuperates
by appropriation, by gaining just enough insight to fling
itself back to the center to rest and re-atrophy— to rereify.
Love— transference love (?)— will resurface in this
dissertation. It provides the texture of novels read in
chapter three. It appears in the autobiographical writings
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of some of my students in chapter four. And it is the
subjective state within which I have written.

Conclusion
I have argued that a "racialized" standpoint is a
marginalized one in addition to a feminine/feminist
standpoint, and that a feminine/feminist standpoint is
more capable of displacing at least three hierarchicalized
oppositions (center/margin, mind/body, agape'/eros) than
is a standpoint at the center. In light of the novels
examined in this dissertation, an obvious next question is
how capable of displacement is a racialized standpoint
relative to the feminist one? I have no intention of
attempting to quantify such a comparison in any way. My
intent is only to entertain the notion that arguments
similar (not identical) to those for a feminist standpoint
could be effectively employed for a racialized standpoint.
Expressions of and beliefs about love, indeed,
emotion in general, are culturally specific (for example,
see Catherine Lutz's Unnatural Emotions. 1988). As such,
when I call upon Western Christian concepts as well as
Western psychoanalytic concepts of love, limitations must
be acknowledged. African-American and African-Caribbean
people have, however (as mentioned before), "inherited"
much that has been called "Western." Still, one of the

110
more emphatic points of my writing here is to call
attention to, and to explore the ways in which, encounters
between cultures are what constitutes the very notion of
culture, and results of these encounters are manifested in
regionally particularistic forms. To the extent that this
is so, then, it seems reasonable to look at notions of
love through "Western" lenses as long as the lenses are
acknowledged and their limitations brought to the surface.
It is through readings of literary works that I hope to
encounter some of the translations and transformations of
these Western notions.
In comparing novels by authors of different racial
and gendered positions, a point of interest will be to
what extent does the "non-synchronous" nature of these
subjectivities affect their approaches to love and
marginality. By non-synchrony I am referring to a concept
of dynamic and contradictory relations of race, class, and
gender as theorized by Cameron McCarthy (1988a) whereby,
for instance, one's racial interests will under some
circumstances come into direct conflict with one's
gendered interests. Non-synchrony refers to complex
dealings with differences between. Differences within
require an appeal to feminist psychoanalytic,
poststructural, and "schizoanalytic" theories. It should
be noted that explorations, of "difference within" are
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often relegated to the status of luxury when held next to
the necessity of dealing with difference between created
by historically specific exclusions and oppressions.
However, I argue that readings of differences within and
their interactions with differences between are crucial to
development of multicultural theories that do not
disarticulate

radical minority and feminist concerns.

Difference is approached in different ways for
different historical periods. For the characters of
Morrison's Beloved, for example, the difference between is
the difference that most occupies the energies— the
difference between being social categories of difference
that determine historical exclusion and oppression of
marginal groups. Still, for these characters to have lives
that include love, pleasure, etc. other levels/layers of
difference had to come into play. Barbara Johnson's
"difference within" is useful but limited for
understanding the particular issues at play here.
According to this theory differences between are often
illusions created by repression and projection of
differences within. Both difference between and difference
within connote a negativity to differences in the context
of my usage of it for the immediately preceding writing—
that is, either I have an identity foisted upon me from
without and I am excluded or I am repressing parts of
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myself and thus excluding some ones or some things from my
consideration. These connotations belie the positive
potential of difference and of marginality. Already I have
mentioned the currere of marginality which begins to
reveal causes for celebration in difference (without
ignoring historically oppressive consequences).
I would like to offer the suggestion that there is
another way of thinking about difference that is neither
purely within nor between and is not based on repression
or exclusion in any life-denying senses of those terms,
and that is conducive to action in the ethico-aesthetic
realms. Invisible Man's invisibility-becoming glimpses at
this, I think. The dual or perhaps paradoxical sense of
marginality whereby it serves as both a force that
excludes and includes— excludes one from power and yet
includes one by promoting forms of knowledge that can be
translated into forms of power— seems to parallel
Ellison's usages of "leaping outside history." Leaping out
in search of a kind of psychic relief from the pressures
of invisibility and marginality can be viewed as an act of
hopelessness, of abandoning social and political action
and retreating into self— an ultimately conservative move
much like those of the hysteric and the sorceress as
described by Catherine Clement and Helene Cixous (1988).
On the other hand it can be viewed as leaping outside
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recorded or official history and self-consciously into the
more compelling, unwritten history. In this sense it might
be thought of as taking "the ultimate" political action of
rejecting systems that forbid joy; a way of converting the
hysterical laughter into the "god-laugh," ("the god-laugh
always seems frivolous" (Robbins, 1987, p. 232]), and
searching out and acting out the marginality within.
It seems to me that Ellison is attempting to find a
way of taking this leap outside history while continuing
to maintain a level of "realism" in which social/political
action is more outwardly and materially manifested. That
sense of difference, I think, can be theorized through
love and learning and through notions such as Taubman's
three registers of identity formation where individuals
are viewed as connected, not harnessed. That sense of
difference and identity through cross-cultural imagination
and translations of tradition are explored through
readings of (and translations across) literary works by
Ralph Ellison, Toni Morrison, William Faulkner, Zora Neale
Hurston, Mark Twain, and Jamaica Kincaid in chapter three.

CHAPTER THREE
Literature, Cultural Studies and the Multicultural
Curriculum
The pages of this chapter are devoted to exploring
the ways in which the novels' margins are situated— in
relation to social centers, individual centers and centers
of the novels themselves— and ways in which they translate
between and among one another and/or between and among
tradition(s)

(e.g., canonical works). A central question

in these endeavors is: How are margins and centers
represented? In exploring the margins (and centers),
essentializing movements and gestures are uncovered as
well as the ways in which these movements and gestures
negotiate with registers of identity formation.
Love and learning— the pedagogical imperative within
each novel— are also organizing themes for my approach to
reading. Indeed, as I have implied before, reading is not
possible outside these themes. Where appropriate, the
pedagogical relations between the texts are also
highlighted. The search for voice (key to the search for
identity) impels much of the "literature of the margins"
to proceed through a pedagogical imperative. In Twain and
Faulkner, for example, voice is not found for key
characters to the same extent that it is in the novels by
Hurston, Morrison, Ellison and Kincaid. The journey for
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Huck and Jim is one of love and learning (learning to
love), but Huck's search for voice is repeatedly
frustrated, and Jim's is practically unpursued or
unexamined. The same frustration is found in Absalom.
Absalom! Major characters remain obsessed up to their
deaths. In both novels the limits of voice seem somewhat
pre-figured.
Learning to "read the world" is inseparable from
learning to read one's "self." Richard Wright defines
literacy as "at best, no more than vicarious cultural
transfusions" (cited in Cooke, 1984, p. 83). Michael Cooke
adds, "a voice means, in addition, independent strength
and form and clarity" (p. 83). A combination of these two
ideas might produce an equation to Wilson Harris's
"literacy of the imagination" (also known as "crosscultural imagination")

(1989). Such a literacy insists on

a cautionary note with regard to Cooke's use of the term
independent. Perhaps Althusser's notion of relative
autonomy translates well to this purpose. Althusser is
referring to a model of social formation whereby the level
of ideology is relatively autonomous from social
structures in constructing the individual subject (Hall,
Hobson, Lowe and Willis, 1980, p. 184).

Guattari uses the

term "relatively mutually autonomous" to refer to "vectors
of subjectification" (1990, p. l). "Inferiority would
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appear as a quality produced at the meeting-point of
multiple components which are relatively mutually
autonomous— in certain cases, openly discordant" (p. 1).
In other words, certain of these "vectors of
subjectification" pass through a "terminal" (the position
of the individual) whereby they are taken up, or not, to
produce interiority at a particular time. If voice is the
articulation of the individual subject, then it seems that
relative autonomy substitutes well for Cooke's
independent. Voice issues forth from particular subjects
not as independent expression, but as, at least in part,
particular translations of traditions that are
encountered.
In this same spirit it should be noted that many of
the readings covered in this chapter are borrowed from
other literary critics/theorists. My primary purpose in
this chapter, as stated earlier, is to demonstrate the
theoretical problematics laid out in chapter two. I found
that done, on occasion, in certain others' readings of the
novels selected. Some of the readings, of course, are "my
own," or at least less derivative ones. Still other
readings are more explicitly a braiding (a metissage) of
my own ideas with ideas of other readers.
Morrison's and Ellison's novels are dealt with at
greatest length as they are the two novels out of those
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selected in which I was able to discover the most
intertextuality or encounters with other texts and
traditions. Readings of the other texts spin off of these
two centrifugally, but without "letting go." I write of my
readings within the tradition of literary criticism that
assumes of its readers a certain familiarity with the
texts under consideration.

Intertextual Literary Readings
Love as an explicit thought comes late in Ralph
Ellison's Invisible Man though its expression is implicit
throughout. It seems that invisible man approaches and
touches the power of his own displaced (interactive)
marginality repeatedly but he always heads back for his
(non-displaced) center. While at first read the
"feminine"/feminist standpoint seems notably absent from
the text, closer readings reveal female characters as more
significant and mutually marginalized players. They seem
to lead him into consciousness of his marginalization and
victimization (invisibility). They are, according to
Claudia Tate,
like the underground station masters of the
American slave era [assisting him] along his
course to freedom. . . . They embody the
knowledge he needs to state his escape (Tate,
1987, p. 164-5).

In Tate's essay "Notes on the Invisible Women in
Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man." she theorizes that the
women in this novel are crucial to each major turning
point in invisible man's growing self and social
awareness. The nude "magnificent blonde" at the battle
royal "provides . . . his first lesson in invisibility"
(p. 167) as he recognizes their mutual objectification/
exploitation and her "Kewpie Doll mask" response to it (p.
167). The second major breakthrough occurs, according to
Tate, after Mary Rambo emotionally and physically nurtures
him back to a state of greater self esteem such that he
can "depart from the world of 'Keep This Nigger-Boy
Running'" at least for a while (p. 168). His third and
fourth lessons come from the women of the Brotherhood. He
is able to overcome the anxiety of confronting the taboo
around sexual encounters between

black men and white

women

with Emma and the anonymous rich

white woman as well

asto

identify somewhat with their common exploitation. Finally,
with Sybil he comes not only to recognize invisibility but
also to appreciate the potential

power in it.

But before he can clearly' see his relationship
with the magnificent blonde, Emma, and the
anonymous seductress and acknowledge their
respective marginality, alienation, and
ultimately their respective invisibility, he
must dance his third and final dance, in which
his partner is Sybil. . . . Sybil, like Mary, is
another surrogate mother who comes to deliver
the young protagonist from the deception of his
false identity with the Brotherhood. She is also
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another symbolic blonde, who ushers him to the
threshold of the final battle royal. In
addition, she is his last teacher, who propels
him along the course to freedom by making him
aware that invisibility is not necessarily a
liability but possibly a valuable asset (pp.
169-70).
And it is this recognition of mutual marginalization that
finally brings invisible man to an appreciation for the
necessity of love to life and to action— love, but not to
the exclusion of justifiable and motivating anger; love,
but not self-obliterating or self-submerging love.
So why do I write, torturing myself to put it
down? Because in spite of myself I've learned
some things. Without the possibility of action,
all knowledge comes to one labeled "file and
forget," and I can neither file nor forget. Nor
will certain ideas forget me; they keep filing
away at my lethargy, my complacency. . . . I
denounce because though implicated and partially
responsible, I have been hurt to the point of
abysmal pain, hurt to the point of invisibility.
And I defend because in spite of all I find that
I love. In order to get some of it down I have
to love (Ellison, 1952, pp. 566-7).
When Ellison writes of love at this time I do not
feel that he means it in terms only of agape' or
"brotherly love." Indeed, it was his encounter with Sybil
which was simultaneously sexually, emotionally and
intellectually moving for him that seemed to trigger
thoughts of love and the connections between love and
social action. Further, he displaces the "masculine"
hierarchy of thinking/feeling in the following passage:
There is, by the way, an area in which a man's
feelings are more rational than his mind, and it
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is precisely in that area that his will is
pulled in several directions at the same time
(p. 560).
Listening is love. Or at least that might be what
Kristeva is saying when she calls transference love
"optimum"— optimum because it "avoids the chaotic
hyperconnectedness of fusion love as well as the deathdealing stabilization of love's absence" (1987, p. 15).
Sybil listened. It was an agapic listening without
judgement, an erosic listening with her body, and there
was exchange of those between them. Invisible man seemed
to be shocked into awareness that this mass of human
beings outside consisted of individuals who love and
listen and are loved and listened to.
Listening, like engagement with a text, effects a
dissolution of the boundaries of self, as does love.
Simultaneously frightening and exhilarating it allows the
"outside" "inside", opening up channels of possibility,
sharing languages, inspiring action. Love conceived in
this way could become part of what Guattari calls a
"mental ecology"— i.e. one that can "face up to the logic
of the ambivalence of desire [eros?], . . . re-evaluate
the ultimate goal of work and human activities in terms of
criteria other than those of profit and productivity
[relationality], acknowledge the need to mobilize
individuals and social segments in ways that are always
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diverse and different [difference]" (1990, p. 9). It is
schizophrenic— "his will is pulled in several directions
at the same time" (Ellison, 1952, p.560)— leaping into
difference and otherness. But this schizophrenia can
become a "positive schizophrenic line of escape" (Deleuze
and Guattari, 1983, p. 363), or it can become
"neuroticized" (p. 363) as narcissistic "fusion love"
(pure eros) and from other manifestations of codes
relinquished to institutions (Kristeva, 1987). I should
add that in Kristeva's terms, as for Lacan, narcissism is
not used pejoratively, but as an inescapable condition of
human love and life.
What stands between the subject and his desire
for death is narcissism. The relationship
between narcissism and aggressiveness makes for
the fact that narcissism, the ecstatic
affirmation of one's being alive, is always
enacted at someone's expense. The affirmation of
one's life entails the exploitation of someone
else's life (Schneiderman, 1980, p. 6).
Just as for Serres, where the risk in communication or
pursuit of knowledge is the risk of violence, the pursuit
of love, teaching, the work that strives to eliminate
violence, is interminable, impossible, and essential.
"Fusion love" is excessive in its narcissism— "its
Highness the Ego projects and glorifies itself, or else
shatters into pieces and is engulfed" (Schneiderman, 1980,
p. 6). This is eros, untempered by agape'. Fusion is what,
in Toni Morrison's Beloved, Sethe's love for Beloved (the
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ghost) became for a time (more on this later) , but I do
not believe it started that way with Beloved (the child) .
Love can be murderous as a result of fusion, but love—
especially perhaps mother-love— complicated by the ravages
of the almost total social marginalization of slavery can
be cataclysmic. Killing the child to save her (and the
others) from slavery might have been, as Morrison said,
"the right thing to do [but] she had no right to do it"
(Otten, 1989, p. 83).
Paul D is suspicious and frightened of loving too
big or too much. Sethe's love seems often all-consuming
and without boundaries. Paul D first becomes aware of and
is alarmed by Sethe's seemingly boundless mother-love when
she attempts to apologize for Denver's (Sethe's daughter
named after the poor white girl, Amy Denver, who helped
Sethe) rudeness to Paul D, and then to disallow him to
confront Denver directly about it. He feels that it is
"very risky. For a used-to-be-slave woman to love anything
that much" given the fate of so many relationships under
slavery. One must "love . . . everything, just a little
bit [so that] maybe you'd have a little love left over for
the next one" (Morrison, 1987, p. 45). Later, upon
discovering that Sethe had murdered her baby girl, Paul D
is horrified and uncomprehending of the source, meaning,
and implications of such love.

123
This here Sethe talked about love like any other
woman, . . . but what she meant could cleave
the bone. This here Sethe talked about safety
with a handsaw. This here new Sethe didn't know
where the world stopped and she began. . . .
More important than what Sethe had done was what
she claimed. It scared him.
••Your love is too thick". . . "You got two
feet, Sethe, not four," he said, and right then
a forest sprang up between them; trackless and
quiet (pp. 164-5).
The murderous spectacle put on for the white
inquisitors (the masters from whom Sethe ran away) was
indeed sufficient to save herself and other children from
returning to slavery. (Spectacular expressions such as the
woman who responded to her first bidder at the slave
auction by chopping off her own hand with a hatchet were
not so uncommon to slave women (Fox-Genovese, 1988, p.
329).) Finally, she is heard. But the incident was
permanently inscribed in the memory of herself, her sons
and the community as a horrifying reminder of the
tenuousness of their integrity as a community, as loving
individuals, as families. She buried the memory with the
child, purchasing a headstone with yet another indignity—
selling her body to another white exploiter.
With the unexpected arrival of Paul D the task for
Sethe and he and Denver becomes that of dealing somehow
with this repressed past that interferes with their
abilities to feel for themselves and one another. Paul D
had always "dealt" with his own past by moving around,

124
effectively denying it. But now he wanted to stop and
settle with the person who had known him longer than
anyone else.
The ghost (proper) of Beloved, who had earlier been
maintaining Sethe and Denver without serious challenges,
had now been run off by Paul D. Sethe, Denver, or both had
to bring her back in a form that could not be denied by
Paul D. Beloved's (re)appearance at a crucial point in the
development of the (love) relationship between Sethe and
Paul D has the effect of stopping the painful process of
love/analysis (pedagogy). Paul D and Sethe had been
serving as one another's "analysts" teachers, but a new
analyst had to enter the picture for the cure to be
effected.
The analysis proceeds pathologically. Paul D
participates in exhuming this past by impregnating the
ghost, the analyst, Sethe's past. This act of his could be
seen as a response to fear of love— fear, indeed, of the
object of Sethe's love, knowing what her love can lead to.
On the other hand he provided her past, her ghost with
possibilities (pregnant with possibilities), but in doing
so it almost consumed Sethe. With Beloved as analyst,
Sethe's transference love quickly escalates out of
control. As the boundaries between Sethe and the one she
loves obsessively (Beloved) are further diminished by this
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love of hers, her "self" declines mentally and physically
to a dangerously marginal place. Boundaries dissolve to
the point that Sethe's love must be a kind of selflove/self-hate, excessively narcissistic.
But what is Denver's stake in all this? She is
fascinated with the ghost (Sethe made?). Why? Sethe, the
one Denver loves, is afraid of her own love,
understandably, and that fear/love takes the form of the
ghost. Denver is fascinated with the "abject"— the object
of her mother's fear and love. Kristeva writes that the
abject is at the margins of life/death, "the edge of non
existence," and is signified by waste, corpses (ghosts?)
(Kristeva, 1982, pp. 1-11).
Meanwhile Paul D is plowing through an emotional
crisis of his own. It is when their respective crises of
love reach a climax (the analysis is complete when the
pregnancy "ends") that both Paul D and Sethe together find
a place for love that could be characterized as
displacement of the agape'/eros or of the (selfobliterating love)/(fear and distance) hierarchy. Much of
this work is done via Stamp Paid and Denver through the
legacy of love left behind by Baby Suggs who had arrived
upon a "deconstruction" of those dualisms long ago. Suggs
preached love of body, love of self and, in the "same
breath," Christian love (Morrison, 1987, pp. 88-9).

126
While in Beloved's conclusion the possibility for
love not based on opposition seems imminent, the fate of
invisible man is less clear. He has become aware of his
invisibility/marginality and what that can do for him. But
his notion of love is still quite vague and undeveloped
and he has yet to sustain an intimate relationship in the
context of this new self awareness.
Recognition of marginality and allusions to its
paradoxical nature and its "usefulness" are sprinkled
throughout the experience of invisible man as represented
by Ellison. Invisibility can be used synonymously with
marginality at the social level in the sense that it means
invisible to "others." At the individual level
invisibility is synonymous with marginality in the sense
of its being self awareness that is most difficult to come
by— it is hidden from the self. Invisible man begins his
journey blind to his own invisibility but by the end of
this text he insists that he is "invisible, not blind"
(Ellison, 1952, p. 563).
In the beginning he is unable to draw on the power
that his marginality can provide. He is baffled and
plagued by his Grandfather's dying words about what it
means to "yes them to death," and he participates in his
own exploitation and display in order to attend a school
where he is "named . . . and set running with one and the
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same stroke of the pen" (p. 555). This pattern continues
far beyond the point at which he has caught the first
glimpses of his invisibility on into his work for the
Brotherhood where he thought he could lead an
"historically meaningful life." It seems significant that
the most explicit and clearly articulated verbal lessons
he was given about invisibility were from a "fat man"
(also black) who was committed to an insane asylum and was
formerly a physician— one who seems to embody "order out
of chaos" (or vice-versa). Speaking of invisible man:
Already he's learned to repress not only his
emotions but his humanity. He's invisible, a
walking personification of the Negative, the
most perfect achievement of your dreams sir! The
mechanical man! (p. 92).
And then later, on the train to New York:
You're hidden right out in the open— that is,
you would be if you only realized it. They
wouldn't see you because they don't expect you
to know anything, since they believe they've
taken care of that . . . (p. 152).
To merely hear it verbalized was not enough because
it did not yet name his experience sufficiently. Invisible
man had to experience more. If naming experience is the
first step to forming a sense of autonomy, as Paulo Freire
claims, then "claiming ownership of that freed self"
(Morrison, 1987, p. 95) is one step beyond that. Upon
finally realizing the true agenda of the Brotherhood,
invisible man is flooded with the realizations that,
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They had set themselves up to describe the
world. . . . It was as though I'd learned
suddenly to look around corners; images of past
humiliations flickered through my head and I saw
that they were more than separate experiences.
They were me; they defined me. I was my
experiences and my experiences were me, and no
blind men, no matter how powerful they became, .
. . could take that. . . . Here I had thought
they accepted me because they felt that color
made no difference, when in reality it made no
difference because they didn't see either color
or men . . . I now recognized my invisibility
(Ellison, 1952, pp. 496-7).
This is the point at which Sybil becomes instrumental
in

invisible man's "loss of illusions." Allusions

throughout the book to loss of eyes, a glass eye,
blindness, and castration begin to coalesce into a network
of symbolism. Houston Baker claims that black male
sexuality is a key theme of the novel and that it is
rarely dealt with by literary critics (p. 329). Trueblood
as object of fascination for whites, merges with Norton's
phrase "casting out the offending eye," the imagery of
blindness and illusion, the threat of castration at the
factory hospital, and finally invisible man's dream of
having been castrated by Jack— his testicles at times
described more like eyes. Confronting the repression of
black male sexuality with regard to white women becomes a
crucial interconnected symbolic expression of freedom,
marginality, and love. White woman represents,
the means by which black people in general were
penalized for exercising the freedom of choice,
in that the penalty was traslated into the
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accusation of rape and the sentence was death.
The symbolic linkage between the white woman and
freedom, therefore, finds its origin in hundreds
of years of southern race relations (Tate, 1987,
p. 166).
Returning to his grandfather's dying advice,
invisible man asks the question again, what did he mean by
saying "yes"? As he explores the possibilities, more
capable of imagination now, he stumbles upon an "currere
of marginality":
Was it that we of all, we, most of all, had to
affirm the principle [upon which the country was
built], the plan in whose name we had been
brutalized and sacrificed— not because we would
always be weak nor because
wewere
afraid or
opportunistic, but because
wewere
older than
they, in the sense of what
ittook
to live in
the world with others and because they had
exhausted in us, some— not much, but some— of
the human greed and smallness, yes, and the fear
and superstition that had kept them running.
(Oh, yes, they're running too, running all over
themselves.) (Ellison, 1952, p. 561)
And he further captures the notion of the paradox of
marginality both in a Freirian sense and in the more
subtle sense of Spivak's deconstructivist thought:
Weren't we part of them as well as apart from
them and subject to die when they died? . . .
It's "winner take nothing" that is the great
truth of our country or of any country. Life is
to be lived, not controlled; and humanity is won
by continuing to play in face of certain defeat.
Our fate is to become one, and yet many— This is
not prophecy, but description (1988, pp. 562,
564) .
Like Ellison, Morrison uncovers a paradoxical currere
of marginality in Beloved. The carnival, which allowed for
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a "Colored

Thursday," was a chance unbeknownst to the

white carnival-folk for black people to "see the spectacle
of whitefolks making a spectacle of themselves" (1987, p.
48). Another example of black "Signifyin(g)" on whites is
Paul D's "chain-gang":
With a sledge hammer in his hands and Hi Man's
lead, the men got through. They sang it out and
beat it up, garbling the words so they could not
be understood; tricking the words so their
syllables yielded up other meanings. . . . They
killed a boss so often and so completely they
had to bring him back to life to pulp him one
more time (pp. 108,109).
The power of marginality in the external world is dampened
in Beloved compared to Invisible Man. due to the
difference in the larger social situation of the time
settings. Nor is it a given— it is problematic and
paradoxical. The "meanness" of the black community toward
Sethe resonates with invisible man's recognition that only
"some— not much, but some— of the human greed and
smallness, . . . and the fear and superstition" had been
exhausted in blacks relative to whites (Ellison, 1952,
p.561).
Boundaries between social categories that are
represented as natural ones are exposed as fraudulent in
Beloved as they are in Invisible Man ("a part as well as
apart").

This displacement also arises in the blurring of

self/other for black/white, but Morrison approaches it
from a different perspective than that of Ellison— namely,
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she sees black in white whereas Ellison sees white in
black.
Whitepeople believed that whatever the manners,
under every dark skin was a jungle. Swift
unnavigable waters, swinging screaming baboons,
sleeping snakes, red gums ready for their sweet
white blood. In a way, he thought, they were
right. The more coloredpeople spent their
strength trying to convince them how gentle they
were, how clever and loving, how human, the more
they used themselves up to persuade whites of
something Negroes believed could not be
questioned, the deeper and more tangled the
jungle grew inside. But it wasn't the jungle
blacks brought with them to this place from the
other (livable) place. It was the jungle
whitefolks planted in them. . . . It spread. . .
. it spread, until it invaded the whites who had
made it. . . . The screaming baboon lived under
their own white skin; the red gums were their
own (Morrison, 1987, pp. 198-9).
Ultimately, for Sethe it is the love she negotiates
with Paul D that allows her the awareness that she is
indeed her own "best thing." Like invisible man this
negotiated, "deconstructed" love provides the turningaround place for a more autonomous, yet connected, life.
The difference between the two novels with regard to love
that is most pronounced is the different directions from
which the deconstruction was approached. For Morrison,
Sethe had come from an almost complete reversal of the
agape'/eros hierarchy in her mother-love for first Denver,
then Beloved (as ghost). For Ellison, invisible man seemed
to begin with very little self definition for the concept
of love. But in those situations, dominant oppositions

132
tend to win by default. These different starting places
affected approaches to other oppositions as well. Blurred
boundaries in Beloved became more distinct, clear
distinctions became more fluid in Invisible Man— more
fluid in spite of his wary tendency to keep things
divided.
Love and the pedagogical imperative that lives in
these novels are not bounded by the confines of
expressions among characters only within their respective
texts. That is, Sethe "speaks" beyond the pages of Beloved
and invisible man beyond the pages of Invisible Man. For
example, both have been read as, in part, re-readings and
re-writings of Mark Twain's Adventures of Huckleberry Finn
(Moreland, 1991, & Nadel, 1988). In Beloved. Sethe, a
pregnant woman who had just suffered a severe beating by
her master, runs away from slavery by crossing the Ohio
River from Kentucky into Ohio. But before she makes it
across, exhausted, hungry and about to deliver, she
collapses where she might have died had not a young poor
white runaway girl, Amy Denver, happened upon her, taken
care of her and helped to deliver the child. As Richard
Moreland notes, there are parallels with the relationship
between Sethe and Amy and the one between Huck and Jim, a
difference being it is Sethe's journey (Jim's
counterpart), not Amy's (Huck's counterpart), that is of
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primary concern in Morrison's story. Furthermore, Sethe
and others, find a voice in Morrison's story. Neither Huck
nor Jim are ever able to fully articulate their positions
in Twain's story.
Ellison's Invisible Man. on the other hand,
represents an effort to continue the search for a voice
not only for Jim, who might seem the logical counterpart
to invisible man as both are black, but also for Huck.
Alan Nadel sees invisible man as vascillating between Jim
and Huck.
The point is that at various stages throughout
the book, the invisible man plays Huck and at
others Jim, as often subconsciously as
consciously.
The problem for Ellison at the time he was
writing Invisible Man was that we didn't have a
literature which permitted those roles for
blacks (1988, p. 143).
"For Ellison," according to Nadel, "Twain was the last
great American author to see the full implications of the
connection between the black and the fundamentals of
democracy" (p. 127). In this spirit, in 1947 Ellison re
reads and re-writes Twain's story of Huck and Jim amidst a
sea of unfavorable criticism for Twain's book,
particularly its last section.
This sort of retelling can be thought of as an
example of what Henry Louis Gates calls "Signifyin'"— a
tradition in Black English vernacular. Zora Neale Hurston
was possibly the first to theorize about black
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"Signifying" through her studies as an anthropologist on
African-American and African-Caribbean culture,
particularly through folk story-telling. It is a major
tropological strategy employed in her novel Their Eves
Were Watching God. Henry Louis Gates has made this trope a
focus of much of his recent work. He calls it the trope of
the "Signifyin(g) Monkey." The "g" in Signifyin(g) is a
"Signifyin(g) upon" Derrida's "mispelling" of the French
difference to differance, which Gates does, as does
Derrida, in order to retain an instability for meaning of
the term. Signifyin(g) is a repetition and a reversal
(chiasmus) of a sentence, phrase, or idea, and has been a
part of African-American vernacular tradition since
antebellum America— even referred to in common
conversation as "signifyin upon" (1987).
In order to more clearly explicate this concept I'll
pull out some examples provided by Gates. Jazz music often
proceeds through "signifying riffs." For example, when
John Coltrane performs My Favorite Things he is
Signifyin(g) upon Julie Andrews "vapid original." It is
"repetition of a form and inversion of the same . . .
Resemblance . . . evoked cleverly by dissemblance" (1987,
p.243). And as an example in language Gates provides the
following anecdote in ah endnote from Figures In Black;
While writing this essay, I asked a colleague,
Dwight Andrews, if he had heard of the
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Signifying Monkey as a child. "Why, no" he
replied intently. "I never heard of the
Signifying Monkey until I came to Yale and read
about him in a book." I had been signified upon.
If I had responded to Andrews, "I know what you
mean; your Mama read to me from that same book
the last time I was in Detroit," I would have
signified upon him in return (1987, p. 293) .
Signifyin(g) "constitutes an implicit parody of a
subject's own complicity in illusion" (p. 240). It has no
equal in "standard English" usage. It is at a level of
sophistication in common usage unique, in north America
and the Caribbean, to "Black English."

A key aspect of

Signifyin(g) is its "indirect intent":
The apparent significance of the message differs
from its real significance. The apparent meaning
of the sentence signifies its actual meaning
(Mitchell-Kernan, 1973, p.325).
Signifyin(g) can take the form of irony, parody, or
pastiche, and thus as a language form is not the exclusive
province of black people; but black people named the term,
invented the unique rituals associated with it, and self
consciously use both the strategy and the term itself in
everyday conversation (Gates, 1988, p. 90). Parody is the
form taken by what Gates calls "motivated Signifyin(g)"
and involves negative critique or polemic. Pastiche
corresponds to "unmotivated Signifyin(g)" which is not to
imply a lack of intention but more a lack of negative
critique. As examples of each Gates calls upon Ishmael
Reed's Mumbo Jumbo for "motivated Signifyin(g)" on Richard
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Wright's Native Son and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. and
Alice Walker's The Color Purple as "unmotivated
Signifyin(g)" on Zora Neale Hurston's Their Eves Were
Watching God. Gates explains the difference as follows:
Whereas Reed seems to be about the clearing of a
space of narration, Walker seems to be intent on
underscoring the relation of her text to
Hurston's, in a joyous proclamation of
antecedent and descendant texts. . . . This form
of the double-voiced implies unity and
resemblance rather than critique and difference
(1988, p. xxvii).
In Invisible Man Ellison not only re-tells Twain's
story, he also, according to Alan Nadel, alludes to
literary criticism of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn that
was written by Leslie Fiedler (Nadel, 1988) where he
signifies on Fiedler in the sense parody— albeit a loving
parody. Briefly, what Fiedler had suggested was that the
relationship between Huck and Jim was a homoerotic one
which, according to Fiedler is the only possible response
to feelings of love between black and white men in
America.
So buried at a level of acceptance which does
not touch reason, so desperately repressed from
overt recognition, so contrary to what is
usually thought of as our ultimate level of
taboo— the sense of that love can survive only
in the obliquity of a symbol, persistent,
obsessive, in short, an archetype (Fiedler,
1977, p. 416).
In Invisible Man young Emerson (another allusion) is
the homosexual son of a man to whom invisible man was sent
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to find a job. Invisible man enters this place of business
with an unopened letter of "recommendation" in hand that
turns out to be a slanderous letter of non-recommendation.
Finally, it is young Emerson who reveals to invisible man
what has happened. But he does so under the condition that
invisible man not tell Emerson's father what he has done,
leaving invisible man helpless to defend himself. In
telling invisible man his own story, Emerson refers to
himself as "Huckleberry" and invites him to a gay black
and white nightclub.
The purpose behind Ellison's subtext response to
Fiedler in Invisible Man. Nadel suggests, is to
demonstrate the consequences of Fiedler's reading of Twain
and implicitly of American society. If Fiedler is correct,
then "Huckish" attempts to help black people out of
untenable situations that result from racism are
meaningless— only Huck's guilty conscience is real, and
his act of freeing Jim amounts to nothing. As Nadel
explains,
Huck does not feel guilt about Jim's enslavement
nearly so much as he does about his desire to
end that enslavement, and Huck's act of personal
responsibility is defined by what he does in
spite of his guilt, not because of it. . .
Fiedler, on the other hand, does not see in
Huck's story that his action defies his guilt so
much as that his guilt substitutes for action
(1988, p. 129).
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I have called Ellison's parody loving though
"motivated" because it retains a sense of the plausibility
of Fiedler's conclusions for particular people, places and
times. In fact, Ellison wrote directly to Fiedler's
criticism ten years later in which he explains how Twain's
depiction of Jim understandably produces misreadings by
black critics.
Twain fitted Jim into the outlines of the
minstrel tradition, and it is from behind this
stereotype mask that we see Jim's dignity and
human capacity— and Twain's complexity— emerge
(cited in Nadel, 1988, p. 130).
And by depicting Huck "with his street-sparrow
sophistication," (cited in Nadel, p. 130) Ellison adds,
Huck seems more adult than Jim. Because of this affront,
it is understandable that a black reader would be upset.
Of Fiedler's reading Ellison says,
I believe him so profoundly disturbed by the
manner in which the deep dichotomies symbolized
by blackness and whiteness are resolved that,
forgetting to look at the specific form of the
novel, he leaped squarely into the middle of
that tangle of symbolism which he is dedicated
to unsnarling, and yelled out his most
terrifying name for chaos (cited in Nadel, p.
131).
Through much of the text of Invisible Man Twain's
text is commented upon directly in what more closely
resembles "unmotivated Signifyin(g)". Nadel refers to this
re-reading and re-writing as allusion and "translating
tradition" rather than "Signifyin(g)", but I want to
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insist on the similarity between the two. Just as with
parody and pastiche, allusion is not the sole province of
black literary practice. However, the idea of Signifyin'
which goes by that name is explicitly named and practiced
within African-American vernacular tradition, whereas
parody, pastiche, irony and allusion are literary modes or
tropes common to perhaps all literary traditions. Allusion
as Nadel discusses it in his theoretical text is not
directed only at a black literary tradition but is
intended for more general application.
Signifyin' has been useful for thinking about black
literary theory in that it can signal very specific modes
of parody or pastiche such as those that focus on black
vernacular language usage and Black English usage in
particular. Such culturally specific theoretical
categories are important to reveal and to apply to
culturally specific literature such as African, AfricanAmerican, or African-Caribbean, Gates and others insist
and I agree, in order to avoid what Anthony Appiah calls
"the Naipaul fallacy" (cited in Gates, 1986, p. 405). This
fallacy refers to attempts to establish the worthiness of,
say, African literature by holding it up to European
literature in order to show that they are the same. It can
likewise involve attempts to "understand Africa by
embedding it in European culture," for example (p. 405).

Nadel traces the Signifyin(g) or alluding parallels
between Ellison's and Twain's texts intricately. A
detailed reproduction of his reading does not serve my
purposes at this point. Following, however, are highlights
of his reading: Nadel compares the paint factory incident
where invisible man is tricked into having a serious
accident (at the factory where young Emerson sent him to
work) with the destruction of the raft in Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn by the riverboat; members of the
Brotherhood are referred to by Nadel as "latter-day Tom
Sawyers" in their betrayals of invisible man; invisible
man is, at times, compared to Jim as being one who is also
invisible, and at times, to Huck in his journeying to find
a place where he wouldn't have to be ashamed.
The last third of Twain's book has been the most
controversial. It has been variously regarded as bad
writing, a mistake, or misplaced. Ernest Hemingway wrote,
"If you read it you must stop where the Nigger Jim is
stolen from the boys. That is the real end. The rest is
just cheating" (cited in Nadel, 1988, p. 22). Contrary to
this opinion Ellison writes, "Huck Finn's acceptance of
the evil implicit in his 'emancipation' of Jim represents
Twain's acceptance of his personal responsibility in the
condition of society. This was the tragic face behind his
comic mask" (Ellison, 1953, p. 50).
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Ellison re-writes this part of Twain's text through
invisible man's encounters with the Brotherhood, a group
of mostly male, mostly white orthodox Marxist activists.
Invisible man was selected by the Brotherhood to be their
"mouthpiece" for the people of Harlem. However, when
invisible man delivers a particularly moving speech that
speaks to the hearts of Harlem residents the Brotherhood
becomes upset. They now insist on training invisible man
in the correct "scientific" way to work for them— to give
speeches. This as opposed to his
appeal to the heart, the emotions of his
audience . . . This reversal and subsequent
effects of his training on his humanity create a
discomfort similar to the one created when Tom
decides to show Huck the "proper" way to free
Jim (Nadel, 1988, p. 137).
This alludes to Tom Sawyer's rules for his and Huck's
plan of escape for Jim. Rather than simply releasing Jim
from the prison-hut where he is chained in the easiest,
quickest most obvious manner, Tom insists,
It don't make no difference how foolish it is,
it's the right way— and it's the regular way.
And there ain't no other way, that ever I heard
of; and I've read all the books that gives any
information about these things (Twain, 1985, p.
304).
The Brotherhood represents those (literary) theorists
who "define history and exclude from it those who don't
confirm their theories" (Nadel, 1988, p. 137). Jim's
treatment at the hands of Tom parallels the Brotherhood's
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treatment of invisible man in many ways. Tom/the
Brotherhood sabotage Jim/invisible man in their quests for
freedom/black empowerment. A reversal in this repetition
is that invisible man is Huck as much as he is Jim. It is
Huck who is being manipulated by Tom as well as Jim.
Huck's complicity in his own manipulation also resembles
that of invisible man's involvement with the Brotherhood.
In doing this Ellison directs us toward the last part of
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn— the part that is Twain's
"way of showing the seriousness of Huck's and Jim's
dilemma, the full implications of recognizing Jim's
humanity" (p. 138).
Ellison reveals the frustration of hopes for freedom
and democracy in this part of Twain's novel through his
allusions to it and Signifyin(g) upon it in Invisible Man.
Richard Moreland suggests, "it is this frustration that I
think Morrison brilliantly addresses in Beloved" (1991, p.
2). As such, insofar as Morrison's text is Signifyin(g)
upon Twain's, it too seems to fit more closely Gates
notion of an "unmotivated Signifyin(g)".
Moreland reads Morrison's "put[ting] his [Twain's]
story next to hers" (p. 2), in part, through the ecosophy
of Felix Guattari, whose notions of deterritorialization
and reterritorialization I have related to my use of
translation earlier (in chapter two) (1990). For Guattari
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the beginning of this process is marked by "a-signifying
ruptures" which Moreland sees as represented by the
frustration repeatedly provoked in generations of
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn readers— frustrations born
of the persistent resistance of his novel to providing
satisfactory resolutions. Language and style that were
needed to express such resolutions were not available to
Twain until Morrison's text entered it. Moreland cites
Guattari,
At the heart of all ecological praxes is an asignifying rupture in a context in which the
catalysts of existential change are present, but
lack expressive support from the enunciative
assemblage which frames them (p. 8).
And further,
In the absence of ecological praxis, those
catalysts remain inactive and tend towards
inconsistency; they produce anxiety, guilt,
other forms of psychopathological repetition (p.
8 ).
Moreland adds, "by putting Twain's novel next to
Morrison's, anticipating Morrison's" (p. 8) one finds an
example of Guattari's hope:
But when expressive rupture takes place,
repetition becomes a process of creative
assemblage, forging new incorporeal objects, new
"abstract machines" (cited in Moreland, p. 8).
Such a new assemblage means, in this context, the
extension of Twain's "realist" approach to include
"incorporeal objects" in the form of "real" ghosts, such
as the ghost of Beloved, which energizes a new pedagogical
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situation— "a new condition of knowledge" (Felman, 1987,
p. 31). For example, Huck's elaborate lies with which he
hopes to protect Jim can now be read as "creative
assemblages" in the context of Morrison's re-reading.
"Lies" that Huck tells are in the service of a larger
social truth, the discovery of which can now be seen as a
"work in progress" (Moreland, 1991, p. 12) that requires
"new codes of love" (Kristeva cited in Moreland, p. 12).
The elaboration of both negative and positive
freedoms in a discourse of love is a "work in
progress" more easily traced in Twain's novel
thanks to the similarly new and particular codes
of love elaborated still farther and more
explicitly in Morrison's novel between another
runaway slave in Sethe and another young poorwhite runaway who helps her in Amy Denver (p.
12 ).
Moreland reads Twain through Morrison and Morrison
through Twain demonstrating his thesis at some length— an
exercise that, once again, I need not repeat. Instead, I
will offer my own reading of a conversation among Twain,
Morrison and Ellison following this "summarizing" passage
from Moreland:
This work in progress, drawing out the
frustrated duet in Huck's (and the canon's?)
monologue, involves not only exploring more of
the runaway slave's own parallel, separate
consciousness . . . but also tracing Denver's
task for herself and her communicating her
mother's story for herself and her community
(and for us?) in a different form with
different, more bearable, more liveable
consequences (1991, p. 25) .
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It has been said of the American South that we are
obsessed with the past, but that it is a romanticized
mythical past that we remember and as such is ahistorical.
Still our history presents itself in daily life in hidden
ways. It surfaces in the form of violence and guilt that
some theorists say is peculiar to the South. We seem torn
between what W.J. Cash called a "frontier" mentality of
radical individualism and what are sometimes suffocating
community ties (1969). If this is so, and we suffer from a
repression of collective memory as a society, perhaps the
South needs a kind of social psychoanalysis, as William
Pinar has suggested (in press), and perhaps novelists, as
I have taken some effort so far to suggest, are capable of
being an important part of that analysis.
Twain seems to be addressing the well-worn conflict
between radical individualism and community responsibility
that takes a particular form in the South. He does this,
according to Richard Gray, by "dissecting the Southern
myths and exposing their faults and weaknesses"

(1986, p.

115). However, Jim's story is not told and, at the end of
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Gray suggests that Twain
seems even to give up on his hero. As Gray states,
Huck is pushed to one side of the action, Tom
Sawyer is permitted to play his familiar games,
and the issue of Jim's slavery is reduced to the
level of farce. For all Huck's occasional
protests at Tom's behaviour, or his famous final
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cry of defiance, the comedy loses its edge, the
moral problems are minimised (p.115).
As discussed above, Ellison disagrees with this reading.
Here is where, perhaps, Morrison picks up the story one
hundred years after Twain, and fifty years after Ellison.
Just as Sethe, Paul D., and Denver begin to trust in
the possibility of a new life together, the past comes
back to haunt them in such a way that they cannot dismiss
it. Similarly, an "innocent" reading of Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn and perhaps other Southern literature
might lull us into complacency before fully confronting
our repressed past. Morrison teaches us (as, Ellison
points out, Twain alluded to but was unable to teach us
directly) that past suffering is most scarring only so
long as it is repressed. Confronted, that repressed past
becomes a source of wisdom— wisdom that may otherwise be
unattainable.

(A "line of flight" from structures that

oppress is hollow without a preliminary and ongoing inner
search.)
Huck's painful childhood experiences take him on a
line of flight of often solitary excitement and adventure.
But, one might ask, where is Jim's "line of flight"? Huck
is able to do this because he has discovered his
"invisibility" in a social and historical moment when a
young white boy on a raft is not particularly noticeable.
This assurance of a kind of invisibility affords him a
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freedom of movement not available to a black runaway
slave. Ellison is able to discover the benefits of such
invisibility only because his character lives in mid
twentieth century inner city New York. But, as Nadel
explains, "Ellison's imagery highlights the dilemma of
which both he and Twain were well aware— that there was no
place for Jim to go" (1988, p. 132).

As Morrison's story

reveals, the most marginalized are able to attain a "line
of flight" of sorts only through an internal search
coupled with the assistance and cooperation of a
community. Invisibility of the sort that Huck (and later,
invisible man) is able to utilize is unavailable to Jim or
Sethe or Paul D. On the other hand, Huck seems less able
to look inward than are, ultimately, Morrison's
characters.
Still, this inner search in which a repressed past is
exhumed is not without danger. The past can take over the
present as it did for a time in Beloved when Denver had to
shift her protective efforts from Beloved to Sethe (as did
the rest of the community). Southern ahistorical obsession
with the past must be confronted with history in order to
overcome obsessiveness. That history lives in the present,
in part, through that obsessiveness. But when love (such
as Sethe's love for Beloved) and historical consciousness
become overwhelmed by guilt, growth is no longer possible.
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In order to be a mobilizing force the past must be
exorcised from dwelling under the skin, so to speak, but
not from conscious memory. The ambiguously positive ending
for Beloved seems to hold the possibility of that promise
both for the novel's characters as well as the reader.
Examples of pasts that dwell under the skin are
manifested by irony, cynicism and guilt and can be found
scattered throughout Faulkner's Absalom. Absalom! This
manner of approach to history points to particular
approaches to theory as well. Returning to the visual
metaphors in Ellison one can detect a (I want to say
focus, but that is yet another visual metaphor) gathering,
a cacaphony, attention directed, around the notion of the
gaze that intends to control by way of surveillance— a
gaze that does not really "see" anyone, but least of all
itself. "Outside the Brotherhood we were outside history;
but inside of it they didn't see us" (Ellison, 1952, p.
488). Attention is directed, via Ellison's brightly lit
and illegally electrified city basement filled with jazz
and blues sounds, toward the ways in which "official"
written history (including literary theories) means to
control as well as toward that which it cannot control—
the criminal, the schizophrenic, the marginal, the noisy,
the invisible, the perverse, the phantasm. Ellison's
writing highlights the possibilities for a different
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approach to social, historical, and literary theories— a
point made by Eamon Halpin in his essay "The Ocular and
the Otic: Theoretical Paradigms in Faulkner and Ellison"
(1990). The generation of alternative theoretical
possibilities is yet one more way in which literature
translates tradition. In this case the translation is
noted by Halpin to occur between Ellison and Faulkner.
A "social theory" which "sees" itself (that is, is
aware of its own complicity in the knowledge it produces)
is very different from theory that underpins the
Brotherhood or theory that emerges, as Halpin notes, from
a particular reading of Faulkner's Absalom. Absalom!
Literary (and other) theories which are "visual"— that is,
they represent an all seeing eye/"I"— are compared to
literary theory embodied in Ellison's writing. The sense
in which Ellison's writing exhibits a different— in some
senses opposite— literary theoretical paradigm from that
displayed in Absalom. Absalom!. is another way in which
his novel "converses" with Faulkner,

(now) a traditional

canonical author.
Faulkner's Rosa Coldfield is obsessed. She wants to
know— wants to control— the way the story of Sutpen's
Hundred and of Thomas Sutpen himself gets told and is
received. Rosa repeats, to a reluctant young local man,
Quentin Compson, her story of the past in the small
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Mississippi town where she lives and where, years earlier,
a stranger who moved there disrupted her life. Rosa is not
the only one who is repeating the story, but it is her
version which dominates the novel in its excessively
personal, hyperbolic and paranoid tone. For Halpin, the
only outsider who hears and repeats the story, Shreve (a
Canadian college student who is Quentin's friend),
in his imagined detachment from the events which
both he and Quentin attempt to understand, . . .
exemplifies the literary critic's tendency
towards irony and readerly autonomy (1990, p.
5 ).
Further,
in Shreve the crisis in criticism is effaced or
at least only dimly represented. In the figure
of Rosa Coldfield, by contrast, Faulkner
provides us with a fuller understanding of the
psychology of the literary critic. Whereas
Shreve embodies the critic's representation of
himself to himself, Rosa allows us to see the
conditions out of which such a representation
arises (p. 5).
She resembles the literary critic in the sense that her
living of her story, "her condition is one of belatedness"
(p. 6). Her "methodology is a hermeneutics of suspicion .
. . For Rosa meaning is always concealed, lurking in
secrecy and guilt beneath an illusory surface" (p. 7).
"Her role in the novel's events is one of surveillance"
(p. 8). Like Ellison's Brotherhood, Rosa believes herself
able to see things in others that others can not see for
themselves.
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Her penetrating vision allows her, or at least
seems to allow her, to occupy a position of
greater power than either Ellen [Rosa's sister
who married Sutpen] or her children, whom she
tends to see as hapless victims. Their
visibility is the opposite of Rosa's own
condition, which is a kind of invisibility. Rosa
sees but for the most part cannot be seen
herself (p. 8).
In her monumental efforts to know, she exemplifies
Lyotard's description of the "opposition between
scientific and narrative knowledge" (Halpin, 1990, p. 10):
The scientist questions the validity of
narrative statements and concludes that they are
never subject to argumentation or proof. He
classifies them as belonging to a different
mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped,
backward, alienated, composed of opinions,
customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance,
ideology. Narratives are fables, myths, legends,
fit only for women and children (italics added)
(cited in Halpin, p. 10).
As such, Rosa's approach to interpretation operates within
a complicated opposition of "scientific objectivity"/
superstition or narrative knowledge. She— "almost despite
herself— provides us with an insight into the profoundly
interested nature of interpretive and critical discourse.
In her the scientific observer is exposed as a kind of
paranoid voyeur or spy" (Halpin, 1990, p. 10). For Halpin,
Rosa represents the paradigm of modernist literary
criticism.
Ellison's invisible man, on the other hand, in
feeling victimized by this paradigm of interpretive
strategy, begins to look for alternatives— alternative
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subjectivities. While at times he responds to his
victimization in kind, that is, by using his own
invisibility as a means of "power or control over those
who can be seen" (p. 16), at other moments his
invisibility seems creative of a movement away from
static, assymetric and violent power relations. Here,
invisibility seems to offer him a path to a
different kind of subjectivity, a subjectivity
which is not linked to the omniscient eye, but
to the unpredictable and unbounded
reverberation, to echoes and acoustics, to sound
and music (p. 16).
This "music of invisibility" signals an alternative
"experimental subjectivity" in which the subject is able
to move into or out of "at any point" (p. 17). "The
subject is never quite in time, never part of a regular
and predictable beat within which it could feel in full
control of itself and its destiny" (p. 17). Such an
experimental subjectivity is inherently aware of its own
complicity in positioning by virtue of the fact that it is
"experimental." It is "invisible,not blind" (Ellison,
1952, p. 563). Invisible man seems to find considerable
power at last through his awareness of his invisibility—
invisibility which he says is not the same thing as
blindness such as Jack's (of the Brotherhood). This
awareness is brought into "sharp focus" when invisible man
is forced to leap outside history in a very literal sense
as he burns the papers signifying his own history in
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search of light and escape from a manhole. This idea is
extended in the epilogue when he says, "so after years of
trying to adopt the opinions of others I finally rebelled.
I am an invisible man" (p. 560).
Still, to fall (or jump) into a hole never to emerge
is to respond to blindness with blindness— merely a
response in kind. "The politics of infinitely advancing
while looking over the shoulder is a very dangerous
exercise. You tend to fall into a hole" (Stuart Hall,
1987, p. 45).

Fit Only for Women and Children
While Rosa's narrative strategy may indeed offer
insight into the paranoia of much modernist criticism, her
own story comes through in another manner— a manner that
points to the significance of absences, in terms of race
and gender, in this novel. For me the most intriguing
absences are the voices of Judith (Rosa's niece, Sutpen's
daughter) and Clytie (Sutpen's mulatto daughter and
slave), while the most intriguing presence is the voice of
Rosa. They are powerful characters who are crucial to the
novel. Rosa has the only female voice, and that voice is
represented as near hysteria. The relationship between
Rosa and Clytie strikes me as the most complex and perhaps
the most suggestive.

It seems to me that the complexities, ambiguities,
and psychology of racism, Southern racism in particular,
are most significantly explored through these female
characters. And through exploration of racism, the perhaps
more universal themes of love, hate, and sexuality are
confronted in their particularistic, Southern regional
forms. Rosa is clearly obsessed with the Sutpen family in
general, Sutpen in particular, and appears to live
vicariously through them even after their deaths. This
apparent preoccupation with Thomas Sutpen gets projected
onto Clytie after the death of Charles Bon (Judith's
mulatto half-brother, unbeknownst to her, and her lover)—
a death of one who represents for Rosa her own potential
for love and passion as expressed through her "summer of
wistaria" at age fourteen. (Rosa's erotic fantasizing in
her "summer of wistaria" is reminiscent of Hurston's Janie
and her "pear tree in bloom.") Indeed it is Clytie's
physical touch, "touch of flesh with flesh which
abrogates, cuts sharp and straight across the devious
intricate channels of decorous ordering, which enemies as
well as lovers know because it makes them both" (Faulkner,
1936, p. 139), that shocks Rosa into an awareness of the
problematics of race, sex, love, and hate. Awareness,
however, does not constitute understanding. Minrose Gwin
in her book Black and White Women of the Old South
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expresses Rosa's awareness-without-understanding as
follows:
Rosa's driving need is not so much to discover
the nature of the "something. . . living hidden
in that house," but to know herself— to
understand why her life has turned out as it
has. She finds in Clytie an objective
correlative for the intense ambivalence, the
love and the hate, she feels for herself as
white southern woman trapped by gender, history,
culture, and her own racism. Rosa may intuit
Clytie as a female shadow-self, the product of
pure sexual passion which young Rosa envisions,
but never experiences (1985, p. 117).
According to Catherine Clement (in her reading of
Freud), a collective repressed past survives in the
hysterical woman more than in anyone else (1988, pp. 339). Rosa's hysteria certainly seems to bear that out in
this novel where it takes the form of a paranoia that is
exemplary of the entire South in many ways. In paranoia,
according to Paul Smith, "the 'subject' thus endows the
external world with what it takes to be its own worst
tendencies and qualities. . . [Projection] is undertaken
in order to maintain the fiction, exactly, of a wholeness
and wholesomeness in the subjects' internal economy"
(1988, pp. 95-96). "Rosa reflects the darkness of the
white self which rejects human connection with the black
Other" (Gwin, 1985, p. 111). As one defines oneself, in
part, by who one defines as other this division and
destruction of the racial other is division and
destruction of the self. It is a self divided against
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itself. Indeed, it is the relationship between Clytie and
Rosa which finally destroys them both. Rosa's noted
tendency toward an interpretation through the gaze, or a
hermeneutics of suspicion could be thought of as a kind of
hysterical male identification. How else could Faulkner
write her except as "male"?
These "silences" are indeed noisy. Faulkner's seeming
neglect or exclusion of certain stories and voices are
telling. They do not necessarily reflect an unconscious
exclusion on Faulkner's part, or a malevolent exclusion.
He leads us to speculate on a vast and complex interiority
to women and black people, even though such is not
provided overtly in the narrative. It seems possible that
his narrative strategy reflects a kind of representational
honesty on his part— a reluctance to speak for women and
black people in the same ways he speaks for white males.
In Zora Neale Hurston's novel Their Eves Were Watching
God, published just one year after Absalom. Absalom1. we
see a "corrective" to missing black speech, black female
speech in particular.
The historical moment among the black literatti in
which Hurston wrote Their Eves Were Watching God was one
of contestation over what constitutes an appropriate tone
in black writing. Hurston was in the clear minority as one
who wrote in "dialect" and as one whose work was not
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preoccupied by black struggles with racism. One of her
most vociferous critics was Richard Wright who felt her
lack of bitterness toward whites and the "minstrel image"
her work perpetuated were counter-revolutionary (Hemenway,
1977, p. 241).
Hurston wanted her work to be far-removed from what
she called "the sobbing school of Negrohood," (p. 220) and
claimed that such writing was even a distortion: "We talk
about the race problem a great deal, but go on living and
laughing and striving like everybody else" (p. 221) .
Hemenway expands on this thought in his biography of
Hurston.
By leaving out "the problem," by emphasizing the
art in the folkloric phenomenon, Hurston
implicitly told whites: Contrary to your
arrogant assumptions, you have not really
affected us that much; we continue to practice
our own culture, which as a matter of fact is
more alive, more esthetically pleasing than your
own; and it is not solely a product of defensive
reactions to your actions. She felt that black
culture manifested an independent esthetic
system that could be discussed without constant
reference to white oppression. The price for
this philosophy was an appearance of political
naivete' and the absence of an immediate
historical presence (p. 221).
Still, as Michael Cooke points out, there is a potential
regressiveness to particular forms and/or timing for
Signifyin(g), a major trope for Their Eves Were Watching
God. (I will return to this later as I introduce Jamaica
Kincaid's writing.)
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Hurston's novel begins with "definitions" of men's
desire (which, according to Gates [1988], is a revision,
or Signifyin(g), of Frederick Douglas's 1845 text) and
women's desire opposed to one another, and which Hurston
reverses later within the text. She characterizes men as
"watchers" of distant ships, and women as "dreamers"
creating their own "truth" (lives), and then reverses this
as the protagonist's (Janie's) grandmother (Nanny) talks
about the distant ship carrying her dreams, whereas Tea
Cake (Janie's third husband) sees the distant ship, and
all else that has to do with his fate, as under his
control. This reversal is ever-reversing throughout the
text— those "definitions" never stable.
Broadly speaking, the text is the story of a black
woman in search of self-awareness, which is "thematize[d]
through an opposition between the inside and the outside
of things" (Gates, 1988, p.184)— or, a kind of divided
self. The advantages to keeping things (self) divided, as
referred to by Ellison's invisible man, are strikingly
demonstrated in Their Eves Were Watching God and
brilliantly interpreted by Barbara Johnson (1987).
Johnson recalls Jakobson's discovery of patterns of
aphasia (speech dysfunction) as falling into two main
categories: similarity disorders and contiguity disorders.
With such disorders the ability to follow one topic from
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another on the basis of its similarity or contiguity is
restricted or totally blocked. Personality, cultural
style, and verbal style in "normal" (that is, non-aphasic)
verbal behavior— behavior where both processes are
continually operative— will exhibit preference for one
process over the other, but some facility with both is
necessary. One with a similarity disorder is unable to
follow one topic from another metaphorically; with a
contiguity disorder, one is unable to follow one topic
with another metonymically.
Johnson points out, as has Paul de Man, that metaphor
is the privileged trope of the two in Western culture, and
together metaphor and metonymy constitute an
interdependent opposition. Metaphor as a kind of analogy
presents a necessity— an inference of identity and
totality. Metonymy, because it has to do with contiguity,
is perceived as coming about through chance— it is purely
relational. One problem with this— a problem that is
highlighted by Hurston's use of these tropes— is that it
is often difficult to tell the two tropes apart, for
example, as in "birds of a feather flock together." This
proverb sums up
the tendency of contiguity to become overlaid by
similarity, and vice versa.. . . One has only to
think of the applicability of this proverb to
the composition of neighborhoods in America to
realize that the question of the separability of
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similarity from contiguity may have considerable
political implications (Johnson, B., 1987, p.
157) .
Johnson demonstrates how Hurston is "acutely
conscious of, and superbly skilled in, the seductiveness
and complexity of metaphor as privileged trope and trope
of privilege" (p. 159) through her analysis of the
following passage from Their Eves Were Watching God that I
will reproduce in part after setting the context. The
passage follows an argument between Janie and her second
husband, Joe Starks, over her handling of a business
matter in their store. Joe has told Janie that "Somebody
got to think for women and chillun and chickens and cows"
(cited in Johnson, p. 159) as they cannot think for
themselves.
Times and scenes like that put Janie to thinking
about the inside state of her marriage. Time
came when she fought back with her tongue as
best she could, but it didn't do her any good.
It just made Joe do more. He wanted her
submission and he'd keep on fighting until he
felt he had it.
So gradually, she pressed her teeth
together and learned how to hush. The spirit of
the marriage left the bedroom and took to living
in the parlor. It was there to shake hands
whenever company came to visit, but it never
went back inside the bedroom again (Hurston,
1978, p. 55).
Janie's thoughts at this time take her back to an incident
which revealed to her that "She wasn't petal-open anymore
with him" (p. 56). Joe had slapped and berated her after
she had ruined a meal.
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Janie stood where he left her for unmeasured
time and thought. She stood there until
something fell off the shelf inside her. Then
she went inside there to see what it was. It was
her image of Jody tumbled down and shattered.
But looking at it she saw that it never was the
flesh and blood figure of her dreams. Just
something she had grabbed up to drape her dreams
over. In a way
she turned her back upon the
image where it
lay and looked further.
Shehad
no more blossomy openings dusting pollen over
her man, neither any glistening young fruit
where the petals used to be. . . . She had an
inside and an outside now and suddenly
sheknew
how not to mixthem (cited in Johnson, B., 1987,
pp 161-2) .
Janie's self-division into her inside/outside
opposition is expressed through her use and reversals of
the metaphor/metonymy opposition. Her marriage situation
is related to metaphorically, analogically, as the house
and the store. Her marriage space is related to
metonymically, "a movement through a series of contiguous
rooms" (p. 163). In the first paragraph of the passage
where "the spirit of the marriage left the bedroom, [there
is an] externalization of the inner, metaphorically
grounded in metonymy" (p. 163). "Something fell off the
shelf inside her" (p. 163) in the second paragraph reveals
an "internalization of the outer, metonymically grounded
metaphor" (p. 163).
The reversals operated by the chiasmus [above]
map out a reversal of the power relations
between Janie and Joe. Henceforth, Janie will
grow in power and resistance, while Joe
deteriorates both in his body and in his public
image (p. 163).
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At the point Janie realizes "how not to mix them" is
the point at which she acquires the power of voice. This
power "grows not out of her identity but out of her
division into inside and outside" (p. 163). The ability to
articulate, to have "the power of voice" requires this
divsion in figurative language— the simultaneous presence
of distinct poles, inside and outside, similarity and
contiguity, metaphor and metonymy, and "not their collapse
into oneness" (p. 163). But distinct does not mean that
they can be spoken outside one another. It should be
reiterated that a peculiar characteristic of hierarchical
oppositions is their interdependence upon one another.
This division, therefore, requires deconstruction for its
"resolution," not dialectical synthesis.
It must be remembered that what is at stake in
the maintenance of both sides [as divided]—
metaphor and metonymy, inside and outside— is
the very possibility of speaking at all. The
reduction of a discourse to oneness, identity—
in Janie's case, the reduction of woman to
mayor's wife— has as its necessary consequence
aphasia, silence, the loss of ability to speak:
"She pressed her teeth together and learned to
hush" (p. 164).
There is a difference, then, between self-division
that is divided against the self— a "difference within"
that creates frustration, hatred, xenophobia, "sick"
schizophrenia, neurosis, division that is a sort of
surgical cutting off between self and other as in Lacan's
mirror stage— and self-division that is for the "self"—
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division that enables voice, prevents (critical) aphasia,
avoids essentialistc collapsing of differences. The
differences at stake here point to a dynamism among the
three registers of identity formation as mentioned
earlier.
It is only through a faith in and seeking of love
that Janie is moved to action, to speech, moved to learn.
And it is finally through the realization of the love she
sought (with her third husband, Tea Cake) that Janie gains
the self-knowledge required to understand a history that
lives in the present.
Dis is uh love game. Ah done lived Grandma's
way, now Ah means tuh live mine. . . She was
borned in slavery time when folks, dat is black
folks, didn't sit down anytime dey felt lak it.
So sittin' on porches lak de white madam looked
lak uh mighty fine thing tuh her. Dat's whut she
wanted for me— don't keer whut it cost. Git up
on uh high chair and sit there. She didn't have
time tuh think whut tuh do after you got up on
de stool uh do nothin'. De object wuz tuh git
dere. So Ah got up on de high stool lak she told
me, but Pheoby, Ah done nearly languished tuh
death up dere. Ah felt like de world wuz cryin'
extry and Ah ain't read de common news yet
(Hurston, 1978, pp. 171-2).
The story ends with her in relative solitude (what
Michael Cooke calls "accomplished solitude" [1984, p.
84])— reflective of the way Hurston's own life-story
ended. But it is a different solitude than that of
invisible man who has yet to sustain an intimate
relationship with anyone. Still, Janie's intimacy has been
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limited, for the most part, to one other. Her friendship
with Pheoby signals hope for her connection to the
community— a connection that she desired earlier but that
was largely stifled by Joe Starks. Tea Cake stifled this
connection in his own way as well. It was he who convinced
Janie he could be trusted to return from long absences
from her, yet it was also he who could not stand,
eventually, to allow her out of his sight.
This love for her reached its pinnacle with his
madness. Bitten by a rabid dog, he was "mad with love,"
jealous to the point of murder at which time Janie shot
him in self defense. Once again Janie took control of her
life by refusing to be canceled— this time by what may
have been becoming fusion love, although that possibility
is steeped in a rich ambiguity. The drama of this final
scene is descriptive of the risk of love, ambivalence of
desire, the potential violence though necessity of
knowledge, of the pedagogical relationship. She chooses to
sustain the love she's known with Tea Cake through place
and memory.
So Ah'm back home agin and Ah'm satisfied tuh be
heah. Ah done been tuh do horizon and back and
now Ah kin set heah in mah haouse and live by
comparisons. Dis house ain't so absent of things
lak it used tuh be befo' Tea Cake come along.
It's full uh thoughts, 'specially dat bedroom
(Hurston, 1978, p. 284).
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Of Janie's ending in "accomplished solitude," her
rejection of the social sphere, Cooke writes, "Her home is
a symbol of her condition, free and proud and yet
radically unshared" (1984, p. 84). Her solution is to
deny, to some extent, the significance of the communal
register.
She pulled in her horizon like a great fish-net.
Pulled it from around the waist of the world and
draped it over her shoulder. So much of life in
its meshes! She called in her soul to come and
see (Hurston, 1978, p. 286).
This rejection of the communal in favor of the
individual is, as a personal solution, perhaps ironic for
an author whose life-work was to preserve the community of
African-American folk culture. Rather than view it, as
Cooke does, as a rejection of all but solitude, a
rejection of intimacy— an ironic and thus cynical turn—
her refusal to sever herself from her past and the
pedagogical situation she sets up between herself and
Pheoby ("'Lawd!' Pheoby breathed out heavily, 'Ah done
growed ten feet higher from jus' listenin' tuh you, Janie.
Ah ain't satisfied wid mahself no mo'" [p. 284]) could be
thought to signal a beginning in her conclusion. The
celebratory note with which Hurston ends the novel (Janie
embraces all of the life within the mesh that is her
horizon) is not a note of disconnection or isolation. It
differs radically from Ellison's ending with invisible man
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still in the hole— albeit contemplating leaving that hole
for love and social action. She did, after all, return to
her community. It is hard to imagine that she came back
there only to isolate herself from the others.

The

power of the fictional register (of language) is
recognized by her earlier in the novel as she "kills" Joe
Starks with her words— an act of "motivated Signifyin(g)"- thereby avoiding her own cancelation and, further,
creating her "self." Yet the strength of her words
depended on the public, communal witnessing (and
understanding) of their utterance. Her act of telling the
tale, to herself, to Pheoby, signifies her recognition of
the autobiographical register in forming identity.
Like Hurston, and in another sense, Faulkner, Jamaica
Kincaid's project consists of an exploration of self
through discovering history that lives in the present.
Much of the writing in her latest two texts proceeds
through a discourse of anger. But to read her only as this
is to miss the greater significance in her stories. One
literary mode of expression for Kincaid, particularly in
Lucy, is a metissage— "initiating a genuine dialogue with
the dominant discourses they hope to transform, thus
ultimately favoring exchange rather than provoking
conflict" (Lionnet, 1989, p. 3). This mode of writing
inherently presents a challenge to essentializing
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tendencies in the written history of Western (or any
dominant) culture. As such, as a literary mode and
theoretical category, it holds some cultural specificity
similar to the ways in which "Signifyin(g)" does. Its
specificity, however, is not derivative of any one
particular culture so much as it belongs to a notion of
"post-colonial culture."
The difference between this mode of writing and that
of Signifyin' is in its directness. Both constitute a kind
of translation and, in the case of "unmotivated
Signifyin(g)" at least, a kind of dialogue. However,
metissage conceived of as a "cultural braiding" does not
necessarily proceed through chiasmus— repetition and
reversal. It is this very indirectness in Signifyin(g)
that sometimes renders it regressive rather than
subversive or socially active and creative. As Cooke
observes,
Signifying always involves questions of power on
two levels, the social and the mental, and the
signifier is the one who as best he can makes up
for a lack of social power with an exercise of
intellectual or critical power (1984, p. 26).
This strategy amounts to little or, at worst, it can
backfire when one is
busy signifying, but no one [can] tell.
Signifying and wishful thinking tend to coincide
here. Signifying becomes an idle secret and, as
Gates has justly remarked, dangerously close to
tomming (p. 29).
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When, for example, a black artist "signifies on" white
racial stereotype in certain ways and at certain times,
"both black and white come out the worse" (p. 29), the
white for maintaining ignorant beliefs, "the black for
playing not so much on as down to that belief" (p. 29).
Kincaid entertains no such play.
Jamaica Kincaid warns of the dangers of reading like
a tourist— of pre(sub)suming a particular text, of mis
translating, of failing to remember one's own deep un
knowing of the "known," the "native" in the text. We begin
with her book A Small Place (1988) as a tourist (or wouldbe tourist) of Antigua who Kincaid hopes to teach. Later,
in her book Lucv (1990), she comes to the United States as
an au pair and finds us still mis-translating (even
ourselves), or else not bothering to translate at all,
placing the entire burden on the immigrant, choosing
ignorance.
A Small Place is not called a novel. It is an essay
about life among tourists, natives and neo-colonizers in
"post-colonial" Antigua. However, I am struck by its
similarities to her autobiographical fiction, Lucv. Both
are angry works. Kincaid, in an interview with Donna
Perry, says she is through being "charming"— "when people
say you're charming you are in deep trouble" (cited in
Perry, 1990, p. 498).
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Kincaid plays with a kind of complete reversal of the
colonizer/colonized or tourist/native hierarchies through
her words of utter disdain for white tourists from England
and North America. Tourists become for her the embodiment
of all that is ugly, dirty, stupid and, in some senses,
evil— characteristics colonizers typically ascribe to
colonized.
And you look at . . . the way they [Antiguans]
squat down over a hole they have made in the
ground, the hole itself is something to marvel
at, and since you are being an ugly person this
ugly but joyful thought will swell inside you:
their ancestors were not clever in the way yours
were and not ruthless in the way yours were, for
then would it not be you who would be in harmony
with nature and backwards in that charming way?
An ugly thing, that is what you are when you
become a tourist, an ugly, empty thing, a stupid
thing, a piece of rubbish pausing here and there
to gaze at this and taste that, and it will
never occur to you that the people who inhabit
the place in which you have just paused cannot
stand you (Kincaid, 1988, pp. 16-17).
This reversal is sustained almost throughout the
entire text but with interludes for describing and
explaining Antiguan internalization of oppressor modus
operandi and values in post-colonial Antigua. Then, the
last two sentences:
Of course, the whole thing is, once you cease to
be a master, once you throw off your master's
yoke, you are no longer human rubbish, you are
just a human being, and all the things that adds
up to. So, too, with the slaves. Once they are
no longer slaves, once they are free, they are
no longer noble and exhalted; they are just
human beings (p. 81).
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Kincaid's rage is most likely shocking to her
(intended) readers (intended for the New Yorker magazine
initially, but the first time any of her writing was ever
rejected by them [Perry, 1990, p. 497]). But the colonial
history of Antigua lives in the present— undeniably for
those subject to its excess. Antiguans, long since
"emancipated," are still servants to foreigners and
Antiguans corrupted by foreigners. Where else, Kincaid
asks, could we have learned about capital, Gross National
Product, and so on?
I realized in writing that book that the first
step to claiming yourself is anger. You get mad.
And you can't do anything before you get angry.
And I recommend getting very angry to everyone,
anyone (p. 498).
For the sake of her arguments, she deploys
essentialisms of both tourist and native; British, North
American and Antiguan. In her last two novels (the ones
examined here) she exhibits, at times, a bitterness toward
all of the above that is quite different from novelistic
approaches of African-Caribbean Wilson Harris. His novels,
for example, could be said to be themselves a view or
views to the transformations he imagines rather than
didactics for the way to get there or admonitions against
obstacles to getting there. Some of Kincaid's earlier
works fAt the Bottom of the River [1978] and Annie John
[1983]) could be said to more closely resemble what has
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been called Harris's "postmodern" or "poststructural"
style (Covi, 1990, pp. 345-354). I have chosen, however,
to deal only with the two most recent texts as Kincaid
claims to have abandoned her older style for good, and as
these two texts are such clear demonstrations of the ways
repressed histories live— particularly through language:
For isn't it odd that the only language I have
in which to speak of this crime is the language
of the criminal who committed the crime? And
what can that really mean? For the language of
the criminal can contain only the goodness of
the criminal's deed. The language of the
criminal can explain and express the deed only
from the criminal's point of view. It cannot
contain the horror of the deed, the injustice of
the deed, the agony, the humiliation inflicted
on me (Kincaid, 1988, pp. 31-2).
In this way her writing is a clear example of crosscultural encounter as it reveals the operation of
translation with a master.
The bitterness and anger remain in Lucv. However, she
finds as invisible man discovered, "too much of your life
will be lost, its meaning lost, unless you approach it as
much through love as through hate" (Ellison, 1952, p.
580). Lucy indeed loves Mariah, wife and mother in her au
pair family, at the same time she is an astute observer of
her foibles and contradictions and the connections of
these to larger American society— to patriarchy, to
commodification, to alienation and angst. It is toward
these connections that Mariah seems oblivious except from
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a very limited "liberal feminist" and "liberal
environmentalist" perspective.
Mariah says, "I have Indian blood in me," and
underneath everything I could swear she says it
as if she were announcing her possession of a
trophy. How do you get to be the sort of victor
who can claim to be the vanquished also?
I now heard Mariah say, "Well," and she let
out a long breath, full of sadness, resignation,
even dread. I looked at her; her face was
miserable, tormented, ill-looking. She looked at
me in a pleading way, as if asking for relief,
and I looked back, my face and my eyes hard; no
matter what, I would not give it. . . .
I said, "How do you get to be that way?"
The anguish on her face almost broke my heart,
but I would not bend. It was hollow, my triumph,
I could feel that, but I held on to it just the
same (Kincaid, 1990, pp. 40-1).
Mariah is unaware of the psychosocial and political
dynamics of otherness. Yet Lucy loves Mariah's warmth and
innocence at the same time she resents her seemingly
willful ignorance. Lucy sees her own mother in Mariah— her
mother being the major reason she left Antigua. Seeing her
mother in Mariah seemed to help Lucy to deal with her own
contradictory feelings toward her. Through this love Lucy
and Mariah enter a pedagogical relationship in which both
teach and learn.
The pedagogical imperative with which we are faced in
Kincaid's work is that of cross-cultural imagination—
literacy of the imagination— which includes a re-reading
of our own place in colonial history. It is not read as
history per se, but more as history that lives in the
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present— much like Pinar's characterization of the
repressed but living racial history (in press). One
illustrative episode in Lucy is when Mariah took Lucy to a
favorite clearing in the woods in order to surprise Lucy
with the extravagant beauty of an entire field of blooming
daffodils:
"Mariah, do you realize that at ten years of age
I had to learn by heart a long poem about some
flowers I would not see in real life until I was
nineteen?" . . . This woman who hardly knew me
loved me, and she wanted me to love this thing—
a grove brimming over with daffodils in bloom—
that she loved also. Her eyes sank back in her
head as if they were protecting themselves, as
if they were taking a rest after some unexpected
hard work. It wasn't her fault. It wasn't my
fault. . . The same thing could cause us to shed
tears, but those tears would not taste the same
(Kincaid, 1990, p. 30).
Both Kincaid and Wilson Harris write of West Indian
children having to memorize Wordsworth's "I Wandered
Lonely as a Cloud" (the daffodil poem). Both express a
kind of ambivalence to the educational practice that is
characteristic of Harris's notion of cross-cultural
imagination— an ambivalence that is "unsettlement." As
Harris explains:
That unsettlement is rooted in paradox and in
auction block histories, it is rooted in
centuries of the conquest of species in nature,
it is rooted in the conversion of
conquistadorial biases into the humour of finity
and infinity. Schoolchildren in the West Indies
used to write quite naturally and innocently, it
seemed, of English snow and Wordsworthian
daffodils that they had never seen, rather than
palm-groves or cane-fields or rainforests. The
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absurdity has often (and rightly so) been quoted
as a caveat of blindness inculcated by colonial
institutions stereotyped and bound within other
cultural landscapes (1983, p. 134).
What Harris calls the "unconscious infinity of humour" (p.
134) results in West Indian writing that grew out of such
schooling in which, for example in a poem called Snows by
Martiniquan poet, St.-John Perse, "'strange alliances . .
. white nuptials of noctuids, white festivals of mayflies'
may come into attunement, on cross-cultural loom," (p.
134) with poets and poems* of other cultural and natural
landscapes.*
Kincaid's ambivalence about learning the Wordsworth
poem, and other items from the British canon, is expressed
in her interview with Donna Perry:
Every colonial child has to do that. It's a twoedged thing because I wouldn't have known how to
write and how to think if I hadn't read those
things. I wouldn't have known my idea of justice
if I hadn't read Paradise Lost, if I hadn't been
given parts of Paradise Lost to memorize. It was
given to me because I was supposed to be Satan.
The last chapter of the book I have written has
a lot of things about that. The book is called
Lucv. short for Lucifer (Perry, 1990, p. 507).
Kincaid reads history from a multi-faceted
perspective. Columbus's "discovery" of Antigua in 1493
fascinates her (she intends to read his personal journals)
and she sees it from the perspective of the poetics of
exploration as well as the way that this "great curiosity
in every human being [is] . . . bound up in this horrible

thing that happened (slavery— the domination)" (cited in
Perry, p. 501). Indeed, her approach to studying history
generally is through studies of domination. While angry at
the abominations, Kincaid sees no simple "solutions": "If
you remove the apparatus for the game [of domination as a
game of musical chairs] to go on, then permanently sitting
down is its own prison" (cited in Perry, p. 501). "There's
no such thing as a fresh start" (cited in Perry, p. 502).
Kincaid writes autobiographical fiction. As will be
shown in the next chapter some theorists would claim all
autobiography is fiction and/or all fiction is a kind of
autobiography. I go to that chapter now to explore my own
and some of my students' connections to those (uneasy)
relations— relations displayed and disturbed by
theoretical and literary readings that have gone before.

CHAPTER FOUR
Autobiography: Fact, Fiction, Truth and Lies
In Plato's writings, dialogue gave way to the
literary pseudodialogue. But by the Hellenistic
age, writing prevailed, and real dialectic
passed to correspondence. Taking care of oneself
became linked to constant writing activity. The
self is something to write about, a theme or
object (subject) of writing activity. That is
not a modern trait born of the Reformation or of
romanticism; it is one of the most ancient
Western traditions. It was well established and
deeply rooted when Augustine started his
Confessions (Michel Foucault, 1988, p. 27).
Autobiographical writing, writing and theorizing
about autobiography in education, and other, related
notions such as "teacher lore" (Schubert, 1991), "voices
of teachers" (Aoki, 1990), "narrative dialogue" (Witherell
& Noddings, 1991), "reflective practice" (Schon, 1983,
1991), and "teacher stories" (Pagano, 1990, 1991) have
been increasingly appearing in curriculum discourses over
the last several years (for example, in addition to the
above mentioned, Abbs, 1974; Ayers, 1989; Grumet, 1980,
1988a, 1988b; Miller, 1990; Pagano, 1991; Pinar, 1980,
1981, 1988, in press; Pinar & Grumet, 1976; Taubman, in
press). Many of these projects have been explorations into
the uses of autobiography for teacher education and their
implications for curriculum praxis. Some have been for the
purpose of self-exploration for curriculum theorists and
teacher educators. Some also investigate and generate
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theorizing about autobiography itself. It is this latter
mode of inquiry that I wish to address and participate in
initially in this chapter.
My intent is to survey some prominent theories in
autobiography that have emerged outside the curriculum
field, more often from literary and philosophical
disciplines, as well as some of the theorizing that I have
encountered among curriculum theorists. Autobiography as
approached in this study is embedded within a cultural
studies orientation in that it is viewed as operating
across identity registers to include political critique—
critique at and about the borders between traditional
academic disciplines, and critique of social hierarchies
that forbid or limit participation of particular voices in
the creation of legitimated knowledge. Autobiography in
conversation with literary works is a notion that also
draws explicitly from cultural studies approaches given
that cultural studies as a "field" of inquiry originated
in the literary disciplines and remains significantly
there at present. After a theoretical exploration into
autobiography I will provide demonstrations and discussion
of autobiographical writing by myself and some of my
students for the purpose of illustration. These specific
examples represent a part of my study that is yet
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"embryonic" and, as such, not to be interpreted as "data"
in support of a particular method.

Theory and Autobiography
Autobiography as a "genre" has been a theoretical
problem for literary critics from the first appearances of
critical literature about autobiography, and contemporary
theory is no exception (although the way the problem is
framed is often very different now) (Olney, 1980, pp. 327). It has been argued that, (a) all autobiography is
fiction because even the "self" is a fiction (Sprinker,
1980), (b) autobiography provides "truths" that nothing
else does (Olney, 1980, p. 13), (c) all historical and
autobiographical writing contains elements of fiction and
elements of fact or at least "truth" (Kerby, 1988), (d)
autobiography, or the writing/written self, is represented
metaphorically by style (Starobinski, 1980/1976),

(e)

autobiography exists only as "the late product of a
specific civilization" (Gusdorf, 1980, p. 29). One which
holds "conscious awareness of the singularity of each
individual life" (p. 29). as opposed to those
societies/cultures that exist as interdependent
communities.
For curriculum theorists Jacques Daignault and
Clermont Gauthier (1981) the search for identity— which is

what autobiography may be thought to be— is a search for a
moving target. As such, the search reveals a "paradox of
sense" (p. 180) which is within the "paradigm of infinite
regression" (p. 180). "For example, in order to define a
phenomenon we use words but these words also need to be
defined and the words used in these definitions need to be
defined too and this infinitely" (p. 180). The search is a
game that never ends. Writing an "autobiography" would
seem to be a way of saying "Here I am; the search is over"
if autobiography is concieved as discovery of the self, or
even, in some senses, as creation of the self— for
example, in the sense that creation is believed to be
complete or finished. It is these conceptions of
autobiography that Daignault's and Gauthier's paradoxical
identity challenge.
Michael Sprinker, in his essay "Fictions of the Self:
The End of Autobiography" (1980), echoes the above ideas
about identity, making his case for the implications of
this for autobiography through selected writings and
discussions of Vico, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud. He
recounts stories from Kierkegaard's texts Repetition and
Fear and Trembling, both written under pseudonyms, to
assert their resemblance to Kierkegaard's own life, one
told "through a re-creation of Abraham's sacrifice of
Isaac" (Fear and Trembling) , and the other "through the
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fictional narrative of the relations between Constantius
and the nameless young lover" (p. 330). Some time later,
Kierkegaard admitted to assuming the pseudonyms but denied
having uttered any of the words written under them. In
this way Kierkegaard
refuses to assume the traditional responsibility
of an author for his text, and in so doing he
undermines the conventional notions of author
and text, self and discourse (p. 332).
Sprinker follows this example of Kierkegaard's
condition of writing as an intertextual "multiplicity of
subjects" (p. 332) with a reminder of Nietzsche's
"obliterat[ion °f] the authority of the subject by
exposing it as a deception" (p. 334)— a deception designed
to cover over the only "real" authority: the will to
power. The will to power, Nietzsche warns, is precisely
what may drive one, in the name of autobiography, to find
it "useful and important for one's activity to interpret
oneself falsely" (cited in Sprinker, p. 334).
Freud took this admonition seriously in writing
psychoanalysis, but Freud also serves, for Sprinker, as
another personal example of one whose life demonstrates
the ways in which "the life and the thought are, in fact
produced in the writing" (p. 337).
To turn Freud back upon himself [as did Lacan]
is to discover a discourse trapped in its own
discursiveness, or to put it another way, it is
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to discover in Freud a neurotic impulse to
uncover the secrets and mechanisms of neurosis
(p. 336).
And through an extended reading of Freud's Interpretation
of Dreams. Sprinker draws an analogy from dream (text)
interpretation and autobiography whereby both
interpretation and "inquiry of the self into its own
origin and history" always "return to confirm" themselves
(p. 342) . That is, autobiography
is always circumscribed by the limiting
conditions of writing, of the production of a
text. Vico, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche all
contend that the self is constituted by a
discourse that it never completely masters (p.
342).
This last line is reminiscent of Felman's reading of
Lacan's reading of Freud where she finds the pedagogical
imperative implicit in their work to be for a knowledge
that is not in mastery of itself (Felman, 1982). Like any
other knowledge, self-knowledge is only that which has
discovered "that this master text, the unconscious, is
perpetually changing" (Sprinker, 1980, p. 342)—
Daignault's and Gauthier's paradoxical "search for
identity" (1981), truly an "identity-in-motion" (Taubman,
in press). The necessary intertextuality implied by
Sprinker's "multiplicity of [writing] subjects" (1980, p.
332) is also vaguely reminiscent of Francois Lionnet's
metissage which is "all . . .

a reading practice that
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allows me to bring out the interreferential nature of a
particular set of texts" (1989, p. 8).
Sprinker was criticized by James Olney for his
"Fictions of the Self" in the volume of collected essays
in which Sprinker's essay appears (a collection edited by
Olney). In response to poststructuralists in general,
Sprinker in particular, Olney admonishes:
what they are still troubling about is the self
and consciousness or knowledge of it, even
though in a kind of bravura way some of them may
be denying rather than affirming its reality or
its possibility. And this is the crux of the
matter, the heart of the explanation for the
special appeal of autobiography to students of
literature in recent times: it is a fascination
with the self and its profound, its endless
mysteries and, accompanying that fascination, an
anxiety about the self, an anxiety about the
dimness and vulnerability of that entity that no
one has ever seen or touched or tasted (1980, p.
23).
Janet Varner Gunn in her book Autobiography: Toward a
Poetics of Experience, also criticizes Sprinker's essay:
Michael Sprinker goes one step further in the
last essay of the volume [Olney's book]. Drawing
on the work of Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault,
and Jacques Derrida, his essay joins
autobiography to the ranks of livres sans
auteurs. The struggle against writing's law of
gravity is finally in vain, since "no
autobiography can take place except within the
boundaries of a writing where concepts of
subject, self, and author collapse into the act
of producing a text" [p.342, Sprinker]. . . .
For Sprinker, the "self-written" cannot exist
outside of [the text] (Gunn, 1982, pp.5-6).
Gunn, I believe, misinterprets Sprinker as she does
Derrida's statement "there is nothing outside the text"
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(1976). The text to which she seems to refer is the
particular autobiographical text. Perhaps a better
translation of that statement is Jo Anne Pagano's "there
is nothing that is not a text" (1991, p. 202). Apparently,
Gunn, and perhaps Olney, reads a pessimism into the idea
that what one writes about oneself is not reducible to
that self or vice versa.
There is another critique to be directed toward
Sprinker's essay, however. While he writes of a
"multiplicity of subjects" and intertextuality, he implies
through his particular choice of examples and discussions
around them that this multiplicity is somehow still
"centered," in a sense, within individual human beings.
That is, there is no sense of the cultural communal in his
characterization of identity, writing and autobiography.
Autobiographies of the socially marginalized emphasize
(typically) a multiplicity that is also a plurality, a
collectivity of subjects and a collective subjectivity. It
is this sort of intertextuality, interreferentiality,
inter-subjectivity— a full and complex metissage— that is
central to this study that Sprinker ignores, resists, or
represses.
The above discussion is evocative of Olney's
recognition, in this same collection, of some of the
particular, popular uses of autobiography.
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Autobiography has become the focalizing
literature for various "studies" that otherwise
have little by way of a defining, organizing
center to them. I have in mind such "studies" as
American Studies, Black Studies, Women's
Studies, and African Studies. According to the
argument of these critics (who are becoming more
numerous every day), autobiography— the story of
a distinctive culture written in individual
characters and from within— offers a privileged
access to an experience . . . that no other
variety of writing can offer (1980, p. 13).
Georges Gusdorf, however, sees autobiography as a
fiercely individual act— a perspective that necessarily
denies even the possibility of autobiography for such
(marginalized) groups except insofar as they mirror the
dominant Western ideology of radical individualism.
The author of an autobiography gives himself the
job of narrating his own history; what he sets
out to do is to reassemble the scattered
elements of his individual life and to regroup
them in a comprehensive sketch. . . .
Autobiography . . . requires a man to take a
distance with regard to himself in order to
reconstitute himself in the focus of his special
unity and identity across time (1980, p.35)
Shari Benstock points to the ways in which such
a definition of the autobiographical act [as
Gusdorf's] . . . strikingly recapitulates the
effects of Lacan's mirror stage . . . a
recognition of the alienating force within the
specular (the "regard") that leads to the
desperate shoring-up of the reflected image
against disintegration and division (1988, pp.
14-15).
Traditionalists, like Gusdorf who reject the spirit
of collectivity in the autobiographical act, are searching

185
for that which is a kind of "final authority," at least
implicitly. As Pagano insists, such a search
betrays a hunger for something outside,
something beyond judgment according to which we
might be absolutely certain— according to which
any one of us might be the one presumed to know.
This is, of course, the logic of domination
(1991, p. 201).
This self-authorized authoritative version of the subject,
the self, is autobiography in which "the Subject is made
an Object of investigation. . . . This view of the life
history, is grounded in authority" (Benstock, 1988, p.
19).
But just as with the conservative versus liberal or
radical debates around Afrocentrism, the humanities, and
"political correctness" discussed in chapter one, these
issues and problems cannot be simply divided into
polarized camps. This complexity is well illustrated in
African-American autobiography, for example. AfricanAmerican autobiography (which includes slave narratives),
in addition to questions around identity and subjectivity,
also has to be thought through in the context of who its
expected audience is and has historically been (typically
privileged, dominant, those who read and have access to
books) as well as its pedagogical imperative for that
audience and that author. Of course, any autobiography
must be thought through contextually in this manner, but I
point to African-American autobiography in particular in
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order to highlight the very specific and often overlooked
historical context of African-American writing. Often, in
"writing the self into existence" such authors are also
actively engaged in writing an entire people along with
them. This alters the context for theorizing about
autobiography from the apparent context for much written
autobiographical theory. This context, with its larger
pedagogical and emancipatory project, can render arguments
about "fictions of the self" pedantic, but, at the same
time it renders the isolated, unified, "self-identical"
self obsolete— a distortion. Somehow, the notion of the
"fictional register" must be drawn into conversation with
the communal, as Taubman has suggested. An
autobiographical register which, through such
conversation, deconstructs these identity "constructs"
holds such a possibility.
The problem of the divided self that emerged through
readings in chapter three resurfaces here. The self
divided against itself is the self of the mirror stage— a
stage which signals a search for unity that "derives from
an experience of self as fragmented, partial, segmented,
and different" (Benstock, 1988, p. 12). It is a division
between self and other which is experienced as absolute.
And the self-division that is for the self is that which
works through difference, thereby enabling voice,
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preventing a sort of critical aphasia, learned illiteracy.
Need is for the re-cognition of both divisions— re
cognition that is available only as the autobiographical
register operates consciously within the context of the
others. The deconstruction that takes place through this
operation is eloquently described by Benstock:
If the autobiographical moment prepares for a
meeting of "writing" and "selfhood," a coming
together of method and subject matter, this
destiny— like the retrospective glance that
presumably initiates autobiography— is always
deferred. Autobiography reveals gaps, and not
only gaps in time and space or between the
individual and the social, but also a widening
divergence between the manner and matter of its
discourse. That is, autobiography reveals the
impossibility of its own dream: What begins on
the presumption of self-knowledge ends in the
creation of a fiction that covers over the
premises of its construction (p. 11).
"Marginal" autobiography is in a unique position to
come to this re-cognition. The fragmented, "postmodern
self" that is so widely hailed as a (the?) "sign" of the
times, seems, in some senses, ludicrous to those whose
communal histories have long known fragmentation,
displacement, and dispossession in the most material
senses as well as symbolic ones. W.E.B. DuBois's
recognition brought to print of the "double consciousness"
necessary for African-American individuals' survival is a
very well-known example (1969). As Stuart Hall explains,
Identity is formed at the unstable point where
the "unspeakable" stories of subjectivity meet
the narratives of history, of a culture. And
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since he/she is positioned in relation to
cultured narratives which have been profoundly
expropriated the colonized subject is always
"somewhere else": doubly marginalized, displaced
always other than where he or she is, or is able
to speak from (1987, p. 44).
Our relations to such autobiographies (literatures),
whether we are members of socially marginalized
(colonized) groups or not, are extra-ordinarily
significant to any notion of identity— both national and
individual. Indeed our identities can only be thought
through difference. It is only in our relations to others
that identity, and thus autobiography, has meaning at all.
Such a "relational theory" of autobiography guides ray own
"autobiographical" reading/writing of a novel (below) read
by me as an adolescent, and re-read for this writing.
As Pinar implies, our autobiographical writing
depends on our particular relations to marginality (In
press, p. 395). Those of us who are indeed newly
"victimized" as "fractured identities" within a particular
(negative) facet of the "postmodern age," Christopher
Lasch's "minimal self" (1984), need to attend to that
self-division in our autobiographical constructions. Such
a construction is what Pinar calls an "architecture"— a
construction that takes seriously the boundaries one has
erected as well as dissolved (in press). One who has not
experienced what Hall calls "centering of marginality"
(Hall, 1987, p. 44), on the other hand, may benefit from
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abandoning "the image of an architecture of self" (Pinar,
p. 395), for a deconstructed self. Hall's sentiments seem
similar as he writes,
I believe it is an immensely important gain when
one recognizes that all identity is constructed
across difference and begins to live with the
politics of difference. But doesn't the
acceptance of the fictional or narrative status
of identity in relation to the world also
require as a necessity, its opposite— the moment
of arbitrary closure? Is it possible for there
to be action or identity in the world without
arbitrary closure— what one might call the
necessity to meaning of the end of the sentence?
(1987, p. 45)
In another theoretical twist of the autobiographical
matrix, rather than focusing on the fictional status of
identity, theory also points toward the autobiographical,
or "truthful," status of fiction. Kerby, believes that
history and autobiography ("self-narration") are
necessarily narrative, and that this narrative does not
exclude the "fictional." He expresses this notion as
follows:
Narrative truth may not do for an historical or
biographical study that aims at "objectivity"
(supposing this goal were even possible!), but
it is, nevertheless, a curious fact of human
reality that, to quote Ricoeur, "It makes little
difference whether [the stories we tell] are
true or false, fiction as well as verifiable
history provides us with an identity." A
"truthful" or "authentic" story of the human
subject need not be one that achieves or even
aims at objective historical verisimilitude
(1988, p. 238).
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This position is not incompatible with Jean
Starobinski's in the view that "truth" can be read from a
text in ways unrelated to factual accuracy— for example,
through "style" and through what is selected for
narration. Starobinski seems to feel that since style is
what distinguishes one author from another (one individual
from another) that style is therefore the "essence" of
autobiography and thus we can not talk about the style of
an autobiography or limit theory about it to genre.
The conditions of autobiography furnish only a
large framework within which a great variety of
particular styles may occur. So it is essential
to avoid speaking of an autobiographical "style"
or even an autobiographical "form," because
there is no such generic style or form. Here,
even more than elsewhere, style is the act of an
individual (1980, p. 73).
In a similar sense, philosopher of curriculum Jo Anne
Pagano makes pedagogical use of the self-narration that
emerges from fictional writing of her students. They are,
she suggests, much better able to expose their "desire for
ignorance" (1991, p. 201) and thereby encounter the
"surprise of otherness" through fictionalizing their
journalizing of student teaching. In doing this "we go
beyond ourselves" (p. 202). Pagano expresses concern that
in ("non-fictional") autobiographical writing, even that
which is not to be graded, students may cover over their
own "resistance to knowledge" or "desire to ignore" (p.
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201). In fictionalizing those accounts we are more
inclined
to probe our ignorances and to create new
conditions for knowledge. . . . The advantage of
fiction writing over autobiography is that the
writer can claim a greater distance, and,
consequently, the desire for ignorance is more
readily exposed (p. 201).
Fictions allow one to write the ambiguity that is
"identity"— "I am this, but not now; I was this, but not
really." Jamaica Kincaid demonstrates this possibility, I
think, in writing her novels as self-conscious
autobiographies and her autobiography as fiction. Stories
over the same chronological time sequences differ as she
differs (and defers) from herself. Perspectives toward
autobiography as self-authorized authoritative stories
about ourselves that discover and unify the self remove us
from relationality, politics, ultimately from meaning.
These perspectives deny the active role of ignorance, the
will to ignore. As Pagano suggests, fictional writing is
one way to counter this.
The major issues in these arguments seem to
revolve around subjectivity (What/where is it? If we do
not know, can we even discuss autobiography?), the social
and individual usefulness of autobiography, and the
literary limits and functions of autobiography. If
autobiography is fiction does this mean that a project
such as the one I suggest here is impossible and thus
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useless? That one cannot know more about the "self" in
this way because one cannot write the "truth"? Or even,
one cannot know more about the self because there is no
unified "self" to know; the entity we call our "self" is
so constantly in a state of flux that it makes no sense to
attempt autobiography at all? Or that what we write exists
only as a particular text and is not in the least
representative of the "real" person who wrote it, or of
anyone or anything at all aside from that particular text
(it is a "thing-in-itself")?
It seems to me that there is a kind of truth to an
affirmative answer to these questions, but that to leave
it at that and dismiss autobiography misses the greater
significance revealed in theoretical debates about
identity and pedagogy. More to the point perhaps are the
questions: Does it matter if this is "fact" or "fiction?"
If it is all fiction, is there a "truth" in it? What is to
be gained by doing this? Part of the "truth," I believe,
lies in a negative answer to those earlier questions, and
that is the part I am concerned with now. As Pinar
understands, "we aim, in autobiography, at truthfulness,
not truth, at expanding and complicating the lived space
in which we dwell, through which we experience the world—
as that space expands, so does the world to which we have
access" (W. Pinar, personal communication, July, 1991).
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Like most of the theorists mentioned above, I feel that
much "truthfulness" lies completely outside the realm of
the "factual." I also would argue that "truth" is
contextually bound such that if I ask the question, "Is
the self a fiction?" for one purpose, the answer might be
the opposite of the reply to that same question when asked
for a different purpose.
The particular "method" I am interested in for my own
autobiographical writing in this chapter involves the
interreferential reading of literature (autobiography,
fiction, historical fiction) set in or near my own home or
region, accompanied by reflective writing as a means of
gaining insights into "self" and "other," how I construct
who the "other" is, how I am constructed as the "other,"
and how a "sense of place" is itself built on notions of
the "other." Certain literary works can serve as highly
accessible resources (as compared to so much of social
theoretical literature) for reaching deeper understandings
about the nuances of "difference" and "identity." With
such understandings, the possibilities for what could be
called life-affirming and intelligent interpersonal
relationships among teachers and students and their lives
outside institutions are enhanced. Put another way,
"repressed people tend to be stupid, and when smart,
calculating only. Meditative, not just calculative,
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thought is an index of intelligence" (W. Pinar, personal
communication, July, 1991).
The concept of the "other" is a crucial one for
understanding the construction of "a sense of place."
Creation of a notion of what constitutes "them and us,"
the meaning derived from

"difference," of who, therefore,

is "other" and the subsequent exclusion of the "other"
(even within one's self) are often critical elements to
the "sense of place." (For example, think about the
presumed mindset of one who is called "provincial," "local
yokel," etc.) A challenge to teachers, curriculum
designers/theorists, and other interested people is to
discover ways of invoking the power of place, retaining
the "treasures" (Kincheloe, 1991, pp. 145-151), while
bringing about respect for and celebration of difference.
Respecting difference, but not in a "liberal/pluralist"
sense where difference is respected only to the extent
that one is to acknowledge it, tolerate it and "work" with
it in order to provide "equal opportunity" for everyone to
be more alike— that is to have, say, "white middle-class
values." In contrast to a tolerance defined in this way,
true respect tolerates the sustained existence of
difference, and indeed recognizes difference not as an
indicator of pathology, but as a healthy and even
inevitable condition for living.
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Uncovering place in this way involves the process
known to anthropologists as "making the familiar strange."
This means, in the present context, rendering the
strangeness of the "other," which has been problematically
made "familiar" through stereotyping and/or otherwise
erasing, strange again though in a new sense of that term-a sense that does not assume strangeness to be inherently
frightening and hostile. The "other" is made strange in
that the comforting familiarity of stereotyping is
abandoned and replaced with the disturbing exhilaration
that comes from exposing "dangerous remembrances" about
past experiences that are contrary to "official" thought
as it is so often written/spoken in conventional
discourses— experiences which contribute to the present
drama, often in unexpected ways.
Making the familiar strange also means, in this
context, critically examining the cliches one has learned
to live by— cliches which are not only expressed through
language but also through routines, habits, ways of
seeing. Where did they come from? What purposes have they
served and do they serve? What happens when they are not
taken for granted? Are my cliches the same order of
reasoning as my stereotyping?
I see this approach as being useful for teacher
education as, I believe, it is extremely important for

teachers to be we11-acquainted and comfortable with
difference, including difference within themselves. This
is important in that learning necessarily involves selfawareness which necessarily involves difference-awareness.
How can teachers facilitate students' self discoveries and
creations if teachers are unable to facilitate their own?
Additionally, teachers and their clients (students,
parents, public) stand to benefit immensely if teachers
are equipped to examine their own desires— desires to
teach, desires for students, desires for themselves. This
acquaintance and comfort arises only after the "statues"
(Hurston, 1984, p. 25) that we have built of ourselves,
those aspects of self trapped in, say, Lacan's Imaginary
order, have been disturbed and re-articulated. Such a
disturbance is made possible through, in part,
intertextual readings of literary works and social and
philosophical theory. In what may seem a paradoxical
suggestion, the production of such readings are capable of
disrupting the statue, yet such readings are only possible
once disruption has begun. This is where autobiography, as
an integral part of that intertextual adventure, becomes
crucial. Through re-readings, re-writings and re-visions,
the situation (of reading and writing) moves, such that
what at first appears as paradox is revealed to be closer
to a hermeneutical process. Clearly, adaptations of this
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may be useful for teachers in a variety of classroom
settings, but with the understanding that certain dangers
inhere. Autobiography conceived narrowly, for example as
only direct narrative confession, can be impositional
and/or shattering for some students. This is why it is
even more important to emphasize the notion, as
Starobinski, Pagano, and as Kerby do, that autobiography
can be conceived of as encompassing an almost endless
variety of styles and approaches. One does not have to
narrate some sort of "life story" in order to
express/create/learn about ourselves honestly in writing.
In my classes, while I have not specifically asked
for fictionalized autobiographies, students have been
alerted to that possibility. Some have written poetry in
response. One wrote a kind of poem that looped and circled
around the pages, thereby expressing herself not only
through word-signs but also spatially, in a kind of
"topography." The primary place of fiction in my classroom
has been, however, in the position of parallel readings—
readings for students to respond to in their own
autobiographical accounts. This has not always been done
directly. Yet I have strongly sensed that those who read
the literary readings (Maya Angelou's I Know Whv the Caged
Bird Sinas [1969], and Annie Dillard's An American
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Childhood [1987]), were responding to them in their own
writings, however indirectly.
My own writing which follows immediately, is
autobiographical in an oblique way which, given the
notions of subjectivity and identity that dominate this
work, is for me, one preferred approach to autobiography.
Student work that I include here is not so oblique. While
students were made aware of multiple possibilities for
approaching the task, there was little time (one half of a
semester) for them to experiment and develop a comfort
with unfamiliar approaches. As such I must re-emphasize
the fact that inclusion of their work is not viewed by me
to be anything like a thorough investigation of a "method"
for actual classroom situations. As stated at the outset,
my investigation in this study is primarily theoretical,
and my inclusion of some examples gathered so far from
classroom practices is meant only to demonstrate a
beginning for a future work.

Autobiographical Samples
Mv Selection of a Text
Gwin Bristow's "Plantation Trilogy", including her
books Deep Summer (1937), The Handsome Road (1938), and
This Side of Glorv (1940), were popular books among my
female peers of early adolescence. The books had been

reprinted in paperback in the late 1960's-early 1970's. I
absorbed them each in one to three sittings, often staying
up with flashlight under the covers past two in the
morning. In looking at them now (particularly The Handsome
Road) I am intrigued by what about them so captured me at
that age— a child not especially drawn to the study of
history in school, reading historical fiction into the
early mornings. I know there was a sense within me of
something magical, hidden, contradictory about the state
of Louisiana where I had grown up, though more
particularly about southern Louisiana (where I had not
grown up), and that this sense was, in part, provided me
by these books.
The Handsome Road tells a story of Civil War
Louisiana mostly from the perspective of a young white
woman who was "poor white trash," but also, at times, from
the perspective of a wealthy white plantation-owning
woman. The genre appears to be similar to the romanticized
historical fiction of Gone With the Wind (1936). My
questions as I initially approached the re-reading of this
text were around the ways race, class, and gender were
constructed. Why would this text be most appealing (at
least in the late 1960's-early 1970's) to young, most
likely white, female readers, and to me in particular?
What historical sense of place did it achieve for me? How
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did I situate myself within it ideologically? How did it
support and/or shape my conceptions of race, class, and
gender formation and difference at the time?
There are some other questions of interest to me
about this book, which I cannot answer at this time, but
which I raise for rhetorical purposes. Why was the book
popular enough to go into fourteen printings up through
1973, yet never critically reviewed again after the first
few years of publication? The first paperback came out in
1949. By 1969 it was only in its fifth printing. But by
1973 it was in its fourteenth printing. The cover art and
blurbs on the 1969-73 paperbacks are clearly aimed at a
romance-reading audience. But the book reviews in the late
thirties from reputable sources are favorable and treat
the book as serious adult reading.

The Handsome Road; Romance and "Class Consciousness”
The book opens with a verse entitled "Plantation Song,"
"Nigger pick de cotton, nigger tote de load,
Nigger build de levee foh de ribber to smash,
Nigger nebber walk up de handsome road,
But I radder be a nigger dan po' white trash!"
which the poor white protagonist, Corrie May, later
overhears the slaves singing at a plantation where she has
gotten temporary work. This along with numerous other
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references to slave class condescension toward poor whites
sets the tone for the antagonistic way racial difference,
from the perspective of the poor white protagonist, is
represented through most of the text. At the same time,
this situation inspires a kind of "class-consciousness" in
Corrie May that enables her to resist fulfilling some of
the expectations for a young person of her gender and
social class. But, aside from what Corrie May regards as
condescending, African-Americans in this novel display
little agency, and they receive little sympathy.
Bristow maintains a tension in the character of
Corrie May between acceptance of the "status quo" for
gender and class relations and angry rejection of both
throughout most of the book. Challenges to interpersonal
race relations occur only briefly when Corrie May is under
the care of an African-American family in their home as
she gives birth to an "illegitimate" son. Significantly,
she names her son after

the father of

Bristow, perhaps, condemns slavery

in

this family.
the overt sense,but

covertly romanticizes it— leaving out any graphic
depictions of abuses at the hands of whites, in fact
portraying slave lives as mostly pleasant, but doing that
from a distance with no reference to an interior life. On
the other hand, graphic

depictions of

life for poorwhites

are plentiful. She also

frequently romanticizes

I
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traditional gender roles and the lives of the "elite"
through her uses of language at the same time she seems to
want to expose the social construction of such "common
wisdom."
It is a contradictory book in much the same manner,
perhaps, as particular modern romances are contradictory
in their simultaneous challenges to and affirmations of
traditional femininity (Radway, 1983). As will be
demonstrated in what follows, Corrie May steps outside the
bounds of traditional femininity and of social class
divisions on occasions, at the same time those traditions
are left substantially unchallenged. Such contradictions
explain to me part of my attraction to it. Growing up in a
small north Louisiana town with parents who were liberal
democrats and non-Christian, I felt myself to be
politically and emotionally in a highly contradictory
place (in many senses of the term "place") as a female
adolescent. As I re-read the book (after nearly 20 years)
I found myself engrossed in it all over again— like a
fourteen-year-old— at the same time I clearly recognized
the style of the writing to be largely predictable and
cliched, much like a romance novel.
Now as I re-read an essay by Cora Kaplan, "The Thorn
Birds: Fiction, Fantasy, Femininity" from her book Sea
Changes: Culture and Feminism. I am struck by the
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similarity of her adolescent experience in reading Gone
With the Wind to my own experience with Bristow's books.
Like many readers of this early blockbuster
romance I read it in one bout, too engaged with
the story to eat or to sleep. I was a fast
reader, but it must have taken me two days; no
skipping here for the romance takes up most of
the text. My compulsion was observed for the
book itself was not approved of; pro-Southern
and unashamedly racist, as well as without
literary merit in my parents' eyes, it brought
together a reactionary political narrative with
a reactionary emotional one. I finished the book
late in the night and the ending left me in
despair and near hysteria (Kaplan, 1987, pp.
117-8).
While Bristow's book was, perhaps, not as politically
reactionary as Gone With the Wind in the sense that it
went farther in challenging the plantation system of the
Old South, and my parents did not disapprove my reading
it, I did "inhale" the book, and I did react emotionally
to it at age fourteen, crying at times for both Corrie May
and the wealthy plantation belle, Ann Sheramy.
A mystique around the old plantation homes themselves
was also evoked for me (by then I had visited some of
them). These homes embodied the polar opposites of good
and evil for me— good in that they were, I thought,
romantic and beautiful; evil in that I knew, but probably
repressed the knowledge, that people had been held there
as slaves and very possibly were tortured. I must confess
an awe that I still feel, but an awe felt through the
undeniable awareness of what those places symbolize.
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Recently, I had occasion to experience and explore these
feelings in the very concrete situation of "house-sitting"
one of these homes, Como Plantation, that sits next to the
Mississippi River, isolated by four miles of dirt road
that dead-ends at the house. Some nights were terrifying.
Morrison, in Beloved, describes well what I believe I felt
there:
I was talking about time. It's so hard for me to
believe in it. Some things go. Pass on. Some
things just stay. I used to think it was my
rememory. You know. Some things you forget.
Other things you never do. But it's not. Places,
places are still there. If a house burns down,
it's gone, but the place— the picture of it—
stays, and not just in my rememory, but out
there, in the world. . . . Where I was before I
came here, that place is real. It's never going
away. Even if the whole farm . . . dies. The
picture is still there and what's more, if you
go there— you who never was there— if you go
there and stand in the place where it was, it
will happen again; it will be there for you,
waiting for you (1987, pp. 35-6).
Indeed, the "big house" at Como Plantation was a turn-ofthe-century structure built then because the original
house had burned to the ground. Nevertheless, it was all
there— out there. As I re-read Bristow today, I cannot do
other than read her through Morrison, and, of course,
through my older self as well as my reconstructed
adolescent self.
For Kaplan, rather than an attraction to Southern
place born from personal experience, the strength of her
attraction to Gone With the Wind (henceforth, GWTW) lay in
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its romance and nostalgic embrace of "traditional
femininity [which] could be lived in an unashamed way." It
was a reaction, in part, to fifties female adolescence
and, in part, a form of resistance in a household where
the trappings of fifties femininity were disapproved but
so was censorship. The way, in Kaplan's estimation, that
book spoke to her as well as to women in general is worth
repeating in full here because I believe her
interpretation is relevant for The Handsome Road and for
me as well.
For me personally it was a resonant and painful
text, for I was engaged in a long and bitter
struggle with my father in these years, for my
autonomy, for his love and approval. But it
spoke I think to a much wider audience of
American women readers for whom the pre-Civil
War South did serve as a sort of pre-capitalist
site of family romance, a mythical moment of
settled traditional social relations that the
Civil War destroyed forever. . . . As a parable
of Southern history and as a romantic narrative
with incestuous overtones it is history and
fantasy spoken from the position of the women.
It remains so today (1987, p. 119).
Re-reading The Handsome Road as an adult has, I
believe, evoked from me what Toni Morrison calls rememory-a sense of having been struck by a glimmering of
recollection, of something that has happened but has been
long lost to consciousness. Rememory that occurs through
my reading Bristow now calls up questions for me, about me
and my relations to others, after fourteen years of age—
questions that have, however, in some way sprung from my
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vision now of that fourteen-year-old and what happened,
what was felt, in her life between then and now. In the
context of my current literary and theoretical readings,
no doubt Bristow's book has come to mean more and to mean
other than it did. Likewise,

Kaplan

writes of a kind of

revisionary repetition of her experience of GWTW twentyfive years later with the novel and the television mini
series The Thorn Birds. (I, too, watched the entire mini
series on television. I did not know any men who did.) It
was through her adult reading of another romance that
Kaplan was able to re-read her younger self reading GWTW.
She writes,
Like Gone With the Wind, but with significant
differences, The Thorn Birds pursues an
interesting occasionally radical interrogation
of sexual difference inside a reactionary set of
myths about history (1987, p. 134).
Like romance novels more generally, as mentioned
earlier, each of these texts invite the woman reader to
explore limited reversals of traditional femininity and
masculinity, all the while, ultimately at least,
attempting to bring her back into the fold of traditional
female roles. The heroine may resist fulfilling
traditional role expectations only to be "conquered" as
"Mr. Right" finally arrives (and then, perhaps, dies!).
Here is a sample from The Handsome Road:
Denis came down the hall. He looked tall and
splendid, and Ann called herself a fool to
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hesitate before the chance of the most enviable
marriage on the river. As he met her at the foot
of the staircase he impulsively swept her into
his arms. After a moment Ann drew back a little.
She looked up at him, feeling a sensation of
pleasure at the nearness of his physical beauty.
Denis did not say anything. He stood with one
hand on her shoulder and his other arm around
her waist, smiling down at her so urgently that
Ann felt herself yielding as though his ardor
were a command she had no power to disobey, and
as Denis drew her to him again she put her own
arms around him and pressed his lips down to
hers (1938, p. 53).
And I loved it. Why?! Such analysis almost frightens me.
As Barbara Johnson wrote: "Literature is not only a
thwarted investigator but also an incorrigible perpetrator
of the problem of sexuality" (1980, p. 23) . Similarly (and
to repeat), for Kaplan (who is not Southern), "the deep
South and its fake aristocracy, imitation feudalism (which
Mitchell both deplores and celebrates) was an imaginary
historic site where traditional femininity could be lived
in an unashamed way" (1987, p. 118).
Jessica Benjamin's psychoanalytic theorizing in her
book The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis. Feminism, and the
Problem of Domination (1988) is, in my case, illuminating.
According to Benjamin, for girls (as for boys) "the father
becomes the image of liberation from maternal power . . .
the one who recognizes and embodies desire" (p. 100). He
is the first "ideal love" in households where certain
traditional gender roles are maintained, that is, where
the mother's agency is devalued in comparison to the
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father's. He "seemingly embodies the agency and desire one
lacks in oneself" (p. 100). He is "the way into the world"
(p. 103). In such families, the dual desire of the child
for separation and identification results in a split
whereby the child "assign[s] the contradictory strivings
to different parents" (p. 104). This then can result in
the devaluation of the mother and the idealization of the
father which, for girls, who must necessarily identify
with their mothers, presents a particularly difficult
dilemma in their struggles for independence. The
attraction for women to romance novels is explained by
Benjamin as follows:
In the most common fantasy of ideal love, the
one so frequently found in mass-market romances,
a woman can only unleash her desire in the hands
of a man whom she imagines to be more powerful,
who does not depend upon her for his strength.
Such a man, who desires but does not need her,
satisfies the element missing from both mother
and father, the ability to survive attack and
still be there. In this sense the ideal lover
actually provides a dual solution, containment
and excitement, the holding environment and the
road to freedom— the joint features of both the
ideal mother and father (p. 120).
As I mentioned previously, re-reading Bristow induces
for me "rememory" (that sudden and startling but vague
remembrance of forgotten events or thoughts) and, in the
context of what Benjamin writes, that rememory takes me to
early relationships to my father and to boys. While a full
reconstruction of my earlier reading self through
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Bristow's book is necessarily lacking, the re-reading of
such a previously read novel provokes memories of longforgotten events, perhaps even remembering myself
remembering, much like the smell of my grandmother's house
does. I do remember feeling driven to please my father, to
value school as he did, to be a "good girl."
Second grade: I was a new student in Cypress Springs
Elementary School. The boy who was class clown did not
care that other boys were terrified of and eschewed girls-he "loved" them. I was new, so I was his next target. He
sent a note during class to me, surreptitiously, a love
letter. I remember thrill and mortification. He was
outrageous freedom for me. He said anything at all to the
teacher, and still, usually, charmed her. I, on the other
hand, was outrageously confined (shy, tentative) by
"goodness." I would not acknowledge him. I corrected his
spelling and sent the note back. I was my father's
daughter.
Rememory: Good girl gone bad. My older sister sneaked
out of the house one night to meet her boyfriend. Her
empty room was discovered, I was awakened and questioned,
pleaded with never to do the same, to which I responded,
"I would never do that." The very next night:

(romance and

pain) sneaking out at night together (my sister and I) we
were betrayed by the dog who led our father to the place
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of our liaison with our boyfriends. (God damn this small
town!) Pounding on the door he yelled, "Give me what's
mine!" (My father's daughter.) I remember laughing through
fear. A year or so after this event my older sister would
follow this guy to Mississippi only to return home after a
few weeks with a bruised face. My boyfriend broke my heart
by sleeping with other girls and with emotional distance.
I broke up exclaiming, "I never, ever want to see you
again!" (Twenty years later we are still friends.) Coming
to understand this ownership idea has been difficult for
me almost to the present. (Do I belong to my father? Do I
belong to my partners? Do my partners belong to me? What
about friends? Students? What is owed and what is due?)
Like GWTW. The Handsome Road ends with the heroine
(Corrie May) and the other primary female character (Ann)
"tragically" without husbands or lovers. But unlike
Scarlet in GWTW. this is not a punishment for "bad
behavior"— at least not as explicitly. Still, both women
do end up in the presumably much needed care of men— their
sons.

Legends and place.
Rich descriptions of the natural beauty of south
Louisiana in terms of foliage, sunsets,water, smells
(which, even in 1938 let alone 1859-65, must have been

phenomenal compared to Louisiana today) are sprinkled
throughout the book. Any mention of the sensuality of
natural place— especially, for some reason, in terms of
smell— has always captivated my imagination.
Interestingly, these descriptions are primarily found in
conjunction with scenes of the plantation "big house." For
example, Bristow writes of gardenias in the breeze and
vetivert sachet's for Ann's clothes— two of my favorite
scents to this day. It could be argued that this is a
strategy for impressing upon the reader the starkness and
injustice of the black and poor white situation by way of
pointing out the discrepancies between the two physical
environments. As I recall, for me at fourteen, such a
strategy only served to romanticize the plantation homes
to the extent that I found myself hoping they and their
inhabitants could go on forever unscathed. I even imagined
myself eventually owning one of those homes and becoming a
writer— probably of romantic historical fiction. In what
follows, I read the text as I see it now.
At the heart of The Handsome Road lies Corrie May's
determination to both survive and to get beyond living for
the mere survival that marks her social class in this poor
white antebellum community just north of New Orleans.
Outside town, along the river road, is the stark contrast
of the wealthy plantation homes— homes that house
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"Southern Gentlemen" who were raised to exploit land and
people— especially black people, poor people and women—
and to do so with the utmost "courtesy" and "reserve."
"You'll read the Latin poets, especially
Catullus," [the young 'gentleman's' cynical
aunt] went on, "and you'll be fond of Byron, and
you'll treat every lady as if she were in danger
of breaking in two, and say the Army of North
Virginia was the greatest bunch of fighting men
God Almighty ever let get together on this
earth." "I never saw it," said Denis [Ann's
son]; rather wistfully."My dear child, do you
think that matters? That's the ultimate test of
your type Denis— living by legends you don't
know anything about" (1938, p.262).
Living by legends. Legends of the "Southern Lady," the
plantation myths, of bitterness and blame for southern
defeat (those "damned Yankee Carpetbaggers") survived for
me in forms that I could neither recognize nor face at
fourteen, but which leapt from the pages for me as I re
read and remembered reading. Yet, given the incongruence
of my parents' and my own political views with the local
and southern majority, I surely considered myself immune,
rational, compassionate. I marvel at the strength of
history, "real" history rather than mere legend, of
hegemony, of place, and, simultaneously, I marvel at the
possibility for and incidence of resistance.
Here is that mythical "Southern Lady," "Southern
Belle," that "steel magnolia":
Ann could see herself merging from girlhood into
the great lady of the plantation legend. She
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could do it, not everybody could. A great lady
was music and moonshine, but she was also hard
as steel. She was too frail to put on her own
shoes and stockings but she bore ten children
quietly; she had never an idea in her lovely
head but she could make a hundred not
necessarily congenial guests coalesce into a
pleasant unit; she must always be sent upstairs
to rest before the ordeal of getting dressed for
a ball but she could dance till sunrise once she
got there; she turned faint at the sight of
blood from a cut finger but she could ride to
hounds and be in at the kill (pp.90-1).
Bristow assures us that, for Ann, this was the natural
order. Ann's position could be read through Benjamin's
psychoanalytic theory of domination (1988). Such a
reaction to difference as exhibited by wealthy white
planters can be justified by them only as they see their
separation from the "others" as complete. This, however,
calls up a contradiction for them in that they require
recognition from those others— recognition of their
existence as masters, superiors— which creates a
dependency that exposes as illusion their absolute
separation. Cruelty functions as an attempt to assert and
reinforce separation, independence, dominance, and has the
effect of reifying those ideas. Indeed, when it comes to
social class— "old money," "cultural capital," "poor white
trash"— Bristow seems to recognize the illusions of
naturalness to social class relations (excluding where
such relations involve race) and employs strategies to
point this out.
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Corrie May is confused at how the wealthy resolve
their exploitative cruelty toward the poor with their
ethic of tenderness and gentility at home.
For all her glimpses of rich people at Ardeith,
she had never made it clear in her mind how they
could be so ineffably cruel and at the same time
so very kind. There was a woman in Rattletrap
Square [Corrie May's neighborhood] whose husband
had been killed in a fall from a scaffolding,
and she had been turned into the street with
four children because she could not pay her rent
to the St. Clairs, and yet the very next day Mr.
Bertram St. Clair came to dinner at Ardeith with
his mother, and he was so attentive to the old
lady that he might have been held up as a model
of devotion. It was all very puzzling (p. Ill).
Many other examples of this phenomenon are scattered
throughout the book making clear the notion that the
wealthy assumed their station in life above poor and black
to be, perhaps, divinely ordained— natural— and thus
justifying a double (or even triple) standard of ethics.
Legends survive through double-binds, through
contradiction repressed, through the "illiterate
imagination" (Harris, 1989), in short, through a kind of
stupidity.
Ann (Corrie May's employer at the time) and Corrie
May each think the other is stupid, and somewhere they are
both right, of course. Ann falls for Corrie May's "low
profile" around the plantation when she is working for
Ann.
She's a funny little thing, Ann thought with
irrelevant amusement. So quiet; she doesn't seem
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to notice very much. Very likely she's a bit
stupid. I suppose she's had a hard life, but
then she's used to it. People like that don't
expect much in the world (1938, p. 90).
Then when Ann asked Corrie May to teach her how to knit in
order to support the "war effort,"
Corrie May set about giving her a lesson. In
about thirty minutes she was so exasperated she
had difficulty keeping her temper. She had never
in all her born days seen anybody so stupid as
Ann. Those dainty white fingers of hers seemed
utterly unable to perform any task at all, even
one so simple as throwing thread over a needle.
. . . And what was worse, she didn't seem to
know how to give her attention to what she was
doing. In the middle of an explanation she
looked out of the window and said how pretty the
moon was as it came up (pp. 108-9).
Both Corrie May and Ann are unable to recognize forms of
intelligence in one another— they both assume a natural
stupidity in the other. This is exposed by Bristow as she
repeatedly points out the differing perceptions.
Corrie May gets involved with a carpetbagger after
the war, and she discusses with him why, even though these
people, the deposed master class, are now poorer than he
is, they still carry themselves with superiority. She
explains to him in her way the notions of cultural capital
and the belief by the wealthy in manifest destiny— what
she later calls "that magnificent confidence of birth" (p.
285) .
Corrie May hesitated, but she remembered that
everybody was equal now and she could say what
she pleased, so she continued, "Mr. Gilday, you
ain't really going to get at them people till
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you hit them in the place where they keep a
little private contract with their private God
that they're better than other folks. They got
education and manners and I ain't saying them
things ain't fine to have, I wish I had some,
but them Larnes and Sheramys and their sort,
they honestly think the reason they're like that
and you and me ain't is that the Lord God made
them out of a different kind of dust from us. It
ain't never been in the back side of their mind
that if you and me had been started off like
them the day we were born we'd be elegant as
them now" (p. 183).
Ann, struggling to pay Corrie May's carpetbagger the
taxes on her plantation after the war, is humiliated by
the man and Corrie May when she is short ten dollars out
of one hundred ninety eight owed. Their snide and haughty
behavior toward her is bewildering. "Why do they hate me?"
she asks. This historical and interpersonal naivete, is
not unlike my own experience of racial relations in
Ruston, Louisiana. Certain that I was not racist, I could
not understand why I sensed hostility from AfricanAmerican people or why I felt guilt about that. Nor could
I understand why I felt shame, a sort of vague personal
responsibility, in the face of African-American deference
toward me, as in the case when a woman of color who was
baby-sitting my sisters and I offered to us a biblical
justification for the subordination of dark-skinned
people. Did she believe this, really? It seemed so. Or was
she saying this only for our benefit? Did I want to
believe her? Did she read my desire and play to it? And,
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if so, was her intent kindness or cruelty? I told her that
I did not believe it. Did she believe me?
Corrie May wakes up abruptly to some of the material
realities and the social construction of social class
differences before the Civil War. She watches her thirtyfive year old mother who looks twenty years older and
registers that picture alongside her image of Ann Sheramy
who would still look "exquisite" in twenty years, and then
recalls her subconscious-turned-conscious hearing of her
father's front porch neighborhood rantings.
Then, all of a sudden, she heard some of the
words Pa had been shooting off as she came down
the alley. She had hardly heard them then, she
had only felt mad that Pa talked all the time
instead of doing a job of work. But they must
have gone into her ears and stuck in her head,
for now she heard them.In the whole South, seven
million white people owning all the slaves. So—
if you counted out the slaveowners' families—
six million white people who owned no slaves.
Six million white people who owned nothing at
all. She was not so stupid as not to know that
those who owned slaves owned everything else.
The first sign of a man's rise in the world was
his buying himself a nigger. "Jesus," said
Corrie May aloud (p. 11).
Examples of Corrie May's awarenesses of social class
privilege and difference are numerous throughout the book,
even including a passage where she notices how much easier
it is for a rich couple to make amends after an argument
than for a poor couple (because the rich can get away from
each other, buy each other consolation gifts, and not have
to perform hard labor while angry). Still, race is ever
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pitted against class in this novel, with the persistent
insistence even that slave women were better off than poor
white women.
The mulatto girl Bertha, Napoleon's wife, who
expected a baby about the same time as Ann, was
appointed for the honor of wet-nursing the heir;
she was moved from the quarters to a room in the
big house and coddled with as many luxuries as
the mistress. Corrie may thought if it were
herself she would have felt like a milch-cow
being petted for the parish fair, but Bertha, a
smart young woman of elegant speech and manners,
put on a multitude of airs. . . . She thought of
the slave-women at Ardeith, carefully tended
during their pregnancies because a little Negro was
worth a hundred dollars the day it was born (pp.
80 -1 ).
Even though it was mentioned that Bertha was mulatto,
the reader is apparently not supposed to wonder what this
means (if she is a naive fourteen-year-old). Or, if she
knows what it means, what the conditions were under which
it came about. While Bristow graphically depicts the mob
beating of Corrie May for publicly expressing her
sentiments about the poor white man being conscripted to
fight the rich white man's war (who was not required to
fight) in order to insure their respective economic
statuses— that is, poor white man "worse off than the
slave"— she never mentions the beatings, murders, and
rapes suffered by black slaves who did not have the option
to just quit their jobs. (This is not to say that it was,
in perhaps most cases, not much of an option for poor
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whites, just that there was no such option for slaves, and
no legal protection.)
Although Bristow states at the outset that she is
writing this from the perspective of the poor whites
because most other literature on the antebellum South is
either from the perspective of rich white or slave black,
I find these kinds of omissions and distortions notable
given the presence, albeit somewhat muted presence, of
challenges to the social order in terms of social class.
It is difficult to imagine why the black story remains so
marginal, in spite of available information on the
subject, unless Bristow is so absolutely "other" to black
people (a reasonable speculation for 1938 in Louisiana)
that they are almost non-existent for her— Ralph Ellison's
"invisible" people. Indeed, although Bristow expressed
awareness of her privileging of the poor white story over
others, a story of the wealthy white emerges through
Corrie May's relations to them. The same cannot be said
for her relations to African-American people in the novel.
Whether or not Bristow employed a conscious strategy for
racial representation, her manner of representation
demonstrates a very real distance— an exoticising— of
black from white that permeated (and permeates) white
consciousness.

Clearly the amount and accuracy of primary sources
about black slaves was (and is) sorely lacking compared to
the multitudes of diaries, journals, newspaper accounts of
whites from the same period. According to Elizabeth FoxGenovese, many of the slave narratives in existence were
dictated to white interviewers who either had difficulty
with "dialect" or simply censored what they heard, or both
(1988, p.33). Thus the slave narratives that possibly were
available to Bristow may have presented a skewed image of
the lives of slaves. Also, she was writing from the
perspective of women, and to find primary sources from
black women is apparently even more difficult than from
black men. Fox-Genovese says: "Few slave women wrote
journals, diaries, and letters. As a group, they did not
enjoy even the precarious access to the world of published
writings enjoyed by white women and former slave men"
(P .33). Still, it is doubtful that there was much, if any,
more material available by or about poor white women. The
character of Corrie May was technically illiterate.
Indeed, the New Orleans woman who inspired Bristow to
create this character and this book could not write her
own name. (Bristow worked as a journalist for the Times
Picayune in New Orleans where she discovered the model for
her novel in the obituaries [Bristow, 1941].)
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After-Words. After-Thoughts: Autobiography and Cultural
Studies
In re-reading I can begin to reconstruct an
adolescent girl who read this (twenty-two years ago)
through locating some of her ignorance— as Shoshana Felman
writes, the sites of her "resistance to knowledge" (1987,
p. 80). I was not prepared, as a southern teen-aged girl,
to relinquish a belief in the romance of the South. Though
this novel provided some sense of the inequities and
contradictions, it did so without seriously challenging
the ahistoricism of Southern romance. Given the mythic
characterization of white Southern women as "steel
magnolias" which, like myth generally, bears some relation
to real people, points of departure from myth and from
cliche were few for my adolescent reading as I remember
it. Notions of race were as enshrouded in a shimmery
vagueness in my re-reading of the book as they are for my
memories of specific relations to race at fourteen. I
sense that race was a kind of undercurrent that beckoned
my attention at the same time it was foreboding. It was
exoticised, in much the manner it seems to be for Bristow.
I do not presume to be setting forth some direct
cause and effect between my adolescent reading of this
novel and what or who I became or was. The value of this
re-reading and re-writing for me was more in its
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suggestion of the possibility of reconstructing a place
(historically, psychologically, geographically) through
which I might examine my present relations to others, to
myself, to "place"— relations that have a direct bearing
on my teaching and notions of knowledge. It has raised for
me issues around desire, guilt, privilege, and domination-issues that never cease to concern me in the classroom,
in my relations to my students.

Indeed, the whole of this

study is one outgrowth of my re-reading as I initially re
read Bristow before I embarked upon this project. As
Morrison and Ellison demonstrate, the process Morrison has
called rememory is difficult and even painful, but
necessary for avoiding existential death. To be
existentially dead— caught in the fictional register of
identity formation?— is to be in no position to
learn/teach. It is to be stupid.
In doing work such as this one is "doing" a form of
cultural studies. One is also employing a fundamental
approach to cultural studies more generally and, in this
case, ultimately applying it to problems of pedagogy in
teacher education. As Richard Johnson writes in "What is
Cultural Studies Anyway?,"
the problems [for approaches which focus on
"lived culture"] is how to grasp the more
concrete and private moments of cultural
circulation. . . . Of course, students of
culture have access to private forms through
their own experiences and social worlds. This is
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a continuous resource, the more so if it is
consciously specified and if its relativity is
recognised. Indeed, a cultural self-criticism of
this kind is the indispensable condition for
avoiding the more grossly ideological forms of
cultural study (1986-7, p. 69).
Yet the work of autobiography, as with (and along with)
literary reading, is necessarily intertextual and intersubjective.
In arguing the need for a "theory of subjectivity"
(p. 63) for cultural studies that takes seriously "the
notion of a discursive self-production of subjects,
especially in the form of histories and memories" (p. 69),
Johnson is also stressing the significance of "readers in
texts; readers in society" (p. 65).

Moving between

readers in texts and readers in societies involves, for
Johnson, an intertextual and an interdiscursive
competence.
In disciplinary terms we move from a ground
usually covered by literary approaches to one
more familiar to historical or sociological
competences, but the common new element here is
the ability to handle a mass of co-existing
determinations, operating at many different
levels. . . . In everyday life, textual
materials are complex, multiple, overlapping,
co-existent, juxta-posed, in a word, "inter
textual." If we use a more agile category like
discourse, indicating elements that cut across
different texts, we can say that all readings
are also "inter-discursive" (pp. 66-67).
Autobiography as cultural studies— roughly, studies
of means and ends of self-representation— operates by
raising and dynamically responding to the following
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question: To what extent does a person's constructions of
self through narratives about her or his life and reading
of texts (especially, here, literary texts) produce new
relations and orientations to "culture," and to what
extent do these constructions re-produce certain relations
and orientations within culture(s)? The self as
problematic, inter-subjective and perpetual process and
project invites us to learn and to nurture a "crosscultural imagination" or "literacy of the imagination"
(Harris, 1989).

Student Autobiographies
The course I taught in which the following
autobiographical work was done involved theoretical
readings loosely centered around sociology and history or
education for the first half of the semester. After some
whole-class lecture and discussion each class period,
students worked together in small groups of five to six
where they were to deal with issues raised in the readings
and discussions, often arguing with one another, getting
to know one another a bit more intimately that the larger
group (about 35 students) allowed. The last portion of
each class involved whole-class discussions again in which
spokespersons from each group would share their group's
ideas with the rest of the class. Occasionally, class

would begin with, instead of my lecture, presentations on
readings by students individually to the entire class on
the readings, and in which the student brought in at least
one relevant outside reading. During group time I
circulated among groups, not always making it to each
group each time, where I listened, offered suggestions,
and participated in discussions. For the second half of
the semester we began reading literary autobiographical
writings by Maya Angelou and Annie Dillard. Along with
these readings students were to do brief interactive (with
the texts) autobiographical writings over three general
themes that they selected, in part, from a list of
possible themes. At this time group work involved sharing
their concerns and ideas about the readings and writings,
receiving critique from their group members if they so
chose. Finally, students were required to share one (in
part or in whole) of their writings (their choice) with
the entire class. Clearly, such an assignment was
frightening for many students at first. I attempted to
relieve their sense of vulnerability in a number of ways:
first, autobiography was broadly defined to include a
number of possible forms such as poetry and
autobiographical fiction; second, there were ground rules
for the class regarding confidentiality and judgmental ism;
third, I began by sharing some of my own work and
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third, I began by sharing some of my own work and
periodically did so throughout.
In this class students did receive grades for their
autobiographical work. That work was judged, however,
primarily on whether or not assignments were done and
"attended to"— that is, I asked the question "Does she or
he seem engaged with it?" Something as simple as length of
writing can begin to tell me of at least one sort of
engagement. But that is clearly insufficient. Was the tone
of the writing glib? Did they rely on cliches? Even if
they did rely on cliches, sometimes that was not an
indication of insincerity or non-engagement so much as
inexperience and repression. For this reason and others I
was glad that I had waited, as planned, until mid-term to
begin this work, a time after which I knew my students
better than at the beginning, and had gained a sense of
certain kinds of "limitations." Indeed, it seemed that
many apparent limitations were overcome— students went
"beyond themselves"— with the autobiographical work.
Beyond this it is not easy to articulate specific criteria
for judging, but I can say that I found very few students
who did not get taken in by the project, sometimes in
spite of themselves. I say "in spite of themselves"
because there was resistance to the idea at first. I know
this from signals given in class, but also, more

227
concretely, from voluntary, anonymous written evaluations
given to me at the end of the semester. Still, the
greatest difficulty I have found so far is in finding ways
to discourage students from producing something like
"Muzak" versions of their lives. Though some of them did
succumb to this in at least some of their writings,
clearly, many of them avoided it.

Love and the pedagogical imperative.
Trish (a pseudonym) wrote about her reading self. She
loves to read and learned to love it from, shebelieves,
one high school teacher in particular. She writes:
I don't remember much about Mr. Thibodaux before
the day I fell head over heels in love with him. He
was my eleventh grade English teacher. Incredibly
calm and peaceful, he was the epitome of patience.
Rumor had it that he had once been a monk. This
offered a possible explanation for the endearing way
he folded his hands in front of his waist as if they
were in the sleeve of an imaginary habit.
English had always been my favorite subject and
I was doing quite well in his class. He made the
literature seem lively and interesting and his rapid
fire discussions went over well. One day he asked me
to stay after class. He said that he had liked my
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report on The Catcher in the Rve and asked if I would
be interested in doing some extra reading. Until that
time I had only read what was assigned in school. In
fact, I remember thinking that he was offering me
extra credit. But what he offered was a stack of his
own books that he'd had when he was my age. I didn't
think I would be interested in all this extra
"work." But, always anxious to please the
teacher, I took them.
A strange thing happened as I delved into Harper
Lee and Mark Twain, I constantly thought about Mr.
Thibodaux. What did he think about the story and the
characters? Had he laughed and cried at the same
places I had? I hungrily read everything he suggested
in preparation for the "big moment." That was once a
week when after class he would fold his hands, tilt
his head, and ask, "Well, what have you been
reading?" I had developed a huge crush on him and
this was the only time he spoke to me on any kind of
personal level. Needless to say, I lived for this
moment and was always sure to be well prepared for
the ensuing discussion.
Trish then writes of returning to her high school
after four years— four years of "reading like a madman"—
to visit Mr. Thibodaux. She was shocked at the profound

I
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difference in her earlier impression of his physical
appearance and what she saw now. The prior obsession, she
now realized, was based in a kind of transference love
(though she did not call it that) that her high school
self was unable to disentangle from feelings of romantic
love. Indeed, as discussed earlier, such love cannot be
viewed as in clear distinction.
In private conversation Trish told me that she still
falls in love with good teachers though not with the same
illusions. She was concerned about this and asked me if I
understood— if I did the same thing. She was particularly
distressed over the fact that this most often occurred for
her with her male professors. Reminding her that probably
most of her professors are male I did offer the suggestion
that she give this some thought by writing about it in the
context of her current readings for the class.
Indeed, in her next writing she asked herself the
question, "Why are most of the teachers I loved male?" She
writes:
I don't think that most of the teachers I've
"loved" have to do with that kind of crush/romantic
love as in the case of Mr. Thibodaux. I think that in
my feelings for the good teachers there is a
determinable amount of respect. But in trying to find
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examples of really good female teachers I can only
come up with two . . .
She then initiates an exploration of her different
expectations for male and female teachers with a quote
from Annie Dillard's An American Childhood: "They [boys]
had been learning self-control. We [girls] had failed to
develop any selves worth controlling" (1987, p. 91). Trish
writes:
What a scary, scary passage. Does it really
start that young? How many things must be undone to
expose this conditioning that is begun so early? Is
it possible? I know that this feeling exists in me
and I reject it to the point of meanness. This is not
a good solution! So what can be done about something
that is so prevalent in our society?
Trish's "meanness" is, she discovers, in that her
female teachers must work much harder than her male ones
to win her respect. Female teachers that she had liked as
an elementary and high school student had been likable
because they were "sweet," but all too often this
sweetness was manifested in low expectations for students,
particularly girl students. Trish, it seems, resented this
as she grew older and discovered her own mind. That
resentment resulted in pre-judgment for female teachers,
and a kind of subconscious requirement that they work
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harder now, for atonement. Trish is deeply disturbed at
her own complicity in patriarchy implicit in this
attitude.
I am not suggesting that Trish necessarily came to
some deep psychoanalytic understanding of notions of
desire and transference, nor that this is necessary.
However, I do think it possible that she has been set on a
trajectory of discovery of sorts with her new way of
reading both texts and herself. My own interpretation of
her writing and our conversations is that Trish has
encountered a "surprise of otherness" in her recognition,
through reading and writing, of some of the cultural
foundations of her reactions to male and female teachers,
as well as the possibilities for departures from cultural
"scripts." She has encountered the significance of
otherness not only in her reconstructed perceptions of Mr.
Thibidaux and her female teachers, but also within
herself.

Transformations and difference (past and present).
At the end of the semester Donna (pseudonym) writes:
I've tried and tried to title this writing, but
I just can't find one that is suitable. So, I'll just
jump straight into what I want to say. This is a
combination of me, Donna, trying to explain both to
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myself, and to you, my teacher, what this class has
taught me about "otherness," and how it has changed
my vision of myself as a teacher.
I have always been a very prejudiced person,
although that is something I never would have
admitted, perhaps even to myself, before this course.
My prejudices, although they include racial ones, are
certainly not exclusive to them. I have grown up with
the belief that I was better than "others." "Others,"
in my life, were people who looked different, acted
different, wore the wrong kind of clothes, drove the
wrong car, held the wrong job, had a poor ACT score,
a bad perm, a strange accent. The list is almost
endless. I would certainly never have voiced my
opinion; that would be tacky, cruel. No one that
knows me would ever accuse me of being unkind, stuckup, or even prejudiced. But in my mind, these
feelings lived.
When I made the decision to teach, I began to
see the potential conflict between my desire to be a
good teacher, and the intolerance I felt. In this day
and age, such biases are easy to justify, but I
wasn't fooling myself. This wasn't right, and it
wasn't the person I wanted to be. How could I be a
good teacher, change students' lives, be someone they
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respected and hold on to these beliefs. I couldn't.
The early readings in this course began to give
me something concrete to think about. These things
made sense! As a teacher, it was important for me to
alienate no one, to show no favoritism or bias. All
of these children deserve the best education I could
give them, and I knew that "hiding" my biases would
not work.
Maya Angelou's I Know Whv the Caged Bird Sinas
spoke more directly to my heart. This was a
wonderful, brilliant child. A child with questions
and feelings very much like I would have, had I been
in her situation. But society has not treated me like
it treated her, like it treats so many children. That
was the only real difference between me and Maya. I
read Maya Angelou's book twice; I couldn't get enough
of it the first time. I began to look at the people
around me differently. Why did I have so little
patience with others? Wasn't that why I wanted to
teach, to bring something to someone who did not have
it before? How could I expect everyone to be like me?
They could easily ask the same of me!
I also have had to face up to why this class was
so difficult for me to engage in throughout the
semester. This was trying ground for me to cover, new
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ground. These were questions I had not yet resolved
for myself, and I was hesitant to deal with these
things in a large group of people. However, this
class has gone a long way toward helping me to answer
my questions about myself. I have begun to resolve
the inner struggles that my desire to teach has
generated. I'm glad that I have chosen a future and a
profession that is making me into a better person, a
person that I can respect.
Note: This is the last essay that I actually
wrote. Although it deals with a topic for the first
week, in my mind and heart, it ties together what
this semester has meant to me.
This writing brings to the fore a number of
questions. Was Donna writing just what she thought I
wanted to hear? Of course, I have no way of answering this
definitively, but given the intensity of her writing, to
answer it in the affirmative seems an act of distrust. She
was a very quiet student, as her writing might indicate,
and I had no idea until this time that she felt as she did
about the class. Her grades had all been high as well—
there was no need to attempt to please me on that account.
More importantly for me is the question of how or if
this differs, in result or in apparent goal, from those
"human relations" approaches to, and models for,
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multicultural education that I have criticized and wished
to go beyond.

Certainly, it seems clear that Donna has

experienced a change in attitude toward cultural
differences— the primary stated goal of human relations
multicultural education. But I want to make the argument
that her change has been toward the very idea of
difference, and that this constitutes, for Donna, a new
way of reading— of reading, similar to Trish, for the
surprise of otherness.
This can be discussed by looking at a few key
sentences in her writing. Some of her statements are
problematic in the context of this project. For example
she writes, "But society has not treated me like it
treated her, like it treats so many children. That was the
only real difference between me and Maya." This urge to
collapse very real differences between herself and Angelou
may be a necessary step in her construction of herself,
much like Pinar advises with his thermostatic notion of an
"architecture of the self." We build it according to what
needs attending for the moment. Plans can always be
changed later. Donna's sense of herself as utterly
separate from "others" may need addressing before concerns
about "fusion." That she will stop with this construction
is in no way implied by her particular reading.

Then, in the same paragraph, she writes: "How could I
expect everyone to be like me? They could easily ask the
same of me!" Is this merely a "human relations" gesture? I
think it probably encompasses that but I do not think it
is merely that. Through certain literary works it is
possible for students to learn a new way to read . . .

a

new assemblage is constructed. That is more than mere
change in attitude as it is typically framed in the goals
of "human relations" multicultural curricula— curricula
which sought to generate harmony across difference without
ever interrogating the historical and cultural sources of
genuine conflict. Finally, I am talking about "human
relations." But not about the sort of human relations that
ignores larger contexts of the social, the cultural, the
historical, and the political. My students, in these
examples, I believe, are discovering the ways in which
culture is made at both macro and micro levels. They
discover the fallacy of viewing tradition as a
monocultural commodity rather than a dynamic
transformation produced by encounters between and among
cultures. We are produced not only by what we "do to"
others, but also by their responses to that and vice
versa. To read "tradition" as "common culture" pure and
simple becomes absurd from this perspective.
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It is not my intention to set these examples up as
some sort of "proof" that ideas in this writing have been
tested and found to "work." I believe that, in fact, these
examples are contradictory enough to point to the need for
further study (in terms of possible uses) in the context
of teacher education classrooms. For these same reasons,
although I have many more examples of student
autobiographical writing, I will not include more writings
here. To do so would only serve to dominate the chapter
with embryonic "data," and to undermine my purpose in
writing it.

Conclusion
The self-reflective writing that has been done in and
for my classroom and by myself, as well as the type of
student and teacher work I am suggesting in this study
through theoretical explorations calls for a
reconceptualization of multicultural teacher education and
curriculum. This reconceptualization involves attending to
the historical and current development of cultural studies
as well as to the politics of identity. Literary and
autobiographical studies glimpsed through a cultural
studies lens are interdisciplinary and intertextual. The
approaches I envision and have attempted to describe
operate through awareness of what Geertz has called

"blurred genres" (1983)— another phrase for studies being
approached within and through other disciplines, and
particularly through "textual" approaches. Students
reading and writing about literature in conversation with
self through awareness of social and cultural theory as
well as the philosophical and psychological underpinnings
of such theory are learning to read difference and
otherness at a depth not typically available to students
of multicultural teacher education. This is, indeed, a
tall order. I am not suggesting that the job could be
completed in this class from which I have drawn examples.
To the contrary, it is just a beginning. Such a "liberal"
intellectual approach requires not a course or two on
multicultural education and self-reflective reading and
writing, but an entire curriculum of study in which
educational studies are envisioned as inherently
multicultural, personal and, in significant senses, as a
"liberal arts discipline" (Beyer, Feinberg, Whitson, and
Pagano, 1991). The particular way in which Beyer, et al.
frame their conception of educational studies as liberal
art is indeed interdisciplinary and one which echoes many
of the concerns of cultural studies.

CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion
You are born at the same time with a lot of
other people, all mixed up with them, like
trying to, having to, move your arms and legs
with strings only the same strings are hitched
to all the other arms and legs and the others
all trying and they dont know why either except
that the strings are all in one another's way
like five or six people all trying to make a rug
on the same loom only each one wants to weave
his own pattern into the rug (Faulkner, Absalom.
Absalom!. 1936, p. 127).
This passage seems an apt description of the way
problems get served up in daily living, and those that I
have attempted to explicate in this writing are no
exception. One might feel that such an image is echoed in
poststructuralist theorizing whereby nothing is ever
certain, stable, unified, or closed, but always in some
sort of turbulent process. Particular and engaging
literature presents itself to us somewhere inbetween daily
life and theory. Yet at the same time, "theory is here
often the straight man whose precarious rectitude and
hidden visibility, passion, and pathos are precisely what
literature has somehow already foreseen" (Johnson, B.,
1980, p. xii).
If literature is comedian to theory's straight man,
then poststructuralist theory must surely be a kind of
literature to other kinds of theory.

Through

poststructuralist theory we have been taught the ways in
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which deconstruction can avoid some of the constraints of
dialectical thinking, and how it is possible to let go of
some of the certainty we have sometimes so desperately, so
obsessively, and at times so oppressively clawed after.
Poststructuralist theorizing seem to be looking into (or
listening into?) creating an environment in which living
can be sufficiently playful, loving, adventurous, and so
on. But this theorizing sometimes appears to want to skip
over the step of obliterating overt physically/materially
manifested oppressions— to pretend that they have already
been taken care of, and that we can move on now. At worst
these theories are oblivious to their own conservatism,
caught in denial and repression, presenting no serious
challenge to whatever is.
Structuralist materialist theorizing, on the other
hand, holds another set of potential traps and
contradictions. The primacy of the material that supports
human need— its availability, control, and movement— is a
fundamental presupposition of materialist theories. As
such these theories are logically first and foremost
social class-based theories. What this has meant
historically is that class concerns have been privileged
over others such as race and gender, "because, we are
told, it [class] is more fundamental than any other
interests or forms of social power" (Young, 1990, p. 4) .

As I have labored to explain, any discourse which
polarizes, posing the one as good and the other as evil,
or one as primary and the other as merely secondary, is
suspect in terms of its own capacity for violence and
totalization. Although I make efforts to avoid this, my
discourse is no exception. Most differences, however, are
matters of degree and not matters of distinction. The very
difficulty of avoiding such polarization can be
appreciated, and degrees of failure forgiven, once we
glimpse the dazzling complexity of human (and other)
existence and relationships. Hence, I must say,
materialism as an informing system cannot be ignored in
this circuit. Indeed, contradictions among "the ruling
class" over issues of culture in the present configuration
are material (structural) as well as psychosocial or
discursive. For example, with well known demographic
trends toward a "majority minority," manifestations of a
fear of falling from the center (fears of, primarily,
white male academics) are often operating in direct
opposition to corporate movements in their visions of
future marketing and employment needs. In this respect it
could be that "capitalism, out of self-interest, [will]
facilitate our entrance into a new stage of race
relations" (Martinez, 1991, p. 130). However, it is
difficult to predict what shape this "stage" may take
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given the still strongly entrenched underlying ideological
construction of white supremacy.
This is where educational institutions might be able
to provide critical intervention. However, the sort of
intervention I envision— one which seriously interrogates
the politics of identity and culture— is difficult to
impossible if the discourse of white supremacy is allowed
to remain invisible and extra-topical in academic debates.
This discourse plays itself out in many particular ways
and forms: popular culture and media, policies of the
state, institutional practices, academic theories, and so
on. All of these discursive forms contribute to the
psychosocial climate that produces subjectivities and
notions of identity. Such a discursive field also takes
particular shapes and textures according to the particular
cultural ecologies in which it is functioning. Educational
interventions that do not take such particularities into
account amount to a kind of intellectual tourism (Roman,
cited in McCarthy 1988b)— tourism that is unable to
challenge dominant ideologies of white supremacy and
patriarchy.
Intellectual tourism results when scholars refuse to
figure particular cultural forms, subjectivities, and
agencies into their theoretical formulations and, rather,
to subsume all of these under singular, totalizing social

theories such as with liberal and radical theories of
social class, as well as conservative and neo-conservative
theories of cultural deprivation (McCarthy, 1988b). Within
such a paradigm "third world" subjects become objects as
do marginalized groups in the "first world." Likewise, one
can learn to read like a tourist (as do students within
such systems)— a learned illiteracy— reading oneself into
everything, one-way translation that reads others only
through the lenses of a singularly conceptualized,
dominant culture, reading that literally precedes itself
in exotic fantasizing. I mean by "precedes itself" that it
is pre-figured; (re)interpretation is unnecessary. It is
the type of reading Mariah and her husband did of Lucy (in
Kincaid's Lucy) whereby Lucy's pedagogical attitude was
interpreted as her way of expressing to them what a "hard
life" she (and "her people") had had.
My own efforts here and in my classroom are to expose
that "will to ignore" that leads to critical illiteracy so
that a new condition of reading is possible. This is
reading that discloses to the reader her or his own desire
to ignore, to repress, to seek "bottom line" closure
everywhere. Once again, it is reading that "encounters and
propagates the surprise of otherness" (Johnson, B., 1987,
p. 15). Reading for the surprise of otherness, like
identity formation across Taubman's three registers, is

244
always reading via someone/something else. This someone
else is not only, in part, other than the reader, it is
also, in part, other than the author. It is translation
without a master.
Like the impossibility of escaping the metaphysics of
presence, this goal or outcome, is unrealizable in any
absolute sense. The process of working toward this is what
is significant. However, process does not imply method. As
Johnson explains, "No methodology can be relied on to
generate surprise. On the contrary, it is usually surprise
that engenders methodology" (p. 15). This "literacy of the
imagination" (Harris, 1989) is a literacy that does not
answer to the notion of an "excellence" (in education)
that exists above and apart from notions of "equity." It
is, I believe, a move toward the same literacy that
Whitson refers to when he writes, "the point is that
literacy requires the dialogue that bigotry prevents, so
that the bigot is and must be a bad reader" (1988, p.
294). One cannot "see" (or hear) the familiar until it is
made strange. Western culture is best understood in the
context of studies of other cultures, including the ways
in which these cultures encounter and transform one
another. And this reading of the world necessarily takes
place in the context of reading the self.

I
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Cultural Studies Toward a Politics of Identity
Literature and Identity
"Listening to the non-synchronous voices from the
periphery," (McCarthy, 1988b, p. 17) Faulkner's gaze might
become Ellison's (musical) hearing. Theoretical voices
from the periphery are still grossly under-represented,
even in the literature of cultural studies. Even when
theory written by the marginalized has been included it
has been highly derivative of Anglo or European theory.
For example, no one would guess from Stuart Hall's earlier
work that he is an African-Caribbean immigrant to England.
More often, voices from the periphery that generate "otic"
theories— theories of listening— are literary voices. The
gazing "ocular" "abstractions of western sociology . . .
that negate the specific histories of third world people"
(p. 18) and other marginalized groups demand a response
that only a "literature of resistance" (p. 18) can
provide. McCarthy offers an eloquent plea:
I argue for a genuine, interdisciplinary
encounter between third world and New World
literature and popular cultural forms and Old
World derived sociology of education as the
basis of an alternative radical discourse that
would render audible the heterogeneous voices of
oppressed raced, classed, and gendered third
world subjects (p. 18).
The power of such literature becomes most evident
when measured next to the stridency and shrillness of
conservative attacks against it— attacks intended to
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conserve what is thought to be western cultural tradition
as embodied in canonical literature. When cultural studies
scholars insist to traditionalists ("canonizers") that
they do not wish to eliminate canonical works,
traditionalist arguments proceed through a different tack.
What was the a-historical becomes the anti-historical.
Literature becomes canonized presumably because it is
great as proven, in part, by "the test of time." It is
great and enduring, so the argument often goes, because it
contains universal truths— verities. But "universal
truths" or values are hard to pin down because the
contexts in which these texts are read is ever-shifting.
To assert the existence of universal truths is to assert a
kind of final interpretation— an a-historical stance.
Currently, in critiques of multiculturalism,
traditionalists are frequently going further than just to
say the "great works"

should always be taught. Now they

are more insistent about the way they should be taught.
Particular readings of canonical texts that take into
consideration social/historical contexts that may include
uncovering racism or sexism for example, are under attack
for "reducing literature to 'ideology'" (Berube, 1991, p.
37). Complaints about "ideological" readings of texts are
often really complaints about historical readings. It is
in this sense that what was the ahistorical becomes now

I
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the anti-historical. So who, Berube asks, is being
reductive?
In these debates attacks against "political
correctness" are often veiled attacks against cultural
studies as well as exhibitions of profound insecurities
over national identity. "Multiculturalists," cultural
studies scholars, the so-called politically correct, do
need to pay attention to these expressions of fear and
desire. The Left academics, some of whom are scholars of
the politics of culture, who are accused of this
intolerance, have been steadily losing advocates because
of a failure to acknowledge particular problems of
identity— perhaps especially those problems of the
autobiographical register (in spite of the fact the
ostensible arguments are over national identity). People
who might wish to be social activists but feel
demoralized, in need of emotional support at a time when
there are few social rewards for activism, have been
accused of being self-indulgent. Consequently, support
groups with names like "adult children" or "recovering
addicts" are getting the commitments from people who might
otherwise be peace or civil rights activists, for example
(Herman, 1991, pp. 42-46). "No one, of course, should have
to make the impossible choice between personal and social
change" (p. 46).

The problems with this move to embrace psychological
health to the exclusion of commitment to social health are
obvious. Once again, identity is "lived" as if it operates
out of a single register, only this way it is the
autobiographical rather than the communal. The fallacy of
such a uni-dimensional approach to identity is evident,
for example, in the ways in which some psychological
practitioners have historically supported politically
repressive goals through such moves as offering
"incontrovertible evidence of homosexual psychopathology,
and design[ing] propaganda to efficiently destroy radical
organizations" (p. 46). Clearly, when identity problems
are relinquished to such practitioners the social and
political problems are multiplied. As Herman suggests,
progressive change is predicated on rejection of "the
dualism between internal and external transformation" (p.
46). A politics of culture and identity approached through
literature can perhaps provide a reparation.
The anxiety over "eternal truths" in canonical
literature could be read as a search for a kind of
consolation. Italo Calvino wrote in The Uses of Literature
of the fallacy of seeing literature merely as
an assortment of eternal human sentiments, as
the truth of a human language that politics
tends to overlook. . . . Behind this way of
thinking is the notion of a set of established
values that literature is responsible for
preserving, the classical and immobile idea of
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literature as the depository of a given truth.
If it agrees to take on this role, literature
confines itself to a function of consolation,
preservation, and regression (cited in Goodman,
1991, p. 124).
Calvino offers an alternative way to view literature. It
becomes most useful
when it gives a voice to whatever is without a
voice, when it gives a name to what as yet has
no name, especially to what the language of
politics excludes or attempts to exclude (p.
124) .
Voices from the periphery, to be heard, require a cultural
studies of listening, an "otic" theory. For me, good
literature is written work which engages readers by
appealing to similarities at the same time it provides
glimpses at and avenues of escape into difference,
marginality, otherness. To do this literature itself has
to listen. Literature, then, often begins in the mundane
but takes a "line of flight," in Deleuze's sense of that
phrase, out of the mundane. It is a frontier of sorts
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1987, pp. 36-51).

Autobiography and Identity
But what about the "ocular" character of
autobiography whereby a "specular structure" presents
itself the moment a writer "declares himself the subject
of his own understanding" (de Man cited in Smith, 1988, p.
103)? Specular is as self-reflection— reflection that can
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be trapped in infinite regress, a hall of mirrors. How is
this reconciled to the call for theorizing that undermines
"the gaze?" Self gazing upon self gives way to listening
as soon as that self recognizes its own division, its
relational necessity, its very definition in dynamic
relationality, and its (non-neurotic) instability. It is
difficult to see something that always moves away, but
movement is essential for creating sound, for hearing.
With autobiography that asserts itself only in relation
(in relation to margins), particular, regional and
repressed histories can be recovered as they are with
literature of the margins.
The self that is not in mastery of itself (or of
anyone) recognizes its own division. That division is, in
part, about race. As Deleuze and Guattari remind us,
there is no race but inferior, minoritarian,
there is no dominant race, a race is not defined
by its purity but rather by the impurity
conferred upon it by a system of domination.
Bastard and mixed blood are the true names of
race (1990, p. 12).
Susie Phipps has heard this story. Recall what Paul Smith
writes about paranoia: "the 'subject' thus endows the
external world with what it takes to be its own worst
tendencies and qualities" (1988, p. 95). The "subject"
projects its own pessimistic inner concoctions onto the
world it "sees." Theories of the visual are analogous to
the paranoid— a kind of "metaparanoia11 (p. 97) . As in
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Faulkner's Rosa and Ellison's Brotherhood, and as Halpin
points out (1990), those ocular theories (theorists)
presume to see all but believe that they themselves cannot
be seen and indeed work to cover over their own
visibility. Within this "metaparanoia," "The division of
the 'subject' (the division it makes and the division it
is) is thus hidden for the purposes of a mastery" (p. 97,
italics added).
That instability that is "self," that is not
neurotic, not divided against itself, can be "seen"
through a new "vision" of a non-visual approach to
theorizing. Literature and autobiography are crucial to
that project. Because the exhilaration and significance of
reading/writing and writing/reading literature lie
somewhere between the tentative naming of oneself and
plunging into difference, I encourage students and
teachers to think about directing their writing toward
such "discoveries" (inventions?).
The stories we create about ourselves are, in part,
what determines our perceptions of ourselves and, as such,
influence what we become to ourselves and others. The self
is constructed by the writing, but not as a static, final
self. Rather, it becomes a self-in-motion, reading and
writing in such a way as to recognize the fictional,
communal, and autobiographical registers of identity as
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interpenetrating and deconstructing one another. Yet, the
larger questions for this study have become: What is a
better way to come to "know" difference, both cultural and
individual? How can we work to understand both cultural
and individual difference both intra- and inter
sub jectively?
Many argue that the best way to understand cultural
difference is through immersion. But even were this to be
a possible, practical, approach for (multicultural)
teacher education, it still requires of the participant a
suspension of resistance to difference that living within
a different culture does not necessarily insure. Certain
literary works can provide a kind of "practical"
immersion, while autobiographical work done alongside
literary readings can serve as a medium for suspending
resistance to difference by placing the self positively
within that difference, as in the case, for example, of my
student, Donna. At the same time, readings from the
cultural studies traditions can provide the tools for
deepening such an approach, for thinking through social,
cultural and literary theories as they inform intertextual readings of literary works of different times and
cultures, and thereby remind us of the truly multi
cultural encounters that create and sustain us.
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Final Remarks
It is clear that British Cultural Studies holds no
monopoly on those ideas that inspired and sustained it,
such as the ideas of studies that challenge disciplinary
boundaries and that dare to work from the academic margins
in order to avoid appropriation by the dominant political
order(s). Many disciplines of the traditional liberal arts
and social sciences are increasingly viewing themselves as
actors through such scholarly approaches— for example, in
anthropology Geertz proclaims the necessary acknowledgment
of "blurred genres" (1983); in philosophy, post
structuralists proclaim the primacy of literary texts as
philosophical texts (e.g., Guattari, 1990); literature,
philosophy and autobiography are bound together for the
purpose of psychotherapy (White & Epston, 1990); and these
same elements are employed in the service of
historiography (Portelli, 1991). Nevertheless, "cultural
studies" as a movement that provided much of the early
labor for these others must be acknowledged and their
struggles remembered lest the difficulties be
unnecessarily repeated. Its history and labors have as yet
informed the work of multicultural education scholars only
marginally. It is as though we have believed that our
teacher education students cannot be troubled with such a
heavy intellectual burden. Such a belief is not justified
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by my own experiences through approaches described in this
study— approaches that have now been shared with both
undergraduate and graduate students of education.
However, a difficulty remains for me with the
autobiographical work over which there must never be
complacency. The fact that many students may respond to
autobiographical assignments with such an intensity as to
indicate that they want, indeed are hungry, to tell their
tales does not absolve me of the responsibility of
questioning my rights to ask for them and my ways of
asking for them. People often want what is not in their
best interests, as is so often exemplified by economically
deprived parents of children attending economically
deprived schools who insist that they want for their
children lock-step, rote and "discipline." The question of
whether or not to proceed this way comes back to me always
as an uneasy one at best. With Grumet I feel that:
if my work permits the teachers I work with to
examine their own work with a seeing that is
more inclusive, that surveys an ever widening
surround, that is a search I would gladly join.
But if my work certifies me as an agent of the
state to peer into what is hidden from public
view, if it is my look that discovers and
appraises, then I might as well approach the
classroom with bloodhound as well as briefcase,
and they ought to demand to see my warrant
before they let me in (1991, p. 71).
Finally, I cannot justify what I do beyond what I see (or
think I see), and have attempted to describe and explain
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here, as a growth of love. And I write this word (love) in
hopes that it will not be read as a regressively
sentimental idea, full of sweetness and harmony, but
rather in the context of the ways it has been written and
thought in earlier chapters.
Finally, it is love that brings together literature,
marginality, and curriculum. As Daignault pointed out
(1989) to me (and as I later found for myself with
excursions through English language etymological
dictionaries), the Latin infinitive for religion,
religere, means to re-read and to care. (Negligere is its
Latin opposite and means negligence). Curare, different
but similar in sound and spelling to currere, also means
to care. Cultus (culture) means care; worship. And love is
related in my own text to both care and to religion (in
the sense of spirituality) as well as desire. "Leave is
the offspring of yet another Indo-European root, leubh'to care, to desire; to love'" (Partridge, 1982, p. 189).
And this leaves us with crisis, Greek

krisis (a

separating, decision, discrimination); Latin

discrimen

(interval, intervening space, turning point, difference,
risk). The risk of loving— caring, deciding,
discriminating, and finally leaving (in any number of
senses)— is common to the educational enterprise and to
literature. And it is living in the midst of this risk
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(crisis) that marks the margins in all its layers. I leave
you with this.
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